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Christopher Peacocke

Biographic Data

ID1007703
NAMEChristopher Peacocke
GIVEN NAMESChristopher
FAMILY NAMEPeacocke
SIGNATUREPEACOCKE C
AFFILIATIONSColumbia University
ORCID0000-0002-8372-7373
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS67
TOTAL CITATIONS99
AUTHOR COUNT66
EDITOR COUNT1
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1976
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2024
H-INDEX6
  • The Soul in Sound: The Nature of Musical Consciousness / Norms and Realism

    Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•L’annuaire du Collège de France•2024

    The Soul in Sound: The Nature of Musical ConsciousnessConférence 1 − What Can be Heard in the Music: What, Why, and HowThis non-technical lecture applied the resources of philosophy in order to explain various phenomena of musical perception. I distinguished three ways in which emotions and modalities of action can be involved in the perception of music. The proper characterization of each of these leads to a general principle concerning the dist…

  • David Wiggins: A Personal Philosophical Memoir

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophy•2022

    My first encounter with David Wiggins’ thought occurred a few weeks before I took my undergraduate final examinations in Oxford in 1971. In Blackwell's Bookshop I came across a slim blue volume Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity . I purchased it and read it cover-to-cover the same day. It was immediately clear that this was contemporary writing in a different league from anything I had previously read on the topic

  • Précis of The Primacy of Metaphysics

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophical Studies•2021

  • What is involved in the primacy of metaphysics

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophical Studies•2021

  • The Distinctive Character of Musical Experience

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•The British Journal of Aesthetics•2020•Cited by: 1

    The goal of this paper is to use the dual resources of the contemporary theory of intentional content and the notion of experiencing something metaphorically as something else, which I have defended in my earlier work, to explain the distinctive character of musical experience. These resources are used to explain Felix Mendelssohn's point that emotional content in music can be more specific than anything capturable in language; to give an account…

  • The Primacy of Metaphysics

    Christopher Peacocke•BOOK•Primacy of Metaphysics•2019

    Is the metaphysics of a domain prior in the order of philosophical explanation to a theory of intentional contents and meanings about that domain? Or is the opposite true? This book argues from the nature of meaning and intentional content to the conclusion that content and meaning are never prior to the metaphysics. For every domain, either a metaphysics-first view or a no-priority view is correct. Metaphysics-first views are developed for sever…

  • Is Kant's I think Unique

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2019•References: 1

  • Primacy of Metaphysics

    Christopher Peacocke•BOOK•Primacy of Metaphysics•2019

  • Perception, Biology, Action, and Knowledge

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2014•Cited by: 1

  • The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness

    Christopher Peacocke•BOOK•Mirror of the World•2014•Cited by: 14

    Christopher Peacocke presents a new theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation. He identifies three sorts of self-consciousness - perspectival, reflective, and interpersonal - and argues that they are key to explaining features of our knowledge, social relations, and emotional lives

  • Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness

    Christopher Peacocke•BOOK•Mirror of the World•2014

    Christopher Peacocke presents a philosophical theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation of such a subject of consciousness. He develops a new treatment of subjects, distinct from previous theories, under which subjects were regarded either as constructs from mental events, or fundamentally embodied, or Cartesian egos. In contrast, his theory of the first person integrates with the pos…

  • First Person Illusions: Are They Descartes’, or Kant's

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophical Perspectives•2012•References: 5

  • Understanding, Modality, Logical Operators

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2010•Cited by: 1

  • Music and Experiencing Metaphorically-As: Further Delineation

    Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•The British Journal of Aesthetics•2010•Cited by: 1

    Journal Article Music and Experiencing Metaphorically-As: Further Delineation Get access Christopher Peacocke Christopher Peacocke Columbia University, New York, and University College, London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 50, Issue 2, April 2010, Pages 189–191, https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayq005 Published: 01 April 2010

  • Means and Explanation in Epistemology

    Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2009

    Journal Article Means and Explanation in Epistemology Get access The Possibility of Knowledge. Quassim Cassam, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. x + 234. Price £32.00.) Christopher Peacocke Christopher Peacocke Columbia University, New York, & University College, London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 59, Issue 237, October 2009, Pages 730–737, https://doi.org/…

  • Perception, Content and Rationality

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2009•Cited by: 1

    Anil Gupta’s Empiricism and Experience is a stylish and stimulating contribution to our subject. My expectation is that those who disagree with some of its central theses will, like me, learn greatly from thinking through where and why they part company with Gupta’s lucidly presented position. For the purposes of a Symposium, I select three points of disagreement. Each point in one way or another concerns the epistemic role of the content of expe…

