Keith Frankish
Biographic Data
| ID | 1034351 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Keith Frankish |
| GIVEN NAMES | Keith |
| FAMILY NAME | Frankish |
| SIGNATURE | FRANKISH K |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Crete |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0968-2944 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 20 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 29 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 18 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The Emancipation of the drone
This paper presents an extended thought experiment conducted by Daniel Dennett and the author as a way of exploring how consciousness might develop without a central “Cartesian Theater.” The starting point is a system with a real Cartesian Theater – a drone remotely piloted by a human sitting at a monitor. The imaginative exercise involves the removal of the human operator and their gradual replacement by onboard systems, emancipating the drone f…
Illusionism and the distortion thesis
Quining Diet Qualia Part II
This is the second part of the article by Keith Frankish Quining Diet Qualia, which asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The “classic” conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down “diet” conception will. I argue that this is wrong and that the diet notion o…
Quining Diet Qualia Part I
This is the first part of the article by Keith Frankish Quining Diet Qualia, which asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The “classic” conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down “diet” conception will. The author argues that this is wrong and that the diet no…
Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness. Part II
This is the second part of the article devoted to the approach to the problem of consciousness, which is called illusionism. Illusionism claims that phenomenal consciousness is illusory, because conscious experience is misrepresented as having phenomenal properties. Illusionism replaces the hard problem of consciousness with the problem of illusion. In this part, special attention is paid to the justification of illusionism and pointing out its …
Illusionism is no trick
Illusionism and its place in contemporary philosophy of mind
The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence
Artificial intelligence, or AI, is a cross-disciplinary approach to understanding, modeling, and creating intelligence of various forms. It is a critical branch of cognitive science, and its influence is increasingly being felt in other areas, including the humanities. AI applications are transforming the way we interact with each other and with our environment, and work in artificially modeling intelligence is offering new insights into the huma…
Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence
Soul Dust
Journal Article Soul Dust: The Magic of Consciousness Get access Soul Dust: The Magic of Consciousness. By Humphrey Nicholas. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011. Pp. xii + 243. Price $24.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.) Keith Frankish Keith Frankish Keith Frankish, The Open University E-mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 64, Issue 255, April…
Quining diet qualia
A diet, but not the qualia plan
Dual systems and dual attitudes
Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
Dual-Process and Dual-System Theories of Reasoning
Dual-process theories hold that there are two distinct processing modes available for many cognitive tasks: one (type 1) that is fast, automatic and non-conscious, and another (type 2) that is slow, controlled and conscious. Typically, cognitive biases are attributed to type 1 processes, which are held to be heuristic or associative, and logical responses to type 2 processes, which are characterised as rule-based or analytical. Dual-system theori…
In two minds
This book explores the idea that we have two minds – one being automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years, there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to such theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning: an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast; and a more recent…
The Architecture of the Mind - Peter Carruthers
Peter Carruthers' The Architecture of the Mind argues for, elaborates, and defends a version of the massive modularity hypothesis, according to which the human mind is composed of a great many functionally specialized components, or modules. The book consists of seven main chapters, plus a short conclusion. The first three chapters make the case for massive modularity. Ch. 1 begins by isolating the notion of modularity appropriate to the thesis t…
The Anti-Zombie Argument
The zombie argument has come to occupy a central role in the case for a non‐physicalist theory of consciousness. I seek to turn the tables on ‘zombists’ by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism. This argument invokes anti‐zombies, purely physical creatures which are conscious. I show that using the same resources as those employed by zombists, it is possible to construct an argument from the conceivability of anti‐zombies to…
Mind and Supermind
Mind and Supermind offers an alternative perspective on the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. Keith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term 'belief' refers to two distinct types of mental state, which have different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation. Building on this claim, he develops a picture of the human mind as a two-level structure, consisting of a basic mind and a supermind, and shows…
Mind and supermind
"Mind and Supermind offers a new perspective on the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. Keith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term 'belief' refers to two distinct types of mental state, which have different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation. Building on this claim, he develops a picture of the human mind as a two-level structure, consisting of a basic mind and a supermind, and shows how the…
Dual-Process and Dual-System Theories of Reasoning
Dual-process theories hold that there are two distinct processing modes available for many cognitive tasks: one (type 1) that is fast, automatic and non-conscious, and another (type 2) that is slow, controlled and conscious. Typically, cognitive biases are attributed to type 1 processes, which are held to be heuristic or associative, and logical responses to type 2 processes, which are characterised as rule-based or analytical. Dual-system theori…
