Mikkel Gerken
Biographic Data
| ID | 1013446 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mikkel Gerken |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mikkel |
| FAMILY NAME | Gerken |
| SIGNATURE | GERKEN M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Southern Denmark |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0266-9838 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 23 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 72 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 22 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Purism and conservatism
In this response to Kate Nolfi's comments on On Folk Epistemology, I defend the book's arguments in favor of strict purist invariantism and against pragmatic encroachment. I first defend the negative Argument Argument against pragmatic encroachment by arguing that Nolfi's ingenious cases do not compromise it or my heuristic proxy/directive force account of practical factor effects. Second, I consider Nolfi's suggestion to amend the book's three m…
Précis of on folk epistemology
In this précis of On Folk Epistemology, I briefly outline some of the book's main substantive theses that the symposiasts discuss. Moreover, I sketch the book's methodology for addressing the relationship between folk epistemology and epistemological theorizing
Stability and cognitive architecture
In this response to Edouard Machery's comments on On Folk Epistemology, I address his methodological challenges, the first of which concerns cross-cultural and interpersonal instability of case judgments. Whereas I agree with Machery about the importance of not going too quickly from folk epistemological judgments to epistemological theory, I argue against skepticism about such judgments. Machery's second challenge concerns my bias account of pat…
The scope of epistemic focal bias
In this response to Michael Blome-Tillmann's comments on On Folk Epistemology, I defend the book's epistemic focal bias account of the salient alternatives effect that Blome-Tillmann takes to motivate epistemic contextualism. First, I defend the epistemic focal bias account against Blome-Tillmann's criticism that it is insufficiently general insofar as it fails to account for a range of cases. Second, I defend the epistemic focal bias account fro…
Scientific values and value-based science reporting
On the assumption that science communication is a part of the scientific practice and enterprise, I critically assess a highly influential science communication strategy, Value-Based Reporting , from the perspective of philosophy of science. On the basis of the critical assessment, I motivate an alternative positive approach, Justification Reporting which aligns better with the norms and values of science. In conclusion, I consider integrations b…
Scientific Contributions and Scientific Authorship
Assessing the Evidence for Outcome Bias and Hindsight Bias
Frontloading and the Necessary A Posteriori
In this paper, I reevaluate Kripke’s arguments for the necessary a posteriori contra a Kantian pure modal rationalism according to which modal cognition is a priori. I argue that Kripke’s critique of Kant suggests an impure but nevertheless ambitious modal rationalism according to which the basis of modal cognition remains a priori. I then argue that Kripke’s critique of pure modal rationalism does not go deep enough. More specifically, I argue t…
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
A transcendental argument from testimonial knowledge to content externalism
1: Introduction. Broadly characterized, transcendental arguments are arguments for a substantive conclusion, X, by way of an argument that it is a necessary condition for the possibility of some general principle or phenomenon, Y We may call Y the evident phenomenon' since it is often taken to be knowable a priori or, less ambitiously, by philosophical reflection. Since Kant's Refutation of Idealism, anti-skeptical transcendental arguments have b…
Salient Alternatives in Perspective
This paper empirically investigates how perspective bears on putative salient alternative effects on knowledge ascriptions. Some theoretical accounts predict salient alternative effects in both first- and third-person perspective conditions. These include semantic accounts such as contextualism [Lewis 1996 Lewis, D. 1996. Elusive Knowledge, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74/4: 549–67. doi: 10.1080/00048409612347521[Taylor & Francis Online], […
Public scientific testimony in the scientific image
Truth‐Sensitivity and Folk Epistemology
Several studies have found a robust effect of truth on epistemic evaluation of belief, decision, action and assertion. Thus, truth has a significant effect on normative participant evaluations. Some theorists take this truth effect to motivate factive epistemic norms of belief, action, assertion etc. In contrast, I argue that the truth effect is best understood as an epistemic instance of the familiar and ubiquitous phenomenon of outcome bias . I…
On Folk Epistemology
On Folk Epistemology is a book about how we ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. Empirical evidence suggests that we do so early and often in thought as well as in talk. Since such knowledge ascriptions are central to how we navigate social life, it is important to understand our basis for making them. A central claim of the book is that factors that have nothing to do with knowledge may lead to systematic mistakes in everyday ascriptions o…
Coda
The brief Coda considers the key conclusions and methodology as a general framework for the study of folk epistemology. In particular, it highlights how the study of folk epistemology simultaneously requires and contributes to epistemological theorizing. Moreover, it briefly considers how our folk epistemological practices may yield distinctive forms of epistemic injustice . For example, it is hypothesized that our ordinary knowledge ascriptions …
The Epistemic Norms of Intra-Scientific Testimony
What is the epistemic position that a scientist must be in vis-à-vis a proposition, p, to be in a good enough epistemic position to assert that p to a fellow scientist within the scientific process? My aim is to provide an answer to this question and, more generally, to connect the epistemological debates about the epistemic norms of assertion to the debates about the nature of the scientific process. The question is important because science is …
How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions
Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental
Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental integrates the epistemology of reasoning and philosophy of mind. By examining the fundamental competencies involved in reasoning, Gerken argues that reasoning depend
Knowledge Ascriptions
A team of world class philosophers offer novel approaches to the complex debate of how we ascribe knowledge to subjects. They address the methodological issues that knowledge ascriptions raise, and explore three recent approaches to knowledge ascriptions: a linguistic turn, a cognitive turn, and a social turn
Discursive justification and skepticism
Warrant and action
Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony
Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 87, Issue 3 p. 532-557 Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony MIKKEL GERKEN, MIKKEL GERKEN University of CopenhagenSearch for more papers by this author MIKKEL GERKEN, MIKKEL GERKEN University of CopenhagenSearch for more papers by this author First published: 24 October 2011 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00532.xCitations: 21Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest per…
Conceptual Equivocation and Warrant by Reasoning
In this paper, I challenge a widely presupposed principle in the epistemology of inference. The principle, (Validity Requirement), is this: S's (purportedly deductive) reasoning, R, from warranted premise-beliefs provides (conditional) warrant for S's belief in its conclusion only if R is valid. I argue against (Validity Requirement) from two prominent assumptions in the philosophy of mind: that the cognitive competencies that constitute reasonin…
Warrant and action
The Epistemic Norms of Intra-Scientific Testimony
What is the epistemic position that a scientist must be in vis-à-vis a proposition, p, to be in a good enough epistemic position to assert that p to a fellow scientist within the scientific process? My aim is to provide an answer to this question and, more generally, to connect the epistemological debates about the epistemic norms of assertion to the debates about the nature of the scientific process. The question is important because science is …
Discursive justification and skepticism
Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony
Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 87, Issue 3 p. 532-557 Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony MIKKEL GERKEN, MIKKEL GERKEN University of CopenhagenSearch for more papers by this author MIKKEL GERKEN, MIKKEL GERKEN University of CopenhagenSearch for more papers by this author First published: 24 October 2011 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00532.xCitations: 21Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest per…
Public scientific testimony in the scientific image
How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions
Conceptual Equivocation and Warrant by Reasoning
In this paper, I challenge a widely presupposed principle in the epistemology of inference. The principle, (Validity Requirement), is this: S's (purportedly deductive) reasoning, R, from warranted premise-beliefs provides (conditional) warrant for S's belief in its conclusion only if R is valid. I argue against (Validity Requirement) from two prominent assumptions in the philosophy of mind: that the cognitive competencies that constitute reasonin…
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
Truth‐Sensitivity and Folk Epistemology
Several studies have found a robust effect of truth on epistemic evaluation of belief, decision, action and assertion. Thus, truth has a significant effect on normative participant evaluations. Some theorists take this truth effect to motivate factive epistemic norms of belief, action, assertion etc. In contrast, I argue that the truth effect is best understood as an epistemic instance of the familiar and ubiquitous phenomenon of outcome bias . I…
Conceptual Equivocation and Warrant by Reasoning
In this paper, I challenge a widely presupposed principle in the epistemology of inference. The principle, (Validity Requirement), is this: S's (purportedly deductive) reasoning, R, from warranted premise-beliefs provides (conditional) warrant for S's belief in its conclusion only if R is valid. I argue against (Validity Requirement) from two prominent assumptions in the philosophy of mind: that the cognitive competencies that constitute reasonin…
Warrant and action
Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony
Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 87, Issue 3 p. 532-557 Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony MIKKEL GERKEN, MIKKEL GERKEN University of CopenhagenSearch for more papers by this author MIKKEL GERKEN, MIKKEL GERKEN University of CopenhagenSearch for more papers by this author First published: 24 October 2011 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00532.xCitations: 21Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest per…
Knowledge Ascriptions
A team of world class philosophers offer novel approaches to the complex debate of how we ascribe knowledge to subjects. They address the methodological issues that knowledge ascriptions raise, and explore three recent approaches to knowledge ascriptions: a linguistic turn, a cognitive turn, and a social turn
Discursive justification and skepticism
Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental
Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental integrates the epistemology of reasoning and philosophy of mind. By examining the fundamental competencies involved in reasoning, Gerken argues that reasoning depend
The Epistemic Norms of Intra-Scientific Testimony
What is the epistemic position that a scientist must be in vis-à-vis a proposition, p, to be in a good enough epistemic position to assert that p to a fellow scientist within the scientific process? My aim is to provide an answer to this question and, more generally, to connect the epistemological debates about the epistemic norms of assertion to the debates about the nature of the scientific process. The question is important because science is …
How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions
On Folk Epistemology
On Folk Epistemology is a book about how we ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. Empirical evidence suggests that we do so early and often in thought as well as in talk. Since such knowledge ascriptions are central to how we navigate social life, it is important to understand our basis for making them. A central claim of the book is that factors that have nothing to do with knowledge may lead to systematic mistakes in everyday ascriptions o…
Coda
The brief Coda considers the key conclusions and methodology as a general framework for the study of folk epistemology. In particular, it highlights how the study of folk epistemology simultaneously requires and contributes to epistemological theorizing. Moreover, it briefly considers how our folk epistemological practices may yield distinctive forms of epistemic injustice . For example, it is hypothesized that our ordinary knowledge ascriptions …
Truth‐Sensitivity and Folk Epistemology
Several studies have found a robust effect of truth on epistemic evaluation of belief, decision, action and assertion. Thus, truth has a significant effect on normative participant evaluations. Some theorists take this truth effect to motivate factive epistemic norms of belief, action, assertion etc. In contrast, I argue that the truth effect is best understood as an epistemic instance of the familiar and ubiquitous phenomenon of outcome bias . I…
Salient Alternatives in Perspective
This paper empirically investigates how perspective bears on putative salient alternative effects on knowledge ascriptions. Some theoretical accounts predict salient alternative effects in both first- and third-person perspective conditions. These include semantic accounts such as contextualism [Lewis 1996 Lewis, D. 1996. Elusive Knowledge, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74/4: 549–67. doi: 10.1080/00048409612347521[Taylor & Francis Online], […
Public scientific testimony in the scientific image
A transcendental argument from testimonial knowledge to content externalism
1: Introduction. Broadly characterized, transcendental arguments are arguments for a substantive conclusion, X, by way of an argument that it is a necessary condition for the possibility of some general principle or phenomenon, Y We may call Y the evident phenomenon' since it is often taken to be knowable a priori or, less ambitiously, by philosophical reflection. Since Kant's Refutation of Idealism, anti-skeptical transcendental arguments have b…
Assessing the Evidence for Outcome Bias and Hindsight Bias
Frontloading and the Necessary A Posteriori
In this paper, I reevaluate Kripke’s arguments for the necessary a posteriori contra a Kantian pure modal rationalism according to which modal cognition is a priori. I argue that Kripke’s critique of Kant suggests an impure but nevertheless ambitious modal rationalism according to which the basis of modal cognition remains a priori. I then argue that Kripke’s critique of pure modal rationalism does not go deep enough. More specifically, I argue t…
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
Purism and conservatism
In this response to Kate Nolfi's comments on On Folk Epistemology, I defend the book's arguments in favor of strict purist invariantism and against pragmatic encroachment. I first defend the negative Argument Argument against pragmatic encroachment by arguing that Nolfi's ingenious cases do not compromise it or my heuristic proxy/directive force account of practical factor effects. Second, I consider Nolfi's suggestion to amend the book's three m…
Précis of on folk epistemology
In this précis of On Folk Epistemology, I briefly outline some of the book's main substantive theses that the symposiasts discuss. Moreover, I sketch the book's methodology for addressing the relationship between folk epistemology and epistemological theorizing
Stability and cognitive architecture
In this response to Edouard Machery's comments on On Folk Epistemology, I address his methodological challenges, the first of which concerns cross-cultural and interpersonal instability of case judgments. Whereas I agree with Machery about the importance of not going too quickly from folk epistemological judgments to epistemological theory, I argue against skepticism about such judgments. Machery's second challenge concerns my bias account of pat…
The scope of epistemic focal bias
In this response to Michael Blome-Tillmann's comments on On Folk Epistemology, I defend the book's epistemic focal bias account of the salient alternatives effect that Blome-Tillmann takes to motivate epistemic contextualism. First, I defend the epistemic focal bias account against Blome-Tillmann's criticism that it is insufficiently general insofar as it fails to account for a range of cases. Second, I defend the epistemic focal bias account fro…
Scientific values and value-based science reporting
On the assumption that science communication is a part of the scientific practice and enterprise, I critically assess a highly influential science communication strategy, Value-Based Reporting , from the perspective of philosophy of science. On the basis of the critical assessment, I motivate an alternative positive approach, Justification Reporting which aligns better with the norms and values of science. In conclusion, I consider integrations b…
Scientific Contributions and Scientific Authorship
Philosophy (18 works) · Epistemology (17 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (15 works) · Computer Science (10 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Philosophy of science (5 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Political science (4 works)