  • Experiencing Metaphorically-As in Music Perception: Clarifications and Commitments

    Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•The British Journal of Aesthetics•2009

    I will organize my response to these welcome and very incisive commentaries around the series of questions they raise. Paul Snowdon very reasonably asks for more explanation of what experiencing metaphorically-as amounts to. As he surmises, I would not want to say that some general notion of metaphor enters the content of any experience in which something is perceived metaphorically-as something else. To experience something metaphorically-as som…

  • The Perception of Music: Sources of Significance

    Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•The British Journal of Aesthetics•2009•Cited by: 4

    Representing one thing metaphorically-as something else is something that can occur in thought, imagination or perception. When a piece of music is heard as expressing some property F, some feature of the music is heard metaphorically-as F. The metaphor is exploited in the perception, rather than being represented. This account is developed and deployed to address some classical issues about music, including Wagner's point that the emotions expre…

  • Truly understood

    Christopher Peacocke•BOOK•Truly understood•2008

  • Rationale and Maxims in the Study of Concepts

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Noûs•2005

  • Interrelations: Concepts, Knowledge, Reference and Structure

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Mind & Language•2004

    This paper has five theses, which are intended to address the claims in Jerry Fodor's paper. (1) The question arises of the relation between the philosophical theory of concepts and epistemology. Neither is explanatorily prior to the other. Rather, each relies implicitly on distinctions drawn from the other. To explain what makes something knowledge, we need distinctions drawn from the theory of concepts. To explain the attitudes mentioned in a t…

  • Realm of Reason

    Christopher Peacocke•BOOK•REALM OF REASON.•2004

  • The Realm of Reason

    Christopher Peacocke•BOOK•REALM OF REASON.•2003

    In his The Realm of Reason, the author proposes a theory that states the conditions under which a thinker can be said to be entitled to form a given belief. The author's ‘Generalised Rationalism’ is based on three principles of rationalism, each framed as a claim about the relation of entitlement. The theory is rationalist in that it holds, against empiricism, that some entitlements are a priori, i.e. justified independently of experience; it is …

  • Logic, Thought and Language

    Open Access•R M Sainsbury, Gregory Mcculloch et al.•BOOK•Logic, Thought and Language•2002

    Much contemporary philosophical debate centres on the topics of logic, thought and language, and on the connections between these topics. This collection of articles is based on the Royal Institute of Philosophy's annual lecture series for 2000–2001. Its contributors include a number of those working at the forefront of the field, and in their papers they reflect their own current pre-occupations. As such, the volume will be of interest to all ph…

  • Précis of Being Known

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2002

Next
  • The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness

    Christopher Peacocke•BOOK•Mirror of the World•2014•Cited by: 14

    Christopher Peacocke presents a new theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation. He identifies three sorts of self-consciousness - perspectival, reflective, and interpersonal - and argues that they are key to explaining features of our knowledge, social relations, and emotional lives

  • Demonstrative thought and psychological explanation

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Synthese•1981•Cited by: 14•References: 6

  • Nonconceptual Content Defended

    Christopher Peacocke, John Mcdowell•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1998•Cited by: 13

  • Colour concepts and colour experience

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Synthese•1984•Cited by: 12

  • Depiction

    Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1987•Cited by: 11

  • Thoughts: An Essay on Content

    Graeme Forbes, Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1988•Cited by: 8

  • Are vague predicates incoherent

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Synthese•1981•Cited by: 6•References: 1

  • The Perception of Music: Sources of Significance

    Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•The British Journal of Aesthetics•2009•Cited by: 4

    Representing one thing metaphorically-as something else is something that can occur in thought, imagination or perception. When a piece of music is heard as expressing some property F, some feature of the music is heard metaphorically-as F. The metaphor is exploited in the perception, rather than being represented. This account is developed and deployed to address some classical issues about music, including Wagner's point that the emotions expre…

  • The Principle‐Based Account of Modality: Elucidations and Resources

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2002•Cited by: 2

  • Precis of A Study of Concepts

    Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1996•Cited by: 2

  • Discussion of Christopher Peacocke's A Study of Concepts

    David Papineau, Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1996•Cited by: 2•References: 2

  • The Limits of Intelligibility: A Post-Verificationist Proposal

    Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1988•Cited by: 2

    A nyone who is not a verificationist faces a dilemma. When we I X are presented with certain distinctions, we are inclined to say they are spurious. Yet the only principles which initially come to mind to justify such a verdict of spuriousness are verificationist principles; and, for the non-verificationist, verificationist principles rule out far too much. This dilemma is of a general form which allows it to arise in several diverse areas. My ai…

  • The Distinctive Character of Musical Experience

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•The British Journal of Aesthetics•2020•Cited by: 1

    The goal of this paper is to use the dual resources of the contemporary theory of intentional content and the notion of experiencing something metaphorically as something else, which I have defended in my earlier work, to explain the distinctive character of musical experience. These resources are used to explain Felix Mendelssohn's point that emotional content in music can be more specific than anything capturable in language; to give an account…

  • Perception, Biology, Action, and Knowledge

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2014•Cited by: 1

  • Understanding, Modality, Logical Operators

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2010•Cited by: 1

  • Music and Experiencing Metaphorically-As: Further Delineation

    Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•The British Journal of Aesthetics•2010•Cited by: 1

    Journal Article Music and Experiencing Metaphorically-As: Further Delineation Get access Christopher Peacocke Christopher Peacocke Columbia University, New York, and University College, London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 50, Issue 2, April 2010, Pages 189–191, https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayq005 Published: 01 April 2010

  • Perception, Content and Rationality

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2009•Cited by: 1

    Anil Gupta’s Empiricism and Experience is a stylish and stimulating contribution to our subject. My expectation is that those who disagree with some of its central theses will, like me, learn greatly from thinking through where and why they part company with Gupta’s lucidly presented position. For the purposes of a Symposium, I select three points of disagreement. Each point in one way or another concerns the epistemic role of the content of expe…

  • Can Possession Conditions Individuate Concepts

    Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1996•Cited by: 1•References: 2

    There are issues in the theory of concepts about which A Study of Concepts could have said more. There are also some issues about which it would have done well to say something different. The commentators in this symposium have successfully identified a series of issues of one or other of these two kinds, and I am very grateful for their thought and detailed attention. I have learned from reflection on their comments, and I take this opportunity …

  • The View from Nowhere

    Christopher Peacocke•REVIEW•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1988•Cited by: 1

  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

    Christopher Peacocke•REVIEW•The Philosophical Review•1984•Cited by: 1

  • The Identities of Persons

    Christopher Peacocke, Amelie Oksenberg Rorty•REVIEW•The Philosophical Review•1978•Cited by: 1

    Introduction, by Amelie O. Rorty 1. Survival and Identity, by David Lewis 2. Survival, by Georges Ray 3. The Importance of Being Identical, by John Perry 4. Lewis, Perry, and What Matters, by Derek Parfit 5. Embodiment and Behavior, by Sydney Shoemaker 6. Lock, Butler, and the Stream of Consciousness: And Men as Natural Kind, by David Wiggins 7. Conditions of Personhood, by Daniel Dennett 8. Persons, Character, and Morality by Bernard Williams 9.…

  • What is a Logical Constant?

    Christopher Peacocke, Inc The Journal Of Philosophy•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•1976

  • The Identities of Persons

    Christopher Peacocke, Amelie Oksenberg Rorty•REVIEW•The Philosophical Review•1978•Cited by: 1

    Introduction, by Amelie O. Rorty 1. Survival and Identity, by David Lewis 2. Survival, by Georges Ray 3. The Importance of Being Identical, by John Perry 4. Lewis, Perry, and What Matters, by Derek Parfit 5. Embodiment and Behavior, by Sydney Shoemaker 6. Lock, Butler, and the Stream of Consciousness: And Men as Natural Kind, by David Wiggins 7. Conditions of Personhood, by Daniel Dennett 8. Persons, Character, and Morality by Bernard Williams 9.…

  • Are vague predicates incoherent

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Synthese•1981•Cited by: 6•References: 1

  • Demonstrative thought and psychological explanation

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Synthese•1981•Cited by: 14•References: 6

  • Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation

    Susan Haack, Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1981

    Journal Article Book Review Get access Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation. By Christopher Peacocks. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979. Pp. vi + 219. Price £9.00) Susan Haack Susan Haack Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 31, Issue 124, July 1981, Pages 273–274, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219119 Published: 01 July 1981

  • Wittgenstein and Experience

    Christopher Peacocke, Ludwig Wittgenstein et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1982

