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Alan Sidelle

Biographic Data

ID1047022
NAMEAlan Sidelle
GIVEN NAMESAlan
FAMILY NAMESidelle
SIGNATURESIDELLE A
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Wisconsin–Madison
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS14
TOTAL CITATIONS6
AUTHOR COUNT14
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1990
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX2
  • Dispositional essentialism and the necessity of laws: A deflationary account

    Open Access•Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•Philosophical Studies•2025•References: 37

  • Modality and Objects

    Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2010•Cited by: 3

    Journal Article Modality and Objects Get access Alan Sidelle Alan Sidelle University of Wisconsin‐Madison Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 238, January 2010, Pages 109–125, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.604.x Published: 25 November 2008

  • Ordinary Objects - Amie Thomasson: Book Reviews

    Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2008

    Amie Thomasson has written a lovely book which is certain to irritate many professional metaphysicians. She defends the objects of common sense – tables, stones and dogs – against a wide array of arguments which have been offered against them in recent years. That will not provide the irritation. What will is the way she defends common sense. Her approach is semantic, broadly speaking. According to Thomasson, the attacks on common sense are based…

  • Innoculi Innocula

    Open Access•Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2002

    In “Innocuous Infallibility,” Earl Conee argues that the infallibility to which I argue Internalism is committed, in “An Argument that Internalism Requires Infallibility,” is harmless and trivial. I maintain that this overlooks the fact that Internalism makes use of an intuitive notion of ‘epistemic twinhood’ to drive its position, rather than one antecedently defined with a filled‐out notion of ‘relevant epistemic circumstances’. Conee is correc…

  • An Argument That Internalism Requires Infallibility

    Open Access•Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2001

    Most contemporary internalists are fallibilists, denying that there need be anything about which we are infallible for us to have knowledge or justified beliefs. At the same time, internalists standardly appeal to ‘internal twins’ in arguing against externalism and motivating internalism—a Cartesian demon can ruin the ‘external’ relations we have to the world, but one is equally well justified in one's beliefs whether or not one is subject to suc…

  • Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness

    Alan Sidelle, André Gallois•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2000

  • Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness

    Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2000

    Book Review| July 01 2000 Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness OCCASIONS OF IDENTITY: THE METAPHYSICS OF PERSISTENCE, CHANGE, AND SAMENESS. By André Gallois. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. xiii, 296. Alan Sidelle Alan Sidelle Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 469–471. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-3-469 Cite Icon Cite Shar…

  • Finding an Intrinsic Account of Identity: What is the Source of Duplication Cases

    Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2000•Cited by: 2

    Many philosophers believe that identity through time cannot depend on features extrinsic to the relata and relations between them. This goes with the view that one must deny identity in cases for which there is a 'duplication case'-a case just like the first, but for an additional, 'external' element which provides an equal or better 'candidate' for identity with one of the relata. Such friends of intrinsicness cannot remedy the failure of contin…

  • Thought Experiments in Philosophy

    Alan Sidelle, Soren Haggqvist•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1998

  • A Companion to Metaphysics

    Alan Sidelle, Jaegwon Kim et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1996

  • What's Wrong with Being Strange

    Alan Sidelle, Eli Hirsch•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1996

  • Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism

    Stephen Yablo, Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1992•Cited by: 1

  • Formed Matter Without Objects: A Reply to Denkel

    Open Access•Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1991

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • Remnants of Meaning

    Alan Sidelle, Stephen Schiffer•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1990

  • Modality and Objects

    Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2010•Cited by: 3

    Journal Article Modality and Objects Get access Alan Sidelle Alan Sidelle University of Wisconsin‐Madison Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 238, January 2010, Pages 109–125, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.604.x Published: 25 November 2008

  • Finding an Intrinsic Account of Identity: What is the Source of Duplication Cases

    Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2000•Cited by: 2

    Many philosophers believe that identity through time cannot depend on features extrinsic to the relata and relations between them. This goes with the view that one must deny identity in cases for which there is a 'duplication case'-a case just like the first, but for an additional, 'external' element which provides an equal or better 'candidate' for identity with one of the relata. Such friends of intrinsicness cannot remedy the failure of contin…

  • Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism

    Stephen Yablo, Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1992•Cited by: 1

  • Remnants of Meaning

    Alan Sidelle, Stephen Schiffer•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1990

  • Formed Matter Without Objects: A Reply to Denkel

    Open Access•Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1991

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism

    Stephen Yablo, Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1992•Cited by: 1

  • A Companion to Metaphysics

    Alan Sidelle, Jaegwon Kim et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1996

  • What's Wrong with Being Strange

    Alan Sidelle, Eli Hirsch•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1996

  • Thought Experiments in Philosophy

    Alan Sidelle, Soren Haggqvist•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1998

  • Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness

    Alan Sidelle, André Gallois•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2000

  • Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness

    Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2000

    Book Review| July 01 2000 Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness OCCASIONS OF IDENTITY: THE METAPHYSICS OF PERSISTENCE, CHANGE, AND SAMENESS. By André Gallois. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. xiii, 296. Alan Sidelle Alan Sidelle Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 469–471. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-3-469 Cite Icon Cite Shar…

  • Finding an Intrinsic Account of Identity: What is the Source of Duplication Cases

    Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2000•Cited by: 2

    Many philosophers believe that identity through time cannot depend on features extrinsic to the relata and relations between them. This goes with the view that one must deny identity in cases for which there is a 'duplication case'-a case just like the first, but for an additional, 'external' element which provides an equal or better 'candidate' for identity with one of the relata. Such friends of intrinsicness cannot remedy the failure of contin…

  • An Argument That Internalism Requires Infallibility

    Open Access•Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2001

    Most contemporary internalists are fallibilists, denying that there need be anything about which we are infallible for us to have knowledge or justified beliefs. At the same time, internalists standardly appeal to ‘internal twins’ in arguing against externalism and motivating internalism—a Cartesian demon can ruin the ‘external’ relations we have to the world, but one is equally well justified in one's beliefs whether or not one is subject to suc…

  • Innoculi Innocula

    Open Access•Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2002

    In “Innocuous Infallibility,” Earl Conee argues that the infallibility to which I argue Internalism is committed, in “An Argument that Internalism Requires Infallibility,” is harmless and trivial. I maintain that this overlooks the fact that Internalism makes use of an intuitive notion of ‘epistemic twinhood’ to drive its position, rather than one antecedently defined with a filled‐out notion of ‘relevant epistemic circumstances’. Conee is correc…

  • Ordinary Objects - Amie Thomasson: Book Reviews

    Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2008

    Amie Thomasson has written a lovely book which is certain to irritate many professional metaphysicians. She defends the objects of common sense – tables, stones and dogs – against a wide array of arguments which have been offered against them in recent years. That will not provide the irritation. What will is the way she defends common sense. Her approach is semantic, broadly speaking. According to Thomasson, the attacks on common sense are based…

  • Modality and Objects

    Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2010•Cited by: 3

    Journal Article Modality and Objects Get access Alan Sidelle Alan Sidelle University of Wisconsin‐Madison Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 238, January 2010, Pages 109–125, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.604.x Published: 25 November 2008

  • Dispositional essentialism and the necessity of laws: A deflationary account

    Open Access•Alan Sidelle•ARTICLE•Philosophical Studies•2025•References: 37

Philosophy (13 works) · Epistemology (12 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 works) · Metaphysics (6 works) · Aesthetics (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Contemporary philosophy (4 works) · General interest (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Psychology (4 works)

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