Jon Erling Litland
Biographic Data
| ID | 1047362 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jon Erling Litland |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jon Erling |
| FAMILY NAME | Litland |
| SIGNATURE | LITLAND J E |
| AFFILIATIONS | The University of Texas at Austin |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7162-0045 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Beyond Substitution—An Antipositionalist's Guide to Subtraction
Existing accounts of relations do not properly account for variably polyadic relations: they fail to capture the relationship between completions of the same relation by different numbers of relata. This paper develops a fully general account of such relations by adding an operation of subtraction to the antipositionalist theory of relations pioneered by Fine in “Neutral Relations”. Along the way we rebut a common argument against antipositionali…
Grounding conditionals
This paper develops a systematic account of the immediate grounds of conditionals, uses this to give a ground-theoretic semantics for the language of intuitionistic propositional logic, and proves intuitionistic logic sound and complete with respect to this semantics. A striking consequence of the account is that all intuitionistic validities are zero-grounded and thus—unlike distinctively classical validities—make no demand on reality
Towards an inferentialist account of essentialist explanation
The fact that it is essential that p in some sense explains that p . This paper makes one negative and one positive contribution. Negatively, the paper argues that the sense of explanation is not ground , and we prove—contra Vogt—that the issue has nothing to do with whether one works with a representational or worldly notion of ground. Positively, the paper proposes an inferentialist account of essence and uses that to develop an account of esse…
Criteria of Identity
A criterion of identity for s states that two objects of s are identical if and only if those very objects stand in a certain relation .This paper proposes an essentialist account of what it is to be a criterion of identity: for a statement to be a criterion of identity for s it has to be essential to being an , as such, that two s are identical iff they stand in .We argue that this account is superior to recently proposed ground-theoretic accoun…
Grounding Legalism
Many authors have proposed that grounding is closely related to metaphysical laws. However, we argue that no existing theory of metaphysical laws is sufficiently general. In this paper, we develop a general theory of grounding laws, proposing that they are generative relations between pluralities of propositions and propositions. We develop the account in an essentialist language; this allows us to state precisely the sense in which grounding mig…
Grounding and defining identity
I systematically defend a novel account of the grounds for identity and distinctness facts: they are all uniquely zero‐grounded. First, this Null Account is shown to avoid a range of problems facing other accounts: a relation satisfying the Null Account would be an excellent candidate for being the identity relation. Second, a plenitudinist view of relations suggests that there is such a relation. To flesh out this plenitudinist view I sketch a n…
Ground first
This paper evaluates the proof-theoretic definition of ground developed by Poggiolesi in a range of recent publications and argues that her proposed definition fails. The paper then outlines an alternative approach where logical consequence relations and the logical operations are defined in terms of ground
Collective Abstraction
This paper develops a novel theory of abstraction—what we call collective abstraction. The theory solves a notorious problem for noneliminative structuralism. The noneliminative structuralist holds that in addition to various isomorphic systems there is a pure structure that can be abstracted from each of these systems; but existing accounts of abstraction fail for nonrigid systems like the complex numbers. The problem with the existing accounts …
Grounding Ground
The Problem of Iterated Ground is to explain what grounds truths about ground: if Γ grounds φ, what grounds that Γ grounds φ? This paper proposes a novel solution based on tying grounding to explanatory arguments. By developing a rigorous account of explanatory arguments operators for factive and non-factive ground can be equipped with natural introduction and elimination rules. A satisfactory account of iterated ground falls directly out of the …
Vagueness & Modality—An Ecumenical Approach
Grounding, Explanation, and the Limit of Internality
Most authors on metaphysical grounding have taken full grounding to be an internal relation in the sense that it's necessary that if the grounds and the grounded both obtain, then the grounds ground the grounded. The negative part of this essay exploits empirical and provably nonparadoxical self-reference to prove conclusively that even immediate full grounding isn't an internal relation in this sense. The positive, second part of this essay uses…
Grounding, Explanation, and the Limit of Internality