    Journal Article Wittgenstein and Experience Get access Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. (Volume I ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe. Volume I I ed. G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, tr. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue.)Oxford: Blackwell, 1980. Pp. vi + 198 + 218, 121 + 144. Price £16.50, £15.50 Christopher Peacocke Christopher Peacocke New College, Oxford Search for other works by thi…

  • Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and Their Relations

    Christopher Peacocke•BOOK•Sense and Content•1984

  • Consciousness and Other Minds

    Christopher Peacocke, Colin Mcginn•ARTICLE•Aristotelian Society Supplementary…•1984

    Christopher Peacocke, Colin McGinn; Consciousness and Other Minds, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 58, Issue 1, 1 July 1984, Pages 97–138

  • Colour concepts and colour experience

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Synthese•1984•Cited by: 12

  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

    Christopher Peacocke•REVIEW•The Philosophical Review•1984•Cited by: 1

  • The Inaugural Address: Analogue Content

    Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Aristotelian Society Supplementary…•1986

    Journal Article The Inaugural Address: Analogue Content Get access Christopher Peacocke Christopher Peacocke Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 60, Issue 1, 1 July 1986, Pages 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/60.1.1 Published: 26 June 2015

  • Reply to Michael Smith

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Synthese•1986

  • Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind

    Christopher Peacocke•REVIEW•The Philosophical Review•1986

  • Sense and Content

    John Campbell, Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1986

  • Qué determina las condiciones de verdad

    Open Access•Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Critica•1987

    In this paper a question is asked about what the relation is between the acceptance conditions of what is believed and the conditions for what is believed to determine the truth value true. By an "acceptance condition" of a given content, it is meant a correct statement of a normative condition concerning that content, and it is argued in support of the conjeture that there is a conception of a content's acceptance conditions on which those accep…

  • Depiction

    Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1987•Cited by: 11

  • The Limits of Intelligibility: A Post-Verificationist Proposal

    Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1988•Cited by: 2

    A nyone who is not a verificationist faces a dilemma. When we I X are presented with certain distinctions, we are inclined to say they are spurious. Yet the only principles which initially come to mind to justify such a verdict of spuriousness are verificationist principles; and, for the non-verificationist, verificationist principles rule out far too much. This dilemma is of a general form which allows it to arise in several diverse areas. My ai…

  • The View from Nowhere

    Christopher Peacocke•REVIEW•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1988•Cited by: 1

  • Thoughts: An Essay on Content

    Graeme Forbes, Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1988•Cited by: 8

  • No Resting Place: A Critical Notice of the View from Nowhere

    Christopher Peacocke, Thomas Nagel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1989

  • Thoughts: An Essay on Content

    Anthony Appiah, Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1989

  • The Metaphysics of Concepts

    Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Mind•1991

    Journal Article The Metaphysics of Concepts Get access CHRISTOPHER PEACOCKE CHRISTOPHER PEACOCKE 1Magdalen College Oxford 0X1 4AU Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume C, Issue 400, 1 October 1991, Pages 525–546, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/C.400.525 Published: 01 October 1991

  • A Study of Concepts

    Christopher Peacocke•BOOK•A Study of Concepts•1992

    This book provides a detailed, systematic, and accessible introduction to an original philosophical theory of concepts that Christopher Peacocke has developed in recent years to explain facts about the nature of thought, including its systematic character, its relations to truth and reference, and its normative dimension. Philosophers from Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein to the recent realists and antirealists have sought to answer the question, Wha…

  • A Moderate Mentalism

    Christopher Peacocke•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1992

    Hilary Putnam's attack on the extreme doctrine he calls mentalism seems to me completely successful. But the attack leaves open certain questions. On a better account of concepts than is given by an extreme mentalism, what is the relation between concept possession and a scientific psychology? On a better account, does the description of a thinker as possessing a given concept amount to a partial specification of a computational mechanism? And if…

  • Proof and Truth

    Christopher Peacocke•CHAPTER•Reality, representation, and…•1993

    How does a proof succeed in establishing the truth of its conclusion? Why are the steps of the proof justified? And how are truth, proof, and justification related to the meaning of the sentence proved? I will be addressing some aspects of these perennially intriguing questions.

Philosophy (58 works) · Epistemology (56 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (22 works) · Computer Science (22 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (22 works) · Psychology (21 works) · Philosophy (18 works) · Mathematics (16 works) · Metaphysics (15 works) · Analytic philosophy (14 works)

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