The Anti-Zombie Argument
The zombie argument has come to occupy a central role in the case for a non‐physicalist theory of consciousness. I seek to turn the tables on ‘zombists’ by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism. This argument invokes anti‐zombies, purely physical creatures which are conscious. I show that using the same resources as those employed by zombists, it is possible to construct an argument from the conceivability of anti‐zombies to…
Dual systems and dual attitudes
Mind and Supermind
Mind and Supermind offers an alternative perspective on the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. Keith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term 'belief' refers to two distinct types of mental state, which have different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation. Building on this claim, he develops a picture of the human mind as a two-level structure, consisting of a basic mind and a supermind, and shows…
Mind and supermind
"Mind and Supermind offers a new perspective on the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. Keith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term 'belief' refers to two distinct types of mental state, which have different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation. Building on this claim, he develops a picture of the human mind as a two-level structure, consisting of a basic mind and a supermind, and shows how the…
The Anti-Zombie Argument
The zombie argument has come to occupy a central role in the case for a non‐physicalist theory of consciousness. I seek to turn the tables on ‘zombists’ by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism. This argument invokes anti‐zombies, purely physical creatures which are conscious. I show that using the same resources as those employed by zombists, it is possible to construct an argument from the conceivability of anti‐zombies to…
In two minds
This book explores the idea that we have two minds – one being automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years, there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to such theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning: an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast; and a more recent…
The Architecture of the Mind - Peter Carruthers
Peter Carruthers' The Architecture of the Mind argues for, elaborates, and defends a version of the massive modularity hypothesis, according to which the human mind is composed of a great many functionally specialized components, or modules. The book consists of seven main chapters, plus a short conclusion. The first three chapters make the case for massive modularity. Ch. 1 begins by isolating the notion of modularity appropriate to the thesis t…
Dual-Process and Dual-System Theories of Reasoning
Dual-process theories hold that there are two distinct processing modes available for many cognitive tasks: one (type 1) that is fast, automatic and non-conscious, and another (type 2) that is slow, controlled and conscious. Typically, cognitive biases are attributed to type 1 processes, which are held to be heuristic or associative, and logical responses to type 2 processes, which are characterised as rule-based or analytical. Dual-system theori…
Quining diet qualia
A diet, but not the qualia plan
Dual systems and dual attitudes
Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence
Artificial intelligence, or AI, is a cross-disciplinary approach to understanding, modeling, and creating intelligence of various forms. It is a critical branch of cognitive science, and its influence is increasingly being felt in other areas, including the humanities. AI applications are transforming the way we interact with each other and with our environment, and work in artificially modeling intelligence is offering new insights into the huma…
Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence
Soul Dust
Journal Article Soul Dust: The Magic of Consciousness Get access Soul Dust: The Magic of Consciousness. By Humphrey Nicholas. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011. Pp. xii + 243. Price $24.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.) Keith Frankish Keith Frankish Keith Frankish, The Open University E-mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 64, Issue 255, April…
Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness. Part II
This is the second part of the article devoted to the approach to the problem of consciousness, which is called illusionism. Illusionism claims that phenomenal consciousness is illusory, because conscious experience is misrepresented as having phenomenal properties. Illusionism replaces the hard problem of consciousness with the problem of illusion. In this part, special attention is paid to the justification of illusionism and pointing out its …
Illusionism is no trick
Illusionism and its place in contemporary philosophy of mind
Quining Diet Qualia Part II
This is the second part of the article by Keith Frankish Quining Diet Qualia, which asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The “classic” conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down “diet” conception will. I argue that this is wrong and that the diet notion o…
Quining Diet Qualia Part I
This is the first part of the article by Keith Frankish Quining Diet Qualia, which asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The “classic” conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down “diet” conception will. The author argues that this is wrong and that the diet no…
Illusionism and the distortion thesis
The Emancipation of the drone
This paper presents an extended thought experiment conducted by Daniel Dennett and the author as a way of exploring how consciousness might develop without a central “Cartesian Theater.” The starting point is a system with a real Cartesian Theater – a drone remotely piloted by a human sitting at a monitor. The imaginative exercise involves the removal of the human operator and their gradual replacement by onboard systems, emancipating the drone f…
Epistemology (12 works) · Philosophy (12 works) · Psychology (10 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Cognitive science (7 works) · Consciousness (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Cognition (5 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (4 works) · Cognitive psychology (4 works)