Vida Yao
Biographic Data
| ID | 1044606 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Vida Yao |
| GIVEN NAMES | Vida |
| FAMILY NAME | Yao |
| SIGNATURE | YAO V |
| AFFILIATIONS | Rice University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Priorities
D’Arms and Jacobson (hereafter, D&J) present a view, Rational Sentimentalism (hereafter, RS), which seeks to vindicate what they call the “sentimental values”, such as the amusing, the disgusting, and the shameful, as well as our appeal to reasons in correcting those values’ paired emotions – our own, and those of others. RS has three main components. The first is an argument that when we describe something as, for example, disgusting, we can be …
How hard is it
Eros and Anxiety
Recent philosophical interest in “transformative experiences” is largely motivated by L. A. Paul’s arguments that such experiences challenge our hopes to live up to an ideal she believes is upheld within western, wealthy cultures. If these experiences reveal information to us about the world and ourselves that is in principle unavailable to us before we undergo them, it seems that there is no hope for us to be “rational”, “authentic” and “autonom…
The good fit1
Philosophers are now wary of conflating the “fittingness” or accuracy of an emotion with any form of moral assessment of that emotion. Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, who originally cautioned against this “conflation”, also warned philosophers not to infer that an emotion is inaccurate from the fact that feeling it would be morally inappropriate, or that it is accurate from the fact that feeling it would be morally appropriate. Such inferences…
I love women’
The Undesirable & the Adesirable
The guise of the good thesis can be understood as an attempt to distinguish between human motivations that are intelligible as desires and those that are not. I propose, first, that we understand the intelligibility at stake here as the kind necessary for the experience of reactive attitudes, both negative and positive, to the behavior and motivations of an agent. Given this, I argue that the thesis must be understood as proposing substantive con…
Strong-willed Akrasia
To act akratically is to act, knowingly, against what you judge is best for you to do, and it is traditionally assumed that to do this is to be weak-willed . Some have rejected this identification of akrasia and weakness of will, arguing that the latter is instead best understood as a matter of abandoning one’s reasonable resolutions. This paper also rejects the identification of akrasia and weakness of will, but argues that this alternative conc…
The good fit1
Philosophers are now wary of conflating the “fittingness” or accuracy of an emotion with any form of moral assessment of that emotion. Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, who originally cautioned against this “conflation”, also warned philosophers not to infer that an emotion is inaccurate from the fact that feeling it would be morally inappropriate, or that it is accurate from the fact that feeling it would be morally appropriate. Such inferences…
I love women’
The Undesirable & the Adesirable
The guise of the good thesis can be understood as an attempt to distinguish between human motivations that are intelligible as desires and those that are not. I propose, first, that we understand the intelligibility at stake here as the kind necessary for the experience of reactive attitudes, both negative and positive, to the behavior and motivations of an agent. Given this, I argue that the thesis must be understood as proposing substantive con…
Strong-willed Akrasia
To act akratically is to act, knowingly, against what you judge is best for you to do, and it is traditionally assumed that to do this is to be weak-willed . Some have rejected this identification of akrasia and weakness of will, arguing that the latter is instead best understood as a matter of abandoning one’s reasonable resolutions. This paper also rejects the identification of akrasia and weakness of will, but argues that this alternative conc…
The Undesirable & the Adesirable
The guise of the good thesis can be understood as an attempt to distinguish between human motivations that are intelligible as desires and those that are not. I propose, first, that we understand the intelligibility at stake here as the kind necessary for the experience of reactive attitudes, both negative and positive, to the behavior and motivations of an agent. Given this, I argue that the thesis must be understood as proposing substantive con…
Strong-willed Akrasia
To act akratically is to act, knowingly, against what you judge is best for you to do, and it is traditionally assumed that to do this is to be weak-willed . Some have rejected this identification of akrasia and weakness of will, arguing that the latter is instead best understood as a matter of abandoning one’s reasonable resolutions. This paper also rejects the identification of akrasia and weakness of will, but argues that this alternative conc…
I love women’
How hard is it
Eros and Anxiety
Recent philosophical interest in “transformative experiences” is largely motivated by L. A. Paul’s arguments that such experiences challenge our hopes to live up to an ideal she believes is upheld within western, wealthy cultures. If these experiences reveal information to us about the world and ourselves that is in principle unavailable to us before we undergo them, it seems that there is no hope for us to be “rational”, “authentic” and “autonom…
The good fit1
Philosophers are now wary of conflating the “fittingness” or accuracy of an emotion with any form of moral assessment of that emotion. Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, who originally cautioned against this “conflation”, also warned philosophers not to infer that an emotion is inaccurate from the fact that feeling it would be morally inappropriate, or that it is accurate from the fact that feeling it would be morally appropriate. Such inferences…
Priorities
D’Arms and Jacobson (hereafter, D&J) present a view, Rational Sentimentalism (hereafter, RS), which seeks to vindicate what they call the “sentimental values”, such as the amusing, the disgusting, and the shameful, as well as our appeal to reasons in correcting those values’ paired emotions – our own, and those of others. RS has three main components. The first is an argument that when we describe something as, for example, disgusting, we can be …
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Analytic philosophy (2 works)