Most authors on metaphysical grounding have taken full grounding to be an internal relation in the sense that it's necessary that if the grounds and the grounded both obtain, then the grounds ground the grounded. The negative part of this essay exploits empirical and provably nonparadoxical self-reference to prove conclusively that even immediate full grounding isn't an internal relation in this sense. The positive, second part of this essay uses…
Vagueness & Modality—An Ecumenical Approach
Grounding, Explanation, and the Limit of Internality
Most authors on metaphysical grounding have taken full grounding to be an internal relation in the sense that it's necessary that if the grounds and the grounded both obtain, then the grounds ground the grounded. The negative part of this essay exploits empirical and provably nonparadoxical self-reference to prove conclusively that even immediate full grounding isn't an internal relation in this sense. The positive, second part of this essay uses…
Vagueness & Modality—An Ecumenical Approach
Grounding Ground
The Problem of Iterated Ground is to explain what grounds truths about ground: if Γ grounds φ, what grounds that Γ grounds φ? This paper proposes a novel solution based on tying grounding to explanatory arguments. By developing a rigorous account of explanatory arguments operators for factive and non-factive ground can be equipped with natural introduction and elimination rules. A satisfactory account of iterated ground falls directly out of the …
Collective Abstraction
This paper develops a novel theory of abstraction—what we call collective abstraction. The theory solves a notorious problem for noneliminative structuralism. The noneliminative structuralist holds that in addition to various isomorphic systems there is a pure structure that can be abstracted from each of these systems; but existing accounts of abstraction fail for nonrigid systems like the complex numbers. The problem with the existing accounts …
Grounding and defining identity
I systematically defend a novel account of the grounds for identity and distinctness facts: they are all uniquely zero‐grounded. First, this Null Account is shown to avoid a range of problems facing other accounts: a relation satisfying the Null Account would be an excellent candidate for being the identity relation. Second, a plenitudinist view of relations suggests that there is such a relation. To flesh out this plenitudinist view I sketch a n…
Ground first
This paper evaluates the proof-theoretic definition of ground developed by Poggiolesi in a range of recent publications and argues that her proposed definition fails. The paper then outlines an alternative approach where logical consequence relations and the logical operations are defined in terms of ground
Criteria of Identity
A criterion of identity for s states that two objects of s are identical if and only if those very objects stand in a certain relation .This paper proposes an essentialist account of what it is to be a criterion of identity: for a statement to be a criterion of identity for s it has to be essential to being an , as such, that two s are identical iff they stand in .We argue that this account is superior to recently proposed ground-theoretic accoun…
Grounding Legalism
Many authors have proposed that grounding is closely related to metaphysical laws. However, we argue that no existing theory of metaphysical laws is sufficiently general. In this paper, we develop a general theory of grounding laws, proposing that they are generative relations between pluralities of propositions and propositions. We develop the account in an essentialist language; this allows us to state precisely the sense in which grounding mig…
Beyond Substitution—An Antipositionalist's Guide to Subtraction
Existing accounts of relations do not properly account for variably polyadic relations: they fail to capture the relationship between completions of the same relation by different numbers of relata. This paper develops a fully general account of such relations by adding an operation of subtraction to the antipositionalist theory of relations pioneered by Fine in “Neutral Relations”. Along the way we rebut a common argument against antipositionali…
Grounding conditionals
This paper develops a systematic account of the immediate grounds of conditionals, uses this to give a ground-theoretic semantics for the language of intuitionistic propositional logic, and proves intuitionistic logic sound and complete with respect to this semantics. A striking consequence of the account is that all intuitionistic validities are zero-grounded and thus—unlike distinctively classical validities—make no demand on reality
Towards an inferentialist account of essentialist explanation
The fact that it is essential that p in some sense explains that p . This paper makes one negative and one positive contribution. Negatively, the paper argues that the sense of explanation is not ground , and we prove—contra Vogt—that the issue has nothing to do with whether one works with a representational or worldly notion of ground. Positively, the paper proposes an inferentialist account of essence and uses that to develop an account of esse…
Philosophy and Theoretical Science (10 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Metaphysics (6 works) · Engineering (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 works) · Relation (database) (4 works)