Alan Sidelle
Biographic Data
| ID | 1047022 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alan Sidelle |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alan |
| FAMILY NAME | Sidelle |
| SIGNATURE | SIDELLE A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Wisconsin–Madison |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1990 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Dispositional essentialism and the necessity of laws: A deflationary account
Modality and Objects
Journal Article Modality and Objects Get access Alan Sidelle Alan Sidelle University of Wisconsin‐Madison Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 238, January 2010, Pages 109–125, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.604.x Published: 25 November 2008
Ordinary Objects - Amie Thomasson: Book Reviews
Amie Thomasson has written a lovely book which is certain to irritate many professional metaphysicians. She defends the objects of common sense – tables, stones and dogs – against a wide array of arguments which have been offered against them in recent years. That will not provide the irritation. What will is the way she defends common sense. Her approach is semantic, broadly speaking. According to Thomasson, the attacks on common sense are based…
Innoculi Innocula
In “Innocuous Infallibility,” Earl Conee argues that the infallibility to which I argue Internalism is committed, in “An Argument that Internalism Requires Infallibility,” is harmless and trivial. I maintain that this overlooks the fact that Internalism makes use of an intuitive notion of ‘epistemic twinhood’ to drive its position, rather than one antecedently defined with a filled‐out notion of ‘relevant epistemic circumstances’. Conee is correc…
An Argument That Internalism Requires Infallibility
Most contemporary internalists are fallibilists, denying that there need be anything about which we are infallible for us to have knowledge or justified beliefs. At the same time, internalists standardly appeal to ‘internal twins’ in arguing against externalism and motivating internalism—a Cartesian demon can ruin the ‘external’ relations we have to the world, but one is equally well justified in one's beliefs whether or not one is subject to suc…
Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness
Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness
Book Review| July 01 2000 Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness OCCASIONS OF IDENTITY: THE METAPHYSICS OF PERSISTENCE, CHANGE, AND SAMENESS. By André Gallois. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. xiii, 296. Alan Sidelle Alan Sidelle Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 469–471. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-3-469 Cite Icon Cite Shar…
Finding an Intrinsic Account of Identity: What is the Source of Duplication Cases
Many philosophers believe that identity through time cannot depend on features extrinsic to the relata and relations between them. This goes with the view that one must deny identity in cases for which there is a 'duplication case'-a case just like the first, but for an additional, 'external' element which provides an equal or better 'candidate' for identity with one of the relata. Such friends of intrinsicness cannot remedy the failure of contin…
Thought Experiments in Philosophy
A Companion to Metaphysics
What's Wrong with Being Strange
Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism
Formed Matter Without Objects: A Reply to Denkel
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Remnants of Meaning
Modality and Objects
Journal Article Modality and Objects Get access Alan Sidelle Alan Sidelle University of Wisconsin‐Madison Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 238, January 2010, Pages 109–125, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.604.x Published: 25 November 2008
Finding an Intrinsic Account of Identity: What is the Source of Duplication Cases
Many philosophers believe that identity through time cannot depend on features extrinsic to the relata and relations between them. This goes with the view that one must deny identity in cases for which there is a 'duplication case'-a case just like the first, but for an additional, 'external' element which provides an equal or better 'candidate' for identity with one of the relata. Such friends of intrinsicness cannot remedy the failure of contin…
Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism
Remnants of Meaning
Formed Matter Without Objects: A Reply to Denkel
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism
A Companion to Metaphysics
What's Wrong with Being Strange
Thought Experiments in Philosophy
Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness
Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness
Book Review| July 01 2000 Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness OCCASIONS OF IDENTITY: THE METAPHYSICS OF PERSISTENCE, CHANGE, AND SAMENESS. By André Gallois. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. xiii, 296. Alan Sidelle Alan Sidelle Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 469–471. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-3-469 Cite Icon Cite Shar…
Finding an Intrinsic Account of Identity: What is the Source of Duplication Cases
Many philosophers believe that identity through time cannot depend on features extrinsic to the relata and relations between them. This goes with the view that one must deny identity in cases for which there is a 'duplication case'-a case just like the first, but for an additional, 'external' element which provides an equal or better 'candidate' for identity with one of the relata. Such friends of intrinsicness cannot remedy the failure of contin…
An Argument That Internalism Requires Infallibility
Most contemporary internalists are fallibilists, denying that there need be anything about which we are infallible for us to have knowledge or justified beliefs. At the same time, internalists standardly appeal to ‘internal twins’ in arguing against externalism and motivating internalism—a Cartesian demon can ruin the ‘external’ relations we have to the world, but one is equally well justified in one's beliefs whether or not one is subject to suc…
Innoculi Innocula
In “Innocuous Infallibility,” Earl Conee argues that the infallibility to which I argue Internalism is committed, in “An Argument that Internalism Requires Infallibility,” is harmless and trivial. I maintain that this overlooks the fact that Internalism makes use of an intuitive notion of ‘epistemic twinhood’ to drive its position, rather than one antecedently defined with a filled‐out notion of ‘relevant epistemic circumstances’. Conee is correc…
Ordinary Objects - Amie Thomasson: Book Reviews
Amie Thomasson has written a lovely book which is certain to irritate many professional metaphysicians. She defends the objects of common sense – tables, stones and dogs – against a wide array of arguments which have been offered against them in recent years. That will not provide the irritation. What will is the way she defends common sense. Her approach is semantic, broadly speaking. According to Thomasson, the attacks on common sense are based…
Modality and Objects
Journal Article Modality and Objects Get access Alan Sidelle Alan Sidelle University of Wisconsin‐Madison Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 238, January 2010, Pages 109–125, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.604.x Published: 25 November 2008
Dispositional essentialism and the necessity of laws: A deflationary account
Philosophy (13 works) · Epistemology (12 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 works) · Metaphysics (6 works) · Aesthetics (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Contemporary philosophy (4 works) · General interest (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Psychology (4 works)