Regina Rini
Biographic Data
| ID | 1013989 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Regina Rini |
| GIVEN NAMES | Regina |
| FAMILY NAME | Rini |
| SIGNATURE | RINI R |
| AFFILIATIONS | York University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6166-3877 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 13 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Moral disagreement is special
Are disagreements about morality the same as disagreements in other domains, epistemologically speaking? This paper argues no, moral disagreement is special. In the moral domain, disagreement with a peer generates special reason to reduce confidence, whether or not this is how we should respond to peer disagreement in other domains. That is because moral disagreement distinctively generates second-personal reasons to adjust our volitional choices…
Conspiracy Stories
We offer a novel analysis of conspiracy theorizing, according to which conspiracy theory communities are engaged in collective projects of storytelling. Other recent accounts start by analyzing individual conspiracy theorists’ psychologies. We argue that a more explanatorily unifying account emerges when we start by analyzing conspiracy theorizing as a social practice. This helps us better account for conspiracy theorists’ psychological heterogen…
Doing your own research and other impossible acts of epistemic superheroism
The COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by an “infodemic” of misinformation and conspiracy theory. This article points to three explanatory factors: the challenge of forming accurate beliefs when overwhelmed with information, an implausibly individualistic conception of epistemic virtue, and an adversarial information environment that suborns epistemic dependence. Normally we cope with the problems of informational excess by relying on other p…
Deepfakes, Deep Harms
Deepfakes are algorithmically modified video and audio recordings that project one person’s appearance on to that of another, creating an apparent recording of an event that never took place. Many scholars and journalists have begun attending to the political risks of deepfake deception. Here we investigate other ways in which deepfakes have the potential to cause deeper harms than have been appreciated. First, we consider a form of objectificati…
The Ethics of Microaggression
Slips of the tongue, unwitting favoritism, and stereotyped assumptions are just some examples of microaggression. Nearly all of us commit microaggressions at some point, even if we don't intend to. Yet over time a pattern of microaggression can cause considerable harm by reminding members of marginalized groups of their precarious position. The Ethics of Microaggression is a much needed and clearly written exploration of this pervasive yet comple…
Safe Space
Microaggression: Conceptual and scientific issues
Scientists, philosophers, and policymakers disagree about how to define microaggression. Here, we offer a taxonomy of existing definitions, clustering around (a) the psychological motives of perpetrators, (b) the experience of victims, and (c) the functional role of microaggression in oppressive social structures. We consider conceptual and epistemic challenges to each and suggest that progress may come from developing novel hybrid accounts of mi…
Fake News and Partisan Epistemology
This paper does four things: (1) It provides an analysis of the concept ‘fake news.’ (2) It identifies distinctive epistemic features of social media testimony. (3) It argues that partisanship-in-testimony-reception is not always epistemically vicious; in fact some forms of partisanship are consistent with individual epistemic virtue. (4) It argues that a solution to the problem of fake news will require changes to institutions, such as social me…
Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defense
Journal Article Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defense Get access Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defense.ByOlson Jonas. (Oxford: OUP, 2014. Pp. viii + 214. Price £35.00.) Regina Rini Regina Rini New York University, USA E-mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 67, Issue 268, July 2017, Pages 650–653, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqw044 Publ…
How not to test for philosophical expertise
Microaggression: Conceptual and scientific issues
Scientists, philosophers, and policymakers disagree about how to define microaggression. Here, we offer a taxonomy of existing definitions, clustering around (a) the psychological motives of perpetrators, (b) the experience of victims, and (c) the functional role of microaggression in oppressive social structures. We consider conceptual and epistemic challenges to each and suggest that progress may come from developing novel hybrid accounts of mi…
The Ethics of Microaggression
Slips of the tongue, unwitting favoritism, and stereotyped assumptions are just some examples of microaggression. Nearly all of us commit microaggressions at some point, even if we don't intend to. Yet over time a pattern of microaggression can cause considerable harm by reminding members of marginalized groups of their precarious position. The Ethics of Microaggression is a much needed and clearly written exploration of this pervasive yet comple…
How not to test for philosophical expertise
How not to test for philosophical expertise
Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defense
Journal Article Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defense Get access Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defense.ByOlson Jonas. (Oxford: OUP, 2014. Pp. viii + 214. Price £35.00.) Regina Rini Regina Rini New York University, USA E-mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 67, Issue 268, July 2017, Pages 650–653, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqw044 Publ…
Fake News and Partisan Epistemology
This paper does four things: (1) It provides an analysis of the concept ‘fake news.’ (2) It identifies distinctive epistemic features of social media testimony. (3) It argues that partisanship-in-testimony-reception is not always epistemically vicious; in fact some forms of partisanship are consistent with individual epistemic virtue. (4) It argues that a solution to the problem of fake news will require changes to institutions, such as social me…
The Ethics of Microaggression
Slips of the tongue, unwitting favoritism, and stereotyped assumptions are just some examples of microaggression. Nearly all of us commit microaggressions at some point, even if we don't intend to. Yet over time a pattern of microaggression can cause considerable harm by reminding members of marginalized groups of their precarious position. The Ethics of Microaggression is a much needed and clearly written exploration of this pervasive yet comple…
Safe Space
Microaggression: Conceptual and scientific issues
Scientists, philosophers, and policymakers disagree about how to define microaggression. Here, we offer a taxonomy of existing definitions, clustering around (a) the psychological motives of perpetrators, (b) the experience of victims, and (c) the functional role of microaggression in oppressive social structures. We consider conceptual and epistemic challenges to each and suggest that progress may come from developing novel hybrid accounts of mi…
Deepfakes, Deep Harms
Deepfakes are algorithmically modified video and audio recordings that project one person’s appearance on to that of another, creating an apparent recording of an event that never took place. Many scholars and journalists have begun attending to the political risks of deepfake deception. Here we investigate other ways in which deepfakes have the potential to cause deeper harms than have been appreciated. First, we consider a form of objectificati…
Doing your own research and other impossible acts of epistemic superheroism
The COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by an “infodemic” of misinformation and conspiracy theory. This article points to three explanatory factors: the challenge of forming accurate beliefs when overwhelmed with information, an implausibly individualistic conception of epistemic virtue, and an adversarial information environment that suborns epistemic dependence. Normally we cope with the problems of informational excess by relying on other p…
Conspiracy Stories
We offer a novel analysis of conspiracy theorizing, according to which conspiracy theory communities are engaged in collective projects of storytelling. Other recent accounts start by analyzing individual conspiracy theorists’ psychologies. We argue that a more explanatorily unifying account emerges when we start by analyzing conspiracy theorizing as a social practice. This helps us better account for conspiracy theorists’ psychological heterogen…
Moral disagreement is special
Are disagreements about morality the same as disagreements in other domains, epistemologically speaking? This paper argues no, moral disagreement is special. In the moral domain, disagreement with a peer generates special reason to reduce confidence, whether or not this is how we should respond to peer disagreement in other domains. That is because moral disagreement distinctively generates second-personal reasons to adjust our volitional choices…
Psychology (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Misinformation and Its Impacts (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Social Psychology (4 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Epistemic virtue (2 works)