Simon M Huttegger
Biographic Data
| ID | 1020913 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Simon M Huttegger |
| GIVEN NAMES | Simon M |
| FAMILY NAME | Huttegger |
| SIGNATURE | HUTTEGGER S M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Irvine |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 20 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 78 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 20 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Bayesian Convergence for Computably Bounded Agents
In this article, we pursue two goals. First, we argue that computable probability theory offers a fitting framework for modeling the credences of computably bounded—and, thus, more realistic—Bayesian reasoners. Second, we develop a Bayesian perspective on algorithmic randomness: a branch of computability theory that provides a formal account of what it takes for a sequence of observations (a data stream) to be probabilistically typical in an algo…
Carnapian Inductive Logic for Exponential Smoothing
This paper explores the inductive logic associated with exponential smoothing, the most widely used predictive rule that manifests the idea that more recent observations have a stronger influence on predictive probabilities than more remote ones. The main result shows that exponential smoothing can be derived from a set of plausible qualitative invariance assumptions about conditional probabilities. I discuss various aspects of the resulting indu…
Superconditioning
When can a shift from a prior to a posterior be represented by conditionalization? A well-known result, known as “superconditioning” and going back to work by Diaconis and Zabell, gives a sharp answer. This paper extends the result and connects it to the reflection principle and common priors. I show that a shift from a prior to a set of posteriors can be represented within a conditioning model if and only if the prior and the posteriors are conn…
Structural Stability in Causal Decision Theory
Rethinking Convergence to the Truth
The Bayesian theorem on convergence to the truth states that a rational inquirer believes with certainty that her degrees of belief capture the truth about a large swath of hypotheses with increasing evidence. This result has been criticized as showcasing a problematic kind of epistemic immodesty when applied to infinite hypotheses that can never be approximated by finite evidence. The central point at issue—that certain hypotheses may forever be…
Bradley Conditionals and Dynamic Choice
One of the main contributions of Richard Bradley’s book is an elegant extension of Jeffrey’s Logic of Decision that countenances the evaluation of conditional prospects. This extension offers a promising new setting in which to model dynamic choice. In Bradley’s framework, plans can be understood as conditionals of an appropriate sort, while dynamic consistency can be viewed as providing a constraint on the evaluation of conditionals across time.…
Signals without teleology
Signals" are a conceptual apparatus in many scientific disciplines. Biologists inquire about the evolution of signals, economists talk about the signaling function of purchases and prices, and philosophers discuss the conditions under which signals acquire meaning. However, less attention has been paid to what is a signal. Most existing accounts are teleological in some way. This paper provides a definition of signals that avoids reference to for…
Communication without common interest: A signaling experiment
Generalized Learning and Conditional Expectation
Reflection and martingale principles are central to models of rational learning. They can be justified in a variety of ways. In what follows we study martingale and reflection principles in the context of measure theory. We give special attention to two approaches for justifying these principles that have not been studied in that context before: diachronic coherence and the value of information. Together with an extant argument based on expected …
Quantum Randomness and Underdetermination
We consider the nature of quantum randomness and how one might have empirical evidence for it. We will see why, depending on one’s computational resources, it may be impossible to determine whether a particular notion of randomness properly characterizes one’s empirical data. Indeed, we will see why even an ideal observer under ideal epistemic conditions may never have any empirical evidence whatsoever for believing that the results of one’s quan…
David Lewis in the lab: Experimental results on the emergence of meaning
Bayesian Convergence to the Truth and the Metaphysics of Possible Worlds
In a recent paper, Belot argues that Bayesians are epistemologically flawed because they believe with probability 1 that they will learn the truth about observational propositions in the limit. While Belot’s considerations suggest that this result should be interpreted with some care, the concerns he raises can largely be defused by putting convergence to the truth in the context of learning from an arbitrarily large but finite number of observat…
The Handicap Principle Is an Artifact
The handicap principle is one of the most influential ideas in evolutionary biology. It asserts that when there is conflict of interest in a signaling interaction signals must be costly in order to be reliable. While in evolutionary biology it is a common practice to distinguish between indexes and fakable signals, we argue this dichotomy is an artifact of existing popular signaling models. Once this distinction is abandoned, we show one cannot a…
