Ariel Zylberman
Biographic Data
| ID | 1048769 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ariel Zylberman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ariel |
| FAMILY NAME | Zylberman |
| SIGNATURE | ZYLBERMAN A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Simon Fraser University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0174-1084 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Rights and the Good
What is the connection between moral rights and the good? While familiar normative theories give justificatory precedence to one notion over the other, this paper explores a neglected alternative: when properly specified, the notion of moral rights and of the good conceptually depend on each other.1
The relational wrong of Poverty
Moral rights without balancing
Relational Primitivism
What kind of property is represented by the moral ought? I defend a relational answer: the moral ought represents a primitive relational property of actions required by the original claims of persons. I argue that the relational answer offers a distinctive and compelling account in its own right that also avoids standard difficulties of familiar theories
The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second-Personal Constitution of Freedom
The two standard interpretations of Kant’s view of the relationship between external freedom and public law make one of the terms a means for the production of the other: either public law is justified as a means to external freedom, or external freedom is justified as a means for producing a system of public law. This article defends an alternative, constitutive interpretation: public law is justified because it is partly constitutive of externa…
Human Rights, Categorical Duties: A Dilemma for Instrumentalism
Contemporary theorists tend to think that the basic justification of human rights is instrumental, as efficient means for producing the theorist's preferred ultimate value or values. Contemporary theorists also tend to think that human rights have a distinctive normative force, correlating with categorical duties. This article shows that instrumentalist accounts of human rights face a dilemma. The very structure of any instrumentalist account mea…
Human Dignity
This article focuses on human dignity as a moral idea and, in particular, on a single but fundamental question: what conception of human dignity, if any, can generate an egalitarian duty to respect all persons? After surveying two mainstream and two alternative conceptions, the article suggests that explaining how human dignity generates an egalitarian duty of respect may be more difficult than has been appreciated
Why Human Rights? Because of You
Relational Primitivism
What kind of property is represented by the moral ought? I defend a relational answer: the moral ought represents a primitive relational property of actions required by the original claims of persons. I argue that the relational answer offers a distinctive and compelling account in its own right that also avoids standard difficulties of familiar theories
Human Dignity
This article focuses on human dignity as a moral idea and, in particular, on a single but fundamental question: what conception of human dignity, if any, can generate an egalitarian duty to respect all persons? After surveying two mainstream and two alternative conceptions, the article suggests that explaining how human dignity generates an egalitarian duty of respect may be more difficult than has been appreciated
Why Human Rights? Because of You
The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second-Personal Constitution of Freedom
The two standard interpretations of Kant’s view of the relationship between external freedom and public law make one of the terms a means for the production of the other: either public law is justified as a means to external freedom, or external freedom is justified as a means for producing a system of public law. This article defends an alternative, constitutive interpretation: public law is justified because it is partly constitutive of externa…
Human Rights, Categorical Duties: A Dilemma for Instrumentalism
Contemporary theorists tend to think that the basic justification of human rights is instrumental, as efficient means for producing the theorist's preferred ultimate value or values. Contemporary theorists also tend to think that human rights have a distinctive normative force, correlating with categorical duties. This article shows that instrumentalist accounts of human rights face a dilemma. The very structure of any instrumentalist account mea…
Human Dignity
This article focuses on human dignity as a moral idea and, in particular, on a single but fundamental question: what conception of human dignity, if any, can generate an egalitarian duty to respect all persons? After surveying two mainstream and two alternative conceptions, the article suggests that explaining how human dignity generates an egalitarian duty of respect may be more difficult than has been appreciated
Relational Primitivism
What kind of property is represented by the moral ought? I defend a relational answer: the moral ought represents a primitive relational property of actions required by the original claims of persons. I argue that the relational answer offers a distinctive and compelling account in its own right that also avoids standard difficulties of familiar theories
Moral rights without balancing
The relational wrong of Poverty
Rights and the Good
What is the connection between moral rights and the good? While familiar normative theories give justificatory precedence to one notion over the other, this paper explores a neglected alternative: when properly specified, the notion of moral rights and of the good conceptually depend on each other.1
Law (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Political science (7 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (6 works) · Law and economics (5 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (4 works) · Mathematics (3 works)