Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Stephen Stich

Biographic Data

ID1052792
NAMEStephen Stich
GIVEN NAMESStephen
FAMILY NAMEStich
SIGNATURESTICH S
AFFILIATIONSRutgers, the State University of New Jersey
ORCID0000-0002-6038-7476
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS23
TOTAL CITATIONS58
AUTHOR COUNT22
EDITOR COUNT1
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1986
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX5
  • A puzzle about knowledge ascriptions

    Open Access•Brian Porter, Kelli Barr et al.•ARTICLE•Noûs•2025

    Philosophers have argued that stakes affect knowledge: a given amount of evidence may suffice for knowledge if the stakes are low, but not if the stakes are high. By contrast, empirical work on the influence of stakes on ordinary knowledge ascriptions has been divided along methodological lines: “evidence‐fixed” prompts rarely find stakes effects, while “evidence‐seeking” prompts consistently find them. We present a cross‐cultural study using bot…

  • Analytic atheism and analytic apostasy across cultures

    Open Access•Nick Byrd, Stephen Stich et al.•ARTICLE•Religious Studies•2025•References: 50

    Reflective thinking often predicts less belief in God or less religiosity – so-called analytic atheism. However, those correlations involve limitations: widely used tests of reflection confound reflection with ancillary abilities such as numeracy; some studies do not detect analytic atheism in every country; experimentally encouraging reflection makes some non-believers more open to believing in God; and one of the most common online research par…

  • Kinship intensity and the use of mental states in moral judgment across societies

    Open Access•Cameron M Curtin, H Clark Barrett et al.•ARTICLE•Evolution and Human Behavior•2020

  • Did religion play a role in the evolution of morality

    Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•Religion Brain & Behavior•2020

    The question of whether religion played a role in the evolution of morality can be interpreted in different ways. I consider three. On the first interpretation, “morality” is understood as an evolved faculty for making moral judgments, where moral judgments are a special category of normative judgments. For seventy years, philosophers and psychologists have sought to characterize this special subset of normative judgments in a well-motivated way.…

  • Epistemology for the Rest of the World

    Stephen Stich, Masaharu Mizumoto et al.•BOOK•Epistemology for the Rest of the…•2018

    Anglophone epistemologