Tim Büthe
Biographic Data
| ID | 1048655 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Tim Büthe |
| GIVEN NAMES | Tim |
| FAMILY NAME | Büthe |
| SIGNATURE | BÜTHE T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Duke University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4724-5000 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 708 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 9 |
Governing AI – attempting to herd cats? Introduction to the special issue on the Governance of Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence raises new, distinct governance challenges, as well as familiar governance challenges in novel ways. The governance of AI, moreover, is not an issue of distant futures, it is well underway – and it has characteristics akin to ‘herding cats’ with a mind of their own. This essay introduces the contributions to the special issue, situating them in broader political and social science literatures. It then provides a sketch of …
Power transitions and the rise of the regulatory state: Global market governance in flux
This special issue examines the consequences of the ongoing power transition in the world economy for global regulatory regimes, especially the variation in rising powers' transition from rule‐takers to rule‐makers in global markets. This introductory article presents the analytical framework for better understanding those consequences, the Power Transition Theory of Global Economic Governance (PTT‐GEG), which extends the scope of traditional pow…
From rule‐takerto rule‐promotingregulatory state: South Korea in the nearly‐globalcompetition regime
When rapid economic growth catapults a country within a few years from the margins of the global economy to middle power status, does global regulatory governance need to brace for a challenge to the status quo? To answer this question, we extend the power transition theory of global economic governance to middle powers: A rising middle power should be expected to challenge the international regulatory status quo only if increasing issue‐specific…
The Qualitative Transparency Deliberations: Insights and Implications
In recent years, a variety of efforts have been made in political science to enable, encourage, or require scholars to be more open and explicit about the bases of their empirical claims and, in turn, make those claims more readily evaluable by others. While qualitative scholars have long taken an interest in making their research open, reflexive, and systematic, the recent push for overarching transparency norms and requirements has provoked ser…
Patterns of Policy Responses to the Covid-19 Pandemic in Federal vs. Unitary European Democracies
Foreign Direct Investment and Institutional Diversity in Trade Agreements: Credibility, Commitment, and Economic Flows in the Developing World, 1971–2007
International trade agreements lead to more foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries. This article examines the causal mechanisms underpinning this trade-investment linkage by asking whether institutional features of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), which allow governments to make more credible commitments to protect foreign investments, indeed result in greater FDI. The authors explore three institutional differences. First, …
The Politics of Private Foreign Aid: Humanitarian Principles, Economic Development Objectives, and Organizational Interests in NGO Private Aid Allocation
A large and increasing share of international humanitarian and development aid is raised from nongovernmental sources, allocated by transnational NGOs. We know little about this private foreign aid, not even how it is distributed across recipient countries, much less what explains the allocation. This article presents an original data set, based on detailed financial records from most of the major U.S.-based humanitarian and development NGOs, whi…
The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy
Over the past two decades, governments have delegated extensive regulatory authority to international private-sector organizations. This internationalization and privatization of rule-making has been motivated not only by the economic benefits of common rules for global markets, but also by the realization that government regulators often lack the expertise and resources to deal with increasingly complex and urgent regulatory tasks. This book exa…
Governing Finance: East Asia's Adoption of International Standards by Andrew Walter
Journal Article Governing Finance: East Asia's Adoption of International Standards by Andrew Walter Get access Governing Finance: East Asiaʼs Adoption of International Standardsby Andrew Walter. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2008. 235 pp. $35.00. Tim Büthe Tim Büthe Duke University and University of California, Berkeley Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Volume 124, Issue …
The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements
The flow of foreign direct investment into developing countries varies greatly across countries and over time. The political factors that affect these flows are not well understood. Focusing on the relationship between trade and investment, we argue that international trade agreements—GATT/WTO and preferential trade agreements (PTAs)—provide mechanisms for making commitments to foreign investors about the treatment of their assets, thus reassurin…
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney. 424p. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. $80.00 cloth, $34.99 paper. This volume examines and exemplifies the usefulness of principal-agent (P-A) theory for the study of international relations through a set of well-integrated analyses of delegation to international (governmental) organizations (IOs…
Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule-Making in the Public Interest
Over recent decades governments have increasingly delegated domestic and international regulatory functions to private-sector agents. This article examines the reasons for such delegation and how private agents differ from public ones, and then analyzes the politics of regulation post delegation. It argues that the key difference between delegation to a public agent and delegation to a private one is that in the latter case a multiple-principals …
Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power
Standards have become one of the most important nontariff barriers to trade, especially national product standards that specify design or performance characteristics of manufactured goods. Divergent national standards often inhibit trade, whereas regional and international standards increasingly serve as instruments of trade liberalization. Consequently, the setting of international standards—seemingly technical and apolitical—is rapidly becoming…
Taking Temporality Seriously: Modeling History and the Use of Narratives as Evidence
Social scientists interested in explaining historical processes can, indeed should, refuse the choice between modeling causal relationships and studying history. Identifying temporality as the defining characteristic of processes that can be meaningfully distinguished as "history," I show that modeling such phenomena engenders particular difficulties but is both possible and fruitful. Narratives, as a way of presenting empirical information, have…
The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements
The flow of foreign direct investment into developing countries varies greatly across countries and over time. The political factors that affect these flows are not well understood. Focusing on the relationship between trade and investment, we argue that international trade agreements—GATT/WTO and preferential trade agreements (PTAs)—provide mechanisms for making commitments to foreign investors about the treatment of their assets, thus reassurin…
Taking Temporality Seriously: Modeling History and the Use of Narratives as Evidence
Social scientists interested in explaining historical processes can, indeed should, refuse the choice between modeling causal relationships and studying history. Identifying temporality as the defining characteristic of processes that can be meaningfully distinguished as "history," I show that modeling such phenomena engenders particular difficulties but is both possible and fruitful. Narratives, as a way of presenting empirical information, have…
Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power
Standards have become one of the most important nontariff barriers to trade, especially national product standards that specify design or performance characteristics of manufactured goods. Divergent national standards often inhibit trade, whereas regional and international standards increasingly serve as instruments of trade liberalization. Consequently, the setting of international standards—seemingly technical and apolitical—is rapidly becoming…
Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule-Making in the Public Interest
Over recent decades governments have increasingly delegated domestic and international regulatory functions to private-sector agents. This article examines the reasons for such delegation and how private agents differ from public ones, and then analyzes the politics of regulation post delegation. It argues that the key difference between delegation to a public agent and delegation to a private one is that in the latter case a multiple-principals …
The Qualitative Transparency Deliberations: Insights and Implications
In recent years, a variety of efforts have been made in political science to enable, encourage, or require scholars to be more open and explicit about the bases of their empirical claims and, in turn, make those claims more readily evaluable by others. While qualitative scholars have long taken an interest in making their research open, reflexive, and systematic, the recent push for overarching transparency norms and requirements has provoked ser…
The Politics of Private Foreign Aid: Humanitarian Principles, Economic Development Objectives, and Organizational Interests in NGO Private Aid Allocation
A large and increasing share of international humanitarian and development aid is raised from nongovernmental sources, allocated by transnational NGOs. We know little about this private foreign aid, not even how it is distributed across recipient countries, much less what explains the allocation. This article presents an original data set, based on detailed financial records from most of the major U.S.-based humanitarian and development NGOs, whi…
Foreign Direct Investment and Institutional Diversity in Trade Agreements: Credibility, Commitment, and Economic Flows in the Developing World, 1971–2007
International trade agreements lead to more foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries. This article examines the causal mechanisms underpinning this trade-investment linkage by asking whether institutional features of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), which allow governments to make more credible commitments to protect foreign investments, indeed result in greater FDI. The authors explore three institutional differences. First, …
Governing AI – attempting to herd cats? Introduction to the special issue on the Governance of Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence raises new, distinct governance challenges, as well as familiar governance challenges in novel ways. The governance of AI, moreover, is not an issue of distant futures, it is well underway – and it has characteristics akin to ‘herding cats’ with a mind of their own. This essay introduces the contributions to the special issue, situating them in broader political and social science literatures. It then provides a sketch of …
Power transitions and the rise of the regulatory state: Global market governance in flux
This special issue examines the consequences of the ongoing power transition in the world economy for global regulatory regimes, especially the variation in rising powers' transition from rule‐takers to rule‐makers in global markets. This introductory article presents the analytical framework for better understanding those consequences, the Power Transition Theory of Global Economic Governance (PTT‐GEG), which extends the scope of traditional pow…
From rule‐takerto rule‐promotingregulatory state: South Korea in the nearly‐globalcompetition regime
When rapid economic growth catapults a country within a few years from the margins of the global economy to middle power status, does global regulatory governance need to brace for a challenge to the status quo? To answer this question, we extend the power transition theory of global economic governance to middle powers: A rising middle power should be expected to challenge the international regulatory status quo only if increasing issue‐specific…
Taking Temporality Seriously: Modeling History and the Use of Narratives as Evidence
Social scientists interested in explaining historical processes can, indeed should, refuse the choice between modeling causal relationships and studying history. Identifying temporality as the defining characteristic of processes that can be meaningfully distinguished as "history," I show that modeling such phenomena engenders particular difficulties but is both possible and fruitful. Narratives, as a way of presenting empirical information, have…
Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power
Standards have become one of the most important nontariff barriers to trade, especially national product standards that specify design or performance characteristics of manufactured goods. Divergent national standards often inhibit trade, whereas regional and international standards increasingly serve as instruments of trade liberalization. Consequently, the setting of international standards—seemingly technical and apolitical—is rapidly becoming…
Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule-Making in the Public Interest
Over recent decades governments have increasingly delegated domestic and international regulatory functions to private-sector agents. This article examines the reasons for such delegation and how private agents differ from public ones, and then analyzes the politics of regulation post delegation. It argues that the key difference between delegation to a public agent and delegation to a private one is that in the latter case a multiple-principals …
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney. 424p. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. $80.00 cloth, $34.99 paper. This volume examines and exemplifies the usefulness of principal-agent (P-A) theory for the study of international relations through a set of well-integrated analyses of delegation to international (governmental) organizations (IOs…
The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements
The flow of foreign direct investment into developing countries varies greatly across countries and over time. The political factors that affect these flows are not well understood. Focusing on the relationship between trade and investment, we argue that international trade agreements—GATT/WTO and preferential trade agreements (PTAs)—provide mechanisms for making commitments to foreign investors about the treatment of their assets, thus reassurin…
Governing Finance: East Asia's Adoption of International Standards by Andrew Walter
Journal Article Governing Finance: East Asia's Adoption of International Standards by Andrew Walter Get access Governing Finance: East Asiaʼs Adoption of International Standardsby Andrew Walter. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2008. 235 pp. $35.00. Tim Büthe Tim Büthe Duke University and University of California, Berkeley Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Volume 124, Issue …
The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy
Over the past two decades, governments have delegated extensive regulatory authority to international private-sector organizations. This internationalization and privatization of rule-making has been motivated not only by the economic benefits of common rules for global markets, but also by the realization that government regulators often lack the expertise and resources to deal with increasingly complex and urgent regulatory tasks. This book exa…
The Politics of Private Foreign Aid: Humanitarian Principles, Economic Development Objectives, and Organizational Interests in NGO Private Aid Allocation
A large and increasing share of international humanitarian and development aid is raised from nongovernmental sources, allocated by transnational NGOs. We know little about this private foreign aid, not even how it is distributed across recipient countries, much less what explains the allocation. This article presents an original data set, based on detailed financial records from most of the major U.S.-based humanitarian and development NGOs, whi…
Foreign Direct Investment and Institutional Diversity in Trade Agreements: Credibility, Commitment, and Economic Flows in the Developing World, 1971–2007
International trade agreements lead to more foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries. This article examines the causal mechanisms underpinning this trade-investment linkage by asking whether institutional features of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), which allow governments to make more credible commitments to protect foreign investments, indeed result in greater FDI. The authors explore three institutional differences. First, …
Patterns of Policy Responses to the Covid-19 Pandemic in Federal vs. Unitary European Democracies
Power transitions and the rise of the regulatory state: Global market governance in flux
This special issue examines the consequences of the ongoing power transition in the world economy for global regulatory regimes, especially the variation in rising powers' transition from rule‐takers to rule‐makers in global markets. This introductory article presents the analytical framework for better understanding those consequences, the Power Transition Theory of Global Economic Governance (PTT‐GEG), which extends the scope of traditional pow…
From rule‐takerto rule‐promotingregulatory state: South Korea in the nearly‐globalcompetition regime
When rapid economic growth catapults a country within a few years from the margins of the global economy to middle power status, does global regulatory governance need to brace for a challenge to the status quo? To answer this question, we extend the power transition theory of global economic governance to middle powers: A rising middle power should be expected to challenge the international regulatory status quo only if increasing issue‐specific…
The Qualitative Transparency Deliberations: Insights and Implications
In recent years, a variety of efforts have been made in political science to enable, encourage, or require scholars to be more open and explicit about the bases of their empirical claims and, in turn, make those claims more readily evaluable by others. While qualitative scholars have long taken an interest in making their research open, reflexive, and systematic, the recent push for overarching transparency norms and requirements has provoked ser…
Governing AI – attempting to herd cats? Introduction to the special issue on the Governance of Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence raises new, distinct governance challenges, as well as familiar governance challenges in novel ways. The governance of AI, moreover, is not an issue of distant futures, it is well underway – and it has characteristics akin to ‘herding cats’ with a mind of their own. This essay introduces the contributions to the special issue, situating them in broader political and social science literatures. It then provides a sketch of …
Political science (13 works) · Economics (11 works) · Law (9 works) · Politics (9 works) · Law (8 works) · Business (5 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Corporate governance (5 works) · International Arbitration and Investment Law (5 works) · International Development and Aid (5 works)