Ulf Hlobil
Biographic Data
| ID | 1046108 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ulf Hlobil |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ulf |
| FAMILY NAME | Hlobil |
| SIGNATURE | HLOBIL U |
| AFFILIATIONS | Concordia University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5072-9380 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 18 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 25 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 18 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Replies for book symposium
Précis of Reasons for Logic, Logic for Reasons
Explaining Deontic Status by Good Reasoning
Two Guises of the Good in Anscombe
An inferentialist approach to Mates’s Puzzle
The Adoption Problem in the Philosophy of Logic
In the philosophy of logic, the Adoption Problem is a challenge to the claim that reasoners can, in certain ways, rationally change which logic they use. The (alleged) problem is that if someone does not already infer in accordance with some fundamental logical principles (such as Universal Instantiation or Modus Ponens), then they cannot rationally begin to do so: the "adoption" of these principles is either unnecessary or impossible. In the lit…
Reasons for Logic, Logic for Reasons
Resolutions Against Uniqueness
Brilliance Beliefs, Not Mindsets, Explain Inverse Gender Gaps in Psychology and Philosophy
Teleo-Inferentialism
The paper presents teleo-inferentialism, which is a novel meta-semantic theory that combines advantages of teleosemantics and normative inferentialism. Like normative inferentialism, teleo-inferentialism holds that contents are individuated by the norms that govern inferences in which they occur. This allows teleo-inferentialism to account for sophisticated concepts. Like teleosemantics, teleo-inferentialism explains conceptual norms in a natural…
A truth-maker semantics for ST
The guise of good reason
The paper argues for a version of the Guise of the Good thesis, namely the claim that if someone acts as the result of practical reasoning, then she takes her premises to jointly provide a sufficient and undefeated reason for her action. I argue for this by showing, first, that it is an application of Boghossian's Taking Condition on inference to practical reasoning and, second, that the motivations for the Taking Condition for theoretical reason…
Why you cannot make people better by telling them what is good
So‐called optimists about moral testimony argue, against pessimists, that, ceteris paribus, we ought to accept and act in accordance with trustworthy, pure moral testimony. I argue that even if we grant this, we need to explain why moral testimony cannot make us more virtuous. I offer an explanation that appeals to the fact that we cannot share inferential abilities via testimony. This explanation is compatible with the core commitments of optimi…
Limits of Abductivism About Logic
I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of th…
Faithfulness for naive validity
Virtues for the Imperfect
Social norms and unthinkable options
Anti-Normativism Evaluated
I argue that recent attempts to show that meaning and content are not normative fail. The two most important arguments anti-normativists have presented are what I call the ‘argument from constitution’ and the ‘argument from guidance’. Both of these arguments suffer from the same basic problem: they overlook the possibility of focusing on assessability by norms, rather than compliance with norms or guidance by norms. Moreover, I argue that the ant…
Limits of Abductivism About Logic
I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of th…
Anti-Normativism Evaluated
I argue that recent attempts to show that meaning and content are not normative fail. The two most important arguments anti-normativists have presented are what I call the ‘argument from constitution’ and the ‘argument from guidance’. Both of these arguments suffer from the same basic problem: they overlook the possibility of focusing on assessability by norms, rather than compliance with norms or guidance by norms. Moreover, I argue that the ant…
Faithfulness for naive validity
Social norms and unthinkable options
A truth-maker semantics for ST
The Adoption Problem in the Philosophy of Logic
In the philosophy of logic, the Adoption Problem is a challenge to the claim that reasoners can, in certain ways, rationally change which logic they use. The (alleged) problem is that if someone does not already infer in accordance with some fundamental logical principles (such as Universal Instantiation or Modus Ponens), then they cannot rationally begin to do so: the "adoption" of these principles is either unnecessary or impossible. In the lit…
Brilliance Beliefs, Not Mindsets, Explain Inverse Gender Gaps in Psychology and Philosophy
Anti-Normativism Evaluated
I argue that recent attempts to show that meaning and content are not normative fail. The two most important arguments anti-normativists have presented are what I call the ‘argument from constitution’ and the ‘argument from guidance’. Both of these arguments suffer from the same basic problem: they overlook the possibility of focusing on assessability by norms, rather than compliance with norms or guidance by norms. Moreover, I argue that the ant…
Social norms and unthinkable options
Virtues for the Imperfect
Faithfulness for naive validity
Why you cannot make people better by telling them what is good
So‐called optimists about moral testimony argue, against pessimists, that, ceteris paribus, we ought to accept and act in accordance with trustworthy, pure moral testimony. I argue that even if we grant this, we need to explain why moral testimony cannot make us more virtuous. I offer an explanation that appeals to the fact that we cannot share inferential abilities via testimony. This explanation is compatible with the core commitments of optimi…
Limits of Abductivism About Logic
I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of th…
The guise of good reason
The paper argues for a version of the Guise of the Good thesis, namely the claim that if someone acts as the result of practical reasoning, then she takes her premises to jointly provide a sufficient and undefeated reason for her action. I argue for this by showing, first, that it is an application of Boghossian's Taking Condition on inference to practical reasoning and, second, that the motivations for the Taking Condition for theoretical reason…
Teleo-Inferentialism
The paper presents teleo-inferentialism, which is a novel meta-semantic theory that combines advantages of teleosemantics and normative inferentialism. Like normative inferentialism, teleo-inferentialism holds that contents are individuated by the norms that govern inferences in which they occur. This allows teleo-inferentialism to account for sophisticated concepts. Like teleosemantics, teleo-inferentialism explains conceptual norms in a natural…
A truth-maker semantics for ST
Resolutions Against Uniqueness
Brilliance Beliefs, Not Mindsets, Explain Inverse Gender Gaps in Psychology and Philosophy
Reasons for Logic, Logic for Reasons
Explaining Deontic Status by Good Reasoning
Two Guises of the Good in Anscombe
An inferentialist approach to Mates’s Puzzle
The Adoption Problem in the Philosophy of Logic
In the philosophy of logic, the Adoption Problem is a challenge to the claim that reasoners can, in certain ways, rationally change which logic they use. The (alleged) problem is that if someone does not already infer in accordance with some fundamental logical principles (such as Universal Instantiation or Modus Ponens), then they cannot rationally begin to do so: the "adoption" of these principles is either unnecessary or impossible. In the lit…
Replies for book symposium
Précis of Reasons for Logic, Logic for Reasons
Epistemology (12 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (9 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Psychology (7 works) · Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophy of language (6 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (5 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 works)