Inductive Learning in Small and Large Worlds
How Much Rationality Do We Need to Explain Conventions
This article surveys the main philosophical and formal ideas revolving around language as being conventional from the perspective of game theory. For very basic situations, this leads to a coherent view of conventions that offers interesting insights. Although there exist many open problems, this article will argue by outlining partial solution attempts that there is no principled reason for not applying methods from game theory to them
In Defense of Reflection
I discuss two ways of justifying reflection principles. First, I propose that an undogmatic reading of dynamic Dutch book arguments provides them with a sound foundation. Second, I show also that minimizing expected inaccuracy leads to a novel argument for reflection principles. The required inaccuracy measures comprise a natural class of functions that can be derived from a generalization of a condition known as propriety or immodesty. This show…
Methodology in Biological Game Theory
Game theory has a prominent role in evolutionary biology, in particular in the ecological study of various phenomena ranging from conflict behaviour to altruism to signalling and beyond. The two central methodological tools in biological game theory are the concepts of Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable strategy. While both were inspired by a dynamic conception of evolution, these concepts are essentially static—they only show that a popu…
Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: Signaling systems vs. partial pooling
Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infin…
Robustness in Signaling Games
The spontaneous emergence of signaling has already been studied in terms of standard evolutionary dynamics of signaling games. Standard evolutionary dynamics is given by the replicator equations. Thus, it is not clear whether the results for standard evolutionary dynamics depend crucially on the functional form of the replicator equations. In this paper I show that the basic results for the replicator dynamics of signaling games carry over to a n…
Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning
Signaling games provide basic insights into some fundamental questions concerning the explanation of meaning. They can be analyzed in terms of rational choice theory and in terms of evolutionary game theory. It is argued that an evolutionary approach provides better explanations for the emergence of simple communication systems. To substantiate these arguments, I will look at models similar to those of Skyrms (2000) and Komarova and Niyogi (2004)…
Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning
Signaling games provide basic insights into some fundamental questions concerning the explanation of meaning. They can be analyzed in terms of rational choice theory and in terms of evolutionary game theory. It is argued that an evolutionary approach provides better explanations for the emergence of simple communication systems. To substantiate these arguments, I will look at models similar to those of Skyrms (2000) and Komarova and Niyogi (2004)…
Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: Signaling systems vs. partial pooling
Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infin…
In Defense of Reflection
I discuss two ways of justifying reflection principles. First, I propose that an undogmatic reading of dynamic Dutch book arguments provides them with a sound foundation. Second, I show also that minimizing expected inaccuracy leads to a novel argument for reflection principles. The required inaccuracy measures comprise a natural class of functions that can be derived from a generalization of a condition known as propriety or immodesty. This show…
David Lewis in the lab: Experimental results on the emergence of meaning
Bayesian Convergence to the Truth and the Metaphysics of Possible Worlds
In a recent paper, Belot argues that Bayesians are epistemologically flawed because they believe with probability 1 that they will learn the truth about observational propositions in the limit. While Belot’s considerations suggest that this result should be interpreted with some care, the concerns he raises can largely be defused by putting convergence to the truth in the context of learning from an arbitrarily large but finite number of observat…
The Handicap Principle Is an Artifact
The handicap principle is one of the most influential ideas in evolutionary biology. It asserts that when there is conflict of interest in a signaling interaction signals must be costly in order to be reliable. While in evolutionary biology it is a common practice to distinguish between indexes and fakable signals, we argue this dichotomy is an artifact of existing popular signaling models. Once this distinction is abandoned, we show one cannot a…
Methodology in Biological Game Theory
Game theory has a prominent role in evolutionary biology, in particular in the ecological study of various phenomena ranging from conflict behaviour to altruism to signalling and beyond. The two central methodological tools in biological game theory are the concepts of Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable strategy. While both were inspired by a dynamic conception of evolution, these concepts are essentially static—they only show that a popu…
