A B Levison
Biographic Data
| ID | 1042437 |
|---|---|
| NAME | A B Levison |
| GIVEN NAMES | A B |
| FAMILY NAME | Levison |
| SIGNATURE | LEVISON A B |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 10 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1964 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1983 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Might Events be Propositions
By the term 'propositional object' I mean anything which is not an individual and is both a bearer of truth value and a possible object of someone's propositional attitude such as thinking that . . ., believing that . . ., remembering that . . ., intending that . . ., fearing that . and so on.' I assume that there are two sorts of propositional objects: propositions and states of affairs. A 'proposition' is a propositional object which is true or…
The Structure of Mind
Knowledge and society
The question of the nature of our knowledge of society has recently been raised in an interesting form by Peter Winch in his monograph, The Idea of a Social Science, and debated in recent issues of Inquiry by A. R. Louch and Winch himself. In this paper I attempt to contribute to this discussion by attacking the problem of the nature of the empirical bases of social scientific knowledge, the main point in dispute between Winch and Louch. I try to…
Logic, Language, and Consistency in Tarski's Theory of Truth
Wittgenstein and Logical Laws
Wittgenstein And Logical Laws A. B. Levison A. B. Levison Northwestern University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 14, Issue 57, October 1964, Pages 345–354, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217774 Published: 01 October 1964
Intension and Decision: A Philosophical Study
Knowledge and society
The question of the nature of our knowledge of society has recently been raised in an interesting form by Peter Winch in his monograph, The Idea of a Social Science, and debated in recent issues of Inquiry by A. R. Louch and Winch himself. In this paper I attempt to contribute to this discussion by attacking the problem of the nature of the empirical bases of social scientific knowledge, the main point in dispute between Winch and Louch. I try to…
Might Events be Propositions
By the term 'propositional object' I mean anything which is not an individual and is both a bearer of truth value and a possible object of someone's propositional attitude such as thinking that . . ., believing that . . ., remembering that . . ., intending that . . ., fearing that . and so on.' I assume that there are two sorts of propositional objects: propositions and states of affairs. A 'proposition' is a propositional object which is true or…
Wittgenstein and Logical Laws
Wittgenstein And Logical Laws A. B. Levison A. B. Levison Northwestern University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 14, Issue 57, October 1964, Pages 345–354, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217774 Published: 01 October 1964
Intension and Decision: A Philosophical Study
Logic, Language, and Consistency in Tarski's Theory of Truth
The Structure of Mind
Knowledge and society
The question of the nature of our knowledge of society has recently been raised in an interesting form by Peter Winch in his monograph, The Idea of a Social Science, and debated in recent issues of Inquiry by A. R. Louch and Winch himself. In this paper I attempt to contribute to this discussion by attacking the problem of the nature of the empirical bases of social scientific knowledge, the main point in dispute between Winch and Louch. I try to…
Might Events be Propositions
By the term 'propositional object' I mean anything which is not an individual and is both a bearer of truth value and a possible object of someone's propositional attitude such as thinking that . . ., believing that . . ., remembering that . . ., intending that . . ., fearing that . and so on.' I assume that there are two sorts of propositional objects: propositions and states of affairs. A 'proposition' is a propositional object which is true or…
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Linguistics (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis (1 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Cognitive science (1 works)