Martin C Libicki

Biographic Data

ID1014391
NAMEMartin C Libicki
GIVEN NAMESMartin C
FAMILY NAMELibicki
SIGNATURELIBICKI M C
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS17
TOTAL CITATIONS34
AUTHOR COUNT17
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1994
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2023
H-INDEX3

  • Detect and Engage: A New American Way of War

    David C Gompert, Martin C Libicki et al.ARTICLESurvival2023

    The threat that paces American force planning is not from Russia, but rather from China. This is leading to a new way of warfare. The authors call it 'detect and engage'. The confluence of artificial intelligence, applied quantum mechanics and satellite networking permits dispersed and diverse units and platforms to operate as a unified joint force across sea, air, land and space. Cyber operations, practically indifferent to location, further ena…

  • Towards a Quantum Internet: Post-pandemic Cyber Security in a Post-digital World

    David C Gompert, Martin C Libicki et al.ARTICLESurvival2021

    A quantum internet could provide more effective security against private cyber crime, Russian cyber war and Chinese efforts to gain information dominance

  • Cyber War and Nuclear Peace

    David C Gompert, Martin C Libicki et al.ARTICLESurvival2019Cited by: 1

    The United States must take the lead in reconfiguring nuclear deterrence to withstand cyber war

  • Cyber House Rules: On War, Retaliation and Escalation

    Lawrence J Cavaiola, David C Gompert et al.ARTICLESurvival2015

    Cyber war is unfamiliar, dynamic and potentially uncontrollable. While not as destructive as nuclear war, it should be approached with similar respect

  • Waging Cyber War the American Way

    David C Gompert, Martin C Libicki et al.ARTICLESurvival2015Cited by: 2

    War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it,' said

  • Cyber Warfare and Sino-American Crisis Instability

    David C Gompert, Martin C Libicki et al.ARTICLESurvival2014Cited by: 5

    China and the US both recognise that an armed conflict between them would include cyber warfare. But there is a curious and risky failure to connect the tactical military advantages of cyber attacks with the strategic hazards

  • Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and Information Warfare

    Martin C LibickiBOOKConquest in Cyberspace2012

  • Underkill: Scalable capabilities for military operations amid populations

    David C Gompert, Stuart E Johnson et al.DATASETPsycEXTRA Dataset2009

    During the first few years of their occupation of Iraq, U.S. military forces proved to be better at killing insurgents than at defeating the insurgents by convincing the Iraqi people to turn against them. As a consequence, the insurgency grew despite its losses, the population's tolerance for the U.S. occupation shrank, and U.S. casualties mounted. At a certain point, a majority of all Iraqis believed that the use of force against U.S. troops was…

  • How Terrorist Groups End: Implications for Countering al Qa'ida

    Seth G Jones, Martin C LibickiBOOKHow terrorist groups end2008

    This research brief describes an analysis of how terrorist groups end. The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ceased to exist as a result of police and intelligence actions or of political accommodations, not military efforts

  • How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida

    Seth G Jones, Martin C LibickiBOOKHow terrorist groups end2008

    All terrorist groups eventually end. But how? Most modern groups have ended because they joined the political process or local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa'ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policing and intelligence, not military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa'ida

  • Exploring Terrorist Targeting Preferences

    Martin C Libicki, Peter Chalk et al.BOOKExploring Terrorist Targeting…2006

    Each year, federal, state, and local governments spend billions of dollars protecting the United States against acts of terrorism, with human, military, and capital resources allocated in ways that reflect the value and vulnerability of each potential target. Yet those buildings, institutions, and icons perceived as being of utmost value to the United States may not be perceived as such to its potential attackers. That one potential attack may hu…

  • A ten-year rule for defense planning

    Open AccessMartin C LibickiARTICLEOrbis2001

  • Rethinking War: The Mouse's New Roar

    Martin C Libicki, Martin LibickiARTICLEForeign Policy1999Cited by: 3

    or most of history, the oft-cited correlation between the size of one's battalions and the odds of military victory had a firm foundation in reality. In classic terms, larger forces won more battles. When technology began to matter, large industrialized nations proved uniquely capable of mobilizing the resources to develop trump cards such as nuclear arms or spy satellites. The rise of globalization over the last half century has now given analys…

  • The emerging primacy of information

    Open AccessMartin C Libicki, Martin LibickiARTICLEOrbis1996Cited by: 11

  • Dominant Battlespace Knowledge: The Winning Edge

    Eliot A Cohen, Stuart E Johnson et al.ARTICLEForeign Affairs1996Cited by: 3

  • And what to do about it

    Richard K Betts, Andrew F Krepinevich et al.ARTICLEThe Washington Quarterly1996Cited by: 6

  • The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon

    Eliot A Cohen, Martin C LibickiARTICLEForeign Affairs1994Cited by: 3