Annalisa Coliva
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1032756 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Annalisa Coliva |
| NOMBRES | Annalisa |
| APELLIDO | Coliva |
| FIRMA | COLIVA A |
| AFILIACIONES | University of California, Irvine |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6258-5276 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 30 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 31 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 25 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 5 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2002 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Hinges, philosophy and mind
Immunity to error through misidentification
According to a prominent strand of thought in analytic philosophy of mind, certain judgments of the form “a is F” are such that, although one can be mistaken about what property it is that a has, one cannot be mistaken that it is a that has the relevant property. Judgments of this kind are said to be immune to error through misidentification (IEM). This article has two main aims. On the one hand, it responds to a need for a systematization of the…
Errors through misidentification and the specialness of first-person thought
This introduction offers a brief overview of the significance of (immunity) to error through misidentification for debates about first-person thought. The introduction also presents the special issue’s contents
Morphology, Knowledge and understanding. prolegomena to a pluralist manifesto
The primary objective of this paper is to tentatively investigate how a family-resemblance approach to concepts might be applied to the related notions of knowledge and understanding, with the aim of deflating or redressing ongoing debates surrounding each. Given that the concept of family-resemblance is frequently misinterpreted, and there is a prevailing tendency to revert to more conventional methods of conceptual analysis, the paper offers a …
Introduction to Hypatia Cluster “Wittgensteinian Understandings of Identities”
Deep disagreements and the genealogical challenge
This paper looks at the so-called “genealogical challenge”, encapsulated in the “you just believe that because ...” (YJBTB) schema, through the lens of hinge epistemology. It is claimed that hinges are typically believed just because one has been brought up to believe them (§1). Yet, due to their extreme variability, it is not always the case that hinges are not rationally held, while fitting into the YJBTB schema. In particular, they are rationa…
Hinge trust
Trust is central to epistemology, particularly in accounts of testimony, where it describes the relationship between a hearer and a speaker (or trustor and trustee), enabling the acquisition of information. The speaker's trustworthiness—marked by sincerity and knowledge—is essential for testimony to transmit knowledge or justified belief. However, trust's nature and role remain conceptually elusive, as the current debate highlights. This paper ad…
Against Quasi-Fideism
In a series of papers, Duncan Pritchard has argued that Wittgenstein's remarks in On Certainty (OC) provide the foundation for a quasi-fideistic account of religious belief. This account seeks to navigate a middle path between evidentialism-the view that religious belief is rational only if supported by epistemic reasons-and fideism, which holds that religious belief cannot be rationally justified precisely because it is not grounded in epistemic…
More and Happier Women
The paper presents a Wittgensteinian account of the concept woman , in terms of family resemblance. This approach is deemed superior to the Carnapian account, championed by Sally Haslanger, in that it allows for more inclusivity and to locate the source of sexism not so much in the very concept of woman but in the beliefs sexist people have about women. The compatibility of this account with semantic externalism is explored, as well as its relati…
Liminal Identities and Epistemic Injustice
The concept of social identity is central to research on epistemic injustice, but what it means to belong or not to belong to a marginalized identity is often left undertheorized. After offering an overview of the state of the art in social and feminist epistemology, in this introduction we argue that liminal and interstitial identities challenge received notions and push the conversation further. We then provide a brief synopsis of the articles …
Woman
Drawing on previous work, I argue that a family resemblance account of the concept woman has several beneficial consequences. Namely, it promotes hermeneutical justice, and, in time, it may serve to change the prototypes and stereotypes people tend unreflectively to associate with woman. I claim that only at that point will full hermeneutical justice be achieved. To this end, I propose a reconceptualization of the notion of hermeneutical injustic…
Hysteria, Hermeneutical Injustice and Conceptual Engineering
In this paper, we look at what Miranda Fricker (2007) calls “hermeneutical injustice” as it arises in the medical context. By drawing on the history of hysteria, I argue that the concept of hysteria has been held in place by power structures affected by negative prejudice against women. In this sense, the concept of hysteria fits the central conditions of the concept of hermeneutical injustice as characterized by Fricker. Yet, reflection on the c…
"You Just Believe That Because . . . It’s a Hinge"
This paper looks at the genealogical challenge encapsulated in the schema “You just believe that because . . .” through the lens of hinge epistemology. It is claimed that hinges are typically held just because one has been brought up to believe them. It is further claimed that, while fitting into the YJBTB schema, hinges are rationally held when different de facto hinges are taken for granted merely because of one’s position in history. Moreover,…
