Nevin Climenhaga
Biographic Data
| ID | 1046003 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nevin Climenhaga |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nevin |
| FAMILY NAME | Climenhaga |
| SIGNATURE | CLIMENHAGA N |
| AFFILIATIONS | Dianoia Institute of Philosophy Australian Catholic University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7376-8788 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Unequal Risks of Mistaken Conviction Are Unavoidable
Di Bello and O’Neil argue that innocent defendants in criminal trials have a right to not be exposed to a greater risk of false conviction than other innocent defendants facing similar charges. They argue that this right is violated when profile evidence is admitted to trial but not when other forms of evidence, such as eyewitness testimony or trace evidence, are admitted. In this article I show that all kinds of evidence can lead to unequal risk…
Epistemic probabilities are degrees of support, not degrees of (rational) belief
I argue that when we use ‘probability’ language in epistemic contexts—e.g., when we ask how probable some hypothesis is, given the evidence available to us—we are talking about degrees of support , rather than degrees of belief . The epistemic probability of A given B is the mind‐independent degree to which B supports A, not the degree to which someone with B as their evidence believes A, or the degree to which someone would or should believe A i…
Papias’s Prologue and the Probability of Parallels
Several scholars, including Martin Hengel, R. Alan Culpepper, and Richard Bauckham, have argued that Papias had knowledge of the Gospel of John on the grounds that Papias's prologue lists six of Jesus's disciples in the same order in which they are named in the Gospel of John: Andrew, Peter, Philip, Thomas, James, and John. In “A Note on Papias's Knowledge of the Fourth Gospel” (JBL 129 [2010]: 793–94), Jake H. O'Connell presents a statistical an…
How Explanation Guides Confirmation
Where E is the proposition that [If H and O were true, H would explain O], William Roche and Elliot Sober have argued that P(H | O&E) = P(H | O). In this article I argue that not only is this equality not generally true, it is false in the very kinds of cases that Roche and Sober focus on, involving frequency data. In fact, in such cases O raises the probability of H only given that there is an explanatory connection between them
Infinite Value and the Best of All Possible Worlds
A common argument for atheism runs as follows: God would not create a world worse than other worlds he could have created instead. However, if God exists, he could have created a better world than this one. Therefore, God does not exist. In this paper I challenge the second premise of this argument. I argue that if God exists, our world will continue without end, with God continuing to create value‐bearers, and sustaining and perfecting the value…
How Explanation Guides Confirmation
Where E is the proposition that [If H and O were true, H would explain O], William Roche and Elliot Sober have argued that P(H | O&E) = P(H | O). In this article I argue that not only is this equality not generally true, it is false in the very kinds of cases that Roche and Sober focus on, involving frequency data. In fact, in such cases O raises the probability of H only given that there is an explanatory connection between them
Infinite Value and the Best of All Possible Worlds
A common argument for atheism runs as follows: God would not create a world worse than other worlds he could have created instead. However, if God exists, he could have created a better world than this one. Therefore, God does not exist. In this paper I challenge the second premise of this argument. I argue that if God exists, our world will continue without end, with God continuing to create value‐bearers, and sustaining and perfecting the value…
Epistemic probabilities are degrees of support, not degrees of (rational) belief
I argue that when we use ‘probability’ language in epistemic contexts—e.g., when we ask how probable some hypothesis is, given the evidence available to us—we are talking about degrees of support , rather than degrees of belief . The epistemic probability of A given B is the mind‐independent degree to which B supports A, not the degree to which someone with B as their evidence believes A, or the degree to which someone would or should believe A i…
How Explanation Guides Confirmation
Where E is the proposition that [If H and O were true, H would explain O], William Roche and Elliot Sober have argued that P(H | O&E) = P(H | O). In this article I argue that not only is this equality not generally true, it is false in the very kinds of cases that Roche and Sober focus on, involving frequency data. In fact, in such cases O raises the probability of H only given that there is an explanatory connection between them
Infinite Value and the Best of All Possible Worlds
A common argument for atheism runs as follows: God would not create a world worse than other worlds he could have created instead. However, if God exists, he could have created a better world than this one. Therefore, God does not exist. In this paper I challenge the second premise of this argument. I argue that if God exists, our world will continue without end, with God continuing to create value‐bearers, and sustaining and perfecting the value…
Papias’s Prologue and the Probability of Parallels
Several scholars, including Martin Hengel, R. Alan Culpepper, and Richard Bauckham, have argued that Papias had knowledge of the Gospel of John on the grounds that Papias's prologue lists six of Jesus's disciples in the same order in which they are named in the Gospel of John: Andrew, Peter, Philip, Thomas, James, and John. In “A Note on Papias's Knowledge of the Fourth Gospel” (JBL 129 [2010]: 793–94), Jake H. O'Connell presents a statistical an…
Epistemic probabilities are degrees of support, not degrees of (rational) belief
I argue that when we use ‘probability’ language in epistemic contexts—e.g., when we ask how probable some hypothesis is, given the evidence available to us—we are talking about degrees of support , rather than degrees of belief . The epistemic probability of A given B is the mind‐independent degree to which B supports A, not the degree to which someone with B as their evidence believes A, or the degree to which someone would or should believe A i…
Unequal Risks of Mistaken Conviction Are Unavoidable
Di Bello and O’Neil argue that innocent defendants in criminal trials have a right to not be exposed to a greater risk of false conviction than other innocent defendants facing similar charges. They argue that this right is violated when profile evidence is admitted to trial but not when other forms of evidence, such as eyewitness testimony or trace evidence, are admitted. In this article I show that all kinds of evidence can lead to unequal risk…
Philosophy (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Argument (complex analysis (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 works) · Archaeology (1 work) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 work) · Atheism (1 work) · Bayes' theorem (1 work)