David Schmeidler
Biographic Data
| ID | 1017033 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David Schmeidler |
| GIVEN NAMES | David |
| FAMILY NAME | Schmeidler |
| SIGNATURE | SCHMEIDLER D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Tel Aviv University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 18 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 14 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1969 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Desirability relations in Savage’s model of decision making
Economic Theory
La théorie économique comprend trois types d’approche. L’une examine les phénomènes économiques, l’autre développe des outils d’analyse, et la derniére étudie l’effort scientifique en économie en général et en théorie économique en particulier. Nous appelons la première approche « l’économie », la seconde, « le développement de méthodes économiques » et la troisième, « la méthodologie de l’économie ». Le même résultat mathématique peut souvent ét…
Frames and decisions under uncertainty in economics theory
States and Contingencies
La puissance des modèles de décision dans l’incertain repose en grande partie sur la spécification des états afin de résoudre toute l’incertitude. Cependant, cette spécification peut miner l’observabilité présumée des préférences sur laquelle se fondent les théories axiomatiques de la décision. Pour résoudre ce problème, nous introduisons la notion de contingence. Si les contingences ne décrivent pas nécessairement de manière exhaustive toutes le…
Economic Models as Analogies
People often wonder why economists analyze models whose as- sumptions are known to be false, while economists feel that they learn a great deal from such exercises. We suggest that part of the knowledge generated by academic economists is case-based rather than rule-based. That is, instead of oering general rules or theories that should be contrasted with data, economists often analyze models that are \theoretical cases", which help understand ec…
Rationality of belief or
On the definition of objective probabilities by empirical similarity
We suggest to define objective probabilities by similarity-weighted empirical frequencies, where more similar cases get a higher weight in the computation of frequencies. This formula is justified intuitively and axiomatically, but raises the question, which similarity function should be used? We propose to estimate the similarity function from the data, and thus obtain objective probabilities. We compare this definition to others, and attempt to…
Axiomatization of an exponential similarity function
Probability and Uncertainty in Economic Modeling
Economic modeling assumes, for the most part, that agents are Bayesian, that is, that they entertain probabilistic beliefs, objective or subjective, regarding any event in question. We argue that the formation of such beliefs calls for a deeper examination and for explicit modeling. Models of belief formation may enhance our understanding of the probabilistic beliefs when these exist, and may also help us characterize situations in which entertai…
Empirical Similarity
An agent is asked to assess a real-valued variable Yp based on certain characteristics Xp = (Xp1, ..., Xpm), and on a database consisting of Xi1, ... Xim, Yi) for i = 1, ..., n. A possible approach to combine past observations of X and Y with the current values of X to generate an assessment of Y is similarity-weighted averaging. It suggests that the predicted value of Y, Ȳps, be the weighted average of all previously observed values Yi, where th…
Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes
Several authors have indicated a contradiction between consistent aggregation of subjective beliefs and tastes, and a Pareto condition. We argue that the Pareto condition that implies the contradiction is not compelling. Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs. Restricting the Pareto condition to choices that only involve identical beliefs allows a utilitarian aggregation: both society’s…
Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
An act maps states of nature to outcomes: deterministic outcomes, as well as random outcomes, are included. Two acts f and g are comonotonic, by definition, if it never happens that f(s) > f(t) and g(t) > g(s) for some states of nature s and t. An axiom of comonotonic independence is introduced here. It weakens the von Neumann-Morgenstern axiom of independence as follows: If f > g and if f, g and h are comonotonic then $f + (1 - $)h > $g + (1 - $…
The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
Previous article Next article The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function GameDavid SchmeidlerDavid Schmeidlerhttps://doi.org/10.1137/0117107PDFBibTexSections ToolsAdd to favoritesExport CitationTrack CitationsEmail SectionsAbout[1] Robert J. Aumann and , Michael Maschler, L. S. Shapley and , A. W. Tucker, The bargaining set for cooperative gamesAdvances in Game Theory, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N.J., 1964, 443–476 MR0176842 (31:1114) 0132…
Economic Models as Analogies
People often wonder why economists analyze models whose as- sumptions are known to be false, while economists feel that they learn a great deal from such exercises. We suggest that part of the knowledge generated by academic economists is case-based rather than rule-based. That is, instead of oering general rules or theories that should be contrasted with data, economists often analyze models that are \theoretical cases", which help understand ec…
Rationality of belief or
On the definition of objective probabilities by empirical similarity
We suggest to define objective probabilities by similarity-weighted empirical frequencies, where more similar cases get a higher weight in the computation of frequencies. This formula is justified intuitively and axiomatically, but raises the question, which similarity function should be used? We propose to estimate the similarity function from the data, and thus obtain objective probabilities. We compare this definition to others, and attempt to…
Axiomatization of an exponential similarity function
Probability and Uncertainty in Economic Modeling