Hinges in the knowledge economy. on greco’s common and procedural knowledge
What philosophical disagreement and philosophical skepticism hinge on
Frege on Language, Logic, and Psychology
Stebbing, Moore (and Wittgenstein) on common sense and metaphysical analysis
Susan Stebbing is often portrayed as indebted to G. E. Moore for her ideas concerning the relationship between common sense and philosophy and about analysis. By focusing mostly on her article “The method of analysis in metaphysics”, this article argues that, in fact, Stebbing anticipated some of Moore’s ideas in “Proof of an external world”, and even ideas in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. It further argues that Stebbing cast an original light on …
Doubts, Philosophy, and Therapy
There is nowadays a tendency, to be dated back to Gordon Baker’s reading, to interpret the later Wittgenstein as proposing a thoroughly therapeutic view of philosophy. Accordingly, he was not dealing with philosophical problems to show how they originated in a misunderstanding of our language. For that would have presupposed his advancing theses about how language works. Rather, his therapeutic method was in the service of liberating philosophers…
Strange bedfellows
Relativism
Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History
Hinge Epistemology
Epistemic Pluralism
Extended Rationality
PART I: MODERATISM ABOUT PERCEPTUAL WARRANTS 1. The Architecture Of Perceptual Warrants 1: The Liberal View 2. The Architecture Of Perceptual Warrants 2: The Conservative View 3. The Architecture Of Perceptual Warrants 3: The Moderate View 4. Moderates Are Legion (While Liberals And Conservatives Are Not) 5. Moderatism And The Content Of Perception 6. Summary PART II: FURTHER MOTIVATION FOR MODERATISM 1. Against Liberal Mooreanism 2. Against Enti…
Varieties of failure (of warrant transmission
Against Quasi-Fideism
In a series of papers, Duncan Pritchard has argued that Wittgenstein's remarks in On Certainty (OC) provide the foundation for a quasi-fideistic account of religious belief. This account seeks to navigate a middle path between evidentialism-the view that religious belief is rational only if supported by epistemic reasons-and fideism, which holds that religious belief cannot be rationally justified precisely because it is not grounded in epistemic…
Varieties of failure (of warrant transmission
The Paradox of Moore's Proof of an External World
Moore's proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright's nor Pryor's readings of the proof can explain this paradox and show how it is only by taking th proof in connection with Cartesian scepticism that one can explain it
Hinges in the knowledge economy. on greco’s common and procedural knowledge
Strange bedfellows
Hysteria, Hermeneutical Injustice and Conceptual Engineering
In this paper, we look at what Miranda Fricker (2007) calls “hermeneutical injustice” as it arises in the medical context. By drawing on the history of hysteria, I argue that the concept of hysteria has been held in place by power structures affected by negative prejudice against women. In this sense, the concept of hysteria fits the central conditions of the concept of hermeneutical injustice as characterized by Fricker. Yet, reflection on the c…
What philosophical disagreement and philosophical skepticism hinge on
Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge
In this BOOK, the first one of two volumes dedicated to Crispin Wright, thirteen chapters discuss some of the main themes in the philosophy of one of Great Britain’s most important living philosophers. These chapters are divided into four sections, preceded by a substantial Introduction, which places them in the context of the development of Wright’s ideas. The chapters address issues such as the rule-following problem, knowledge of our meanings …
Self-knowledge and commitments
Hinge trust
Trust is central to epistemology, particularly in accounts of testimony, where it describes the relationship between a hearer and a speaker (or trustor and trustee), enabling the acquisition of information. The speaker's trustworthiness—marked by sincerity and knowledge—is essential for testimony to transmit knowledge or justified belief. However, trust's nature and role remain conceptually elusive, as the current debate highlights. This paper ad…
Woman
Drawing on previous work, I argue that a family resemblance account of the concept woman has several beneficial consequences. Namely, it promotes hermeneutical justice, and, in time, it may serve to change the prototypes and stereotypes people tend unreflectively to associate with woman. I claim that only at that point will full hermeneutical justice be achieved. To this end, I propose a reconceptualization of the notion of hermeneutical injustic…
Human diagrammatic reasoning and seeing-as
On What There Really Is to Our Notion of Ownership of a Thought
JOHN CAMPBELL'S REPLY to my paper aims at reestablishing the point that there are two strands to our notion of ownership of a thought. There are two ways of cashing out this idea. 1 First, one could say that A is the owner of a thought if and only if both the following two independent conditions apply 2 : (1) X is introspectively aware of a token thought and (2) X is the person who formed that token thought. Second, one may hold that there are tw…
The Paradox of Moore's Proof of an External World
Moore's proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright's nor Pryor's readings of the proof can explain this paradox and show how it is only by taking th proof in connection with Cartesian scepticism that one can explain it
Self-knowledge and commitments
Varieties of failure (of warrant transmission
Human diagrammatic reasoning and seeing-as
Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge
In this BOOK, the first one of two volumes dedicated to Crispin Wright, thirteen chapters discuss some of the main themes in the philosophy of one of Great Britain’s most important living philosophers. These chapters are divided into four sections, preceded by a substantial Introduction, which places them in the context of the development of Wright’s ideas. The chapters address issues such as the rule-following problem, knowledge of our meanings …
Extended Rationality
PART I: MODERATISM ABOUT PERCEPTUAL WARRANTS 1. The Architecture Of Perceptual Warrants 1: The Liberal View 2. The Architecture Of Perceptual Warrants 2: The Conservative View 3. The Architecture Of Perceptual Warrants 3: The Moderate View 4. Moderates Are Legion (While Liberals And Conservatives Are Not) 5. Moderatism And The Content Of Perception 6. Summary PART II: FURTHER MOTIVATION FOR MODERATISM 1. Against Liberal Mooreanism 2. Against Enti…
Hinge Epistemology
Epistemic Pluralism
Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History
Relativism
Stebbing, Moore (and Wittgenstein) on common sense and metaphysical analysis
Susan Stebbing is often portrayed as indebted to G. E. Moore for her ideas concerning the relationship between common sense and philosophy and about analysis. By focusing mostly on her article “The method of analysis in metaphysics”, this article argues that, in fact, Stebbing anticipated some of Moore’s ideas in “Proof of an external world”, and even ideas in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. It further argues that Stebbing cast an original light on …
Doubts, Philosophy, and Therapy
There is nowadays a tendency, to be dated back to Gordon Baker’s reading, to interpret the later Wittgenstein as proposing a thoroughly therapeutic view of philosophy. Accordingly, he was not dealing with philosophical problems to show how they originated in a misunderstanding of our language. For that would have presupposed his advancing theses about how language works. Rather, his therapeutic method was in the service of liberating philosophers…
Strange bedfellows
What philosophical disagreement and philosophical skepticism hinge on
Frege on Language, Logic, and Psychology
"You Just Believe That Because . . . It’s a Hinge"
This paper looks at the genealogical challenge encapsulated in the schema “You just believe that because . . .” through the lens of hinge epistemology. It is claimed that hinges are typically held just because one has been brought up to believe them. It is further claimed that, while fitting into the YJBTB schema, hinges are rationally held when different de facto hinges are taken for granted merely because of one’s position in history. Moreover,…
Hinges in the knowledge economy. on greco’s common and procedural knowledge
More and Happier Women
The paper presents a Wittgensteinian account of the concept woman , in terms of family resemblance. This approach is deemed superior to the Carnapian account, championed by Sally Haslanger, in that it allows for more inclusivity and to locate the source of sexism not so much in the very concept of woman but in the beliefs sexist people have about women. The compatibility of this account with semantic externalism is explored, as well as its relati…
Liminal Identities and Epistemic Injustice
The concept of social identity is central to research on epistemic injustice, but what it means to belong or not to belong to a marginalized identity is often left undertheorized. After offering an overview of the state of the art in social and feminist epistemology, in this introduction we argue that liminal and interstitial identities challenge received notions and push the conversation further. We then provide a brief synopsis of the articles …
Woman
Drawing on previous work, I argue that a family resemblance account of the concept woman has several beneficial consequences. Namely, it promotes hermeneutical justice, and, in time, it may serve to change the prototypes and stereotypes people tend unreflectively to associate with woman. I claim that only at that point will full hermeneutical justice be achieved. To this end, I propose a reconceptualization of the notion of hermeneutical injustic…
Hysteria, Hermeneutical Injustice and Conceptual Engineering
In this paper, we look at what Miranda Fricker (2007) calls “hermeneutical injustice” as it arises in the medical context. By drawing on the history of hysteria, I argue that the concept of hysteria has been held in place by power structures affected by negative prejudice against women. In this sense, the concept of hysteria fits the central conditions of the concept of hermeneutical injustice as characterized by Fricker. Yet, reflection on the c…
Hinges, philosophy and mind
Immunity to error through misidentification
According to a prominent strand of thought in analytic philosophy of mind, certain judgments of the form “a is F” are such that, although one can be mistaken about what property it is that a has, one cannot be mistaken that it is a that has the relevant property. Judgments of this kind are said to be immune to error through misidentification (IEM). This article has two main aims. On the one hand, it responds to a need for a systematization of the…
Errors through misidentification and the specialness of first-person thought
This introduction offers a brief overview of the significance of (immunity) to error through misidentification for debates about first-person thought. The introduction also presents the special issue’s contents
Epistemology (24 obras) · Philosophy (24 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (16 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (14 obras) · Computer Science (11 obras) · Metaphysics (10 obras) · Psychology (10 obras) · Law (8 obras) · Sociology (8 obras) · Philosophy of language (7 obras)