Bradley Conditionals and Dynamic Choice
One of the main contributions of Richard Bradley’s book is an elegant extension of Jeffrey’s Logic of Decision that countenances the evaluation of conditional prospects. This extension offers a promising new setting in which to model dynamic choice. In Bradley’s framework, plans can be understood as conditionals of an appropriate sort, while dynamic consistency can be viewed as providing a constraint on the evaluation of conditionals across time.…
Signals without teleology
Signals" are a conceptual apparatus in many scientific disciplines. Biologists inquire about the evolution of signals, economists talk about the signaling function of purchases and prices, and philosophers discuss the conditions under which signals acquire meaning. However, less attention has been paid to what is a signal. Most existing accounts are teleological in some way. This paper provides a definition of signals that avoids reference to for…
Generalized Learning and Conditional Expectation
Reflection and martingale principles are central to models of rational learning. They can be justified in a variety of ways. In what follows we study martingale and reflection principles in the context of measure theory. We give special attention to two approaches for justifying these principles that have not been studied in that context before: diachronic coherence and the value of information. Together with an extant argument based on expected …
Quantum Randomness and Underdetermination
We consider the nature of quantum randomness and how one might have empirical evidence for it. We will see why, depending on one’s computational resources, it may be impossible to determine whether a particular notion of randomness properly characterizes one’s empirical data. Indeed, we will see why even an ideal observer under ideal epistemic conditions may never have any empirical evidence whatsoever for believing that the results of one’s quan…
Robustness in Signaling Games
The spontaneous emergence of signaling has already been studied in terms of standard evolutionary dynamics of signaling games. Standard evolutionary dynamics is given by the replicator equations. Thus, it is not clear whether the results for standard evolutionary dynamics depend crucially on the functional form of the replicator equations. In this paper I show that the basic results for the replicator dynamics of signaling games carry over to a n…
Robustness in Signaling Games
The spontaneous emergence of signaling has already been studied in terms of standard evolutionary dynamics of signaling games. Standard evolutionary dynamics is given by the replicator equations. Thus, it is not clear whether the results for standard evolutionary dynamics depend crucially on the functional form of the replicator equations. In this paper I show that the basic results for the replicator dynamics of signaling games carry over to a n…
Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning
Signaling games provide basic insights into some fundamental questions concerning the explanation of meaning. They can be analyzed in terms of rational choice theory and in terms of evolutionary game theory. It is argued that an evolutionary approach provides better explanations for the emergence of simple communication systems. To substantiate these arguments, I will look at models similar to those of Skyrms (2000) and Komarova and Niyogi (2004)…
Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: Signaling systems vs. partial pooling
Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infin…
In Defense of Reflection
I discuss two ways of justifying reflection principles. First, I propose that an undogmatic reading of dynamic Dutch book arguments provides them with a sound foundation. Second, I show also that minimizing expected inaccuracy leads to a novel argument for reflection principles. The required inaccuracy measures comprise a natural class of functions that can be derived from a generalization of a condition known as propriety or immodesty. This show…
Methodology in Biological Game Theory
Game theory has a prominent role in evolutionary biology, in particular in the ecological study of various phenomena ranging from conflict behaviour to altruism to signalling and beyond. The two central methodological tools in biological game theory are the concepts of Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable strategy. While both were inspired by a dynamic conception of evolution, these concepts are essentially static—they only show that a popu…
How Much Rationality Do We Need to Explain Conventions
This article surveys the main philosophical and formal ideas revolving around language as being conventional from the perspective of game theory. For very basic situations, this leads to a coherent view of conventions that offers interesting insights. Although there exist many open problems, this article will argue by outlining partial solution attempts that there is no principled reason for not applying methods from game theory to them
Bayesian Convergence to the Truth and the Metaphysics of Possible Worlds
In a recent paper, Belot argues that Bayesians are epistemologically flawed because they believe with probability 1 that they will learn the truth about observational propositions in the limit. While Belot’s considerations suggest that this result should be interpreted with some care, the concerns he raises can largely be defused by putting convergence to the truth in the context of learning from an arbitrarily large but finite number of observat…
The Handicap Principle Is an Artifact
The handicap principle is one of the most influential ideas in evolutionary biology. It asserts that when there is conflict of interest in a signaling interaction signals must be costly in order to be reliable. While in evolutionary biology it is a common practice to distinguish between indexes and fakable signals, we argue this dichotomy is an artifact of existing popular signaling models. Once this distinction is abandoned, we show one cannot a…
Inductive Learning in Small and Large Worlds
David Lewis in the lab: Experimental results on the emergence of meaning
Signals without teleology
Signals" are a conceptual apparatus in many scientific disciplines. Biologists inquire about the evolution of signals, economists talk about the signaling function of purchases and prices, and philosophers discuss the conditions under which signals acquire meaning. However, less attention has been paid to what is a signal. Most existing accounts are teleological in some way. This paper provides a definition of signals that avoids reference to for…
Communication without common interest: A signaling experiment
Generalized Learning and Conditional Expectation
Reflection and martingale principles are central to models of rational learning. They can be justified in a variety of ways. In what follows we study martingale and reflection principles in the context of measure theory. We give special attention to two approaches for justifying these principles that have not been studied in that context before: diachronic coherence and the value of information. Together with an extant argument based on expected …
Quantum Randomness and Underdetermination
We consider the nature of quantum randomness and how one might have empirical evidence for it. We will see why, depending on one’s computational resources, it may be impossible to determine whether a particular notion of randomness properly characterizes one’s empirical data. Indeed, we will see why even an ideal observer under ideal epistemic conditions may never have any empirical evidence whatsoever for believing that the results of one’s quan…
Bradley Conditionals and Dynamic Choice
One of the main contributions of Richard Bradley’s book is an elegant extension of Jeffrey’s Logic of Decision that countenances the evaluation of conditional prospects. This extension offers a promising new setting in which to model dynamic choice. In Bradley’s framework, plans can be understood as conditionals of an appropriate sort, while dynamic consistency can be viewed as providing a constraint on the evaluation of conditionals across time.…
Structural Stability in Causal Decision Theory
Rethinking Convergence to the Truth
The Bayesian theorem on convergence to the truth states that a rational inquirer believes with certainty that her degrees of belief capture the truth about a large swath of hypotheses with increasing evidence. This result has been criticized as showcasing a problematic kind of epistemic immodesty when applied to infinite hypotheses that can never be approximated by finite evidence. The central point at issue—that certain hypotheses may forever be…
Superconditioning
When can a shift from a prior to a posterior be represented by conditionalization? A well-known result, known as “superconditioning” and going back to work by Diaconis and Zabell, gives a sharp answer. This paper extends the result and connects it to the reflection principle and common priors. I show that a shift from a prior to a set of posteriors can be represented within a conditioning model if and only if the prior and the posteriors are conn…
Bayesian Convergence for Computably Bounded Agents
In this article, we pursue two goals. First, we argue that computable probability theory offers a fitting framework for modeling the credences of computably bounded—and, thus, more realistic—Bayesian reasoners. Second, we develop a Bayesian perspective on algorithmic randomness: a branch of computability theory that provides a formal account of what it takes for a sequence of observations (a data stream) to be probabilistically typical in an algo…
Carnapian Inductive Logic for Exponential Smoothing
This paper explores the inductive logic associated with exponential smoothing, the most widely used predictive rule that manifests the idea that more recent observations have a stronger influence on predictive probabilities than more remote ones. The main result shows that exponential smoothing can be derived from a set of plausible qualitative invariance assumptions about conditional probabilities. I discuss various aspects of the resulting indu…
Computer Science (18 works) · Epistemology (15 works) · Philosophy (15 works) · Mathematical economics (12 works) · Mathematics (11 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (8 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (8 works) · Artificial Intelligence (7 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (7 works) · Game Theory and Applications (7 works)