Economic modeling assumes, for the most part, that agents are Bayesian, that is, that they entertain probabilistic beliefs, objective or subjective, regarding any event in question. We argue that the formation of such beliefs calls for a deeper examination and for explicit modeling. Models of belief formation may enhance our understanding of the probabilistic beliefs when these exist, and may also help us characterize situations in which entertai…
States and Contingencies
La puissance des modèles de décision dans l’incertain repose en grande partie sur la spécification des états afin de résoudre toute l’incertitude. Cependant, cette spécification peut miner l’observabilité présumée des préférences sur laquelle se fondent les théories axiomatiques de la décision. Pour résoudre ce problème, nous introduisons la notion de contingence. Si les contingences ne décrivent pas nécessairement de manière exhaustive toutes le…
Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes
Several authors have indicated a contradiction between consistent aggregation of subjective beliefs and tastes, and a Pareto condition. We argue that the Pareto condition that implies the contradiction is not compelling. Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs. Restricting the Pareto condition to choices that only involve identical beliefs allows a utilitarian aggregation: both society’s…
The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
Previous article Next article The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function GameDavid SchmeidlerDavid Schmeidlerhttps://doi.org/10.1137/0117107PDFBibTexSections ToolsAdd to favoritesExport CitationTrack CitationsEmail SectionsAbout[1] Robert J. Aumann and , Michael Maschler, L. S. Shapley and , A. W. Tucker, The bargaining set for cooperative gamesAdvances in Game Theory, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N.J., 1964, 443–476 MR0176842 (31:1114) 0132…
Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
An act maps states of nature to outcomes: deterministic outcomes, as well as random outcomes, are included. Two acts f and g are comonotonic, by definition, if it never happens that f(s) > f(t) and g(t) > g(s) for some states of nature s and t. An axiom of comonotonic independence is introduced here. It weakens the von Neumann-Morgenstern axiom of independence as follows: If f > g and if f, g and h are comonotonic then $f + (1 - $)h > $g + (1 - $…
Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes
Several authors have indicated a contradiction between consistent aggregation of subjective beliefs and tastes, and a Pareto condition. We argue that the Pareto condition that implies the contradiction is not compelling. Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs. Restricting the Pareto condition to choices that only involve identical beliefs allows a utilitarian aggregation: both society’s…
Empirical Similarity
An agent is asked to assess a real-valued variable Yp based on certain characteristics Xp = (Xp1, ..., Xpm), and on a database consisting of Xi1, ... Xim, Yi) for i = 1, ..., n. A possible approach to combine past observations of X and Y with the current values of X to generate an assessment of Y is similarity-weighted averaging. It suggests that the predicted value of Y, Ȳps, be the weighted average of all previously observed values Yi, where th…
Axiomatization of an exponential similarity function
Probability and Uncertainty in Economic Modeling
Economic modeling assumes, for the most part, that agents are Bayesian, that is, that they entertain probabilistic beliefs, objective or subjective, regarding any event in question. We argue that the formation of such beliefs calls for a deeper examination and for explicit modeling. Models of belief formation may enhance our understanding of the probabilistic beliefs when these exist, and may also help us characterize situations in which entertai…
On the definition of objective probabilities by empirical similarity
We suggest to define objective probabilities by similarity-weighted empirical frequencies, where more similar cases get a higher weight in the computation of frequencies. This formula is justified intuitively and axiomatically, but raises the question, which similarity function should be used? We propose to estimate the similarity function from the data, and thus obtain objective probabilities. We compare this definition to others, and attempt to…
Rationality of belief or
Economic Models as Analogies
People often wonder why economists analyze models whose as- sumptions are known to be false, while economists feel that they learn a great deal from such exercises. We suggest that part of the knowledge generated by academic economists is case-based rather than rule-based. That is, instead of oering general rules or theories that should be contrasted with data, economists often analyze models that are \theoretical cases", which help understand ec…
States and Contingencies
La puissance des modèles de décision dans l’incertain repose en grande partie sur la spécification des états afin de résoudre toute l’incertitude. Cependant, cette spécification peut miner l’observabilité présumée des préférences sur laquelle se fondent les théories axiomatiques de la décision. Pour résoudre ce problème, nous introduisons la notion de contingence. Si les contingences ne décrivent pas nécessairement de manière exhaustive toutes le…
Frames and decisions under uncertainty in economics theory
Desirability relations in Savage’s model of decision making
Economic Theory
La théorie économique comprend trois types d’approche. L’une examine les phénomènes économiques, l’autre développe des outils d’analyse, et la derniére étudie l’effort scientifique en économie en général et en théorie économique en particulier. Nous appelons la première approche « l’économie », la seconde, « le développement de méthodes économiques » et la troisième, « la méthodologie de l’économie ». Le même résultat mathématique peut souvent ét…
Mathematics (9 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (7 works) · Mathematical economics (7 works) · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference (6 works) · Economics (6 works) · Artificial Intelligence (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Statistics (5 works) · Economic theories and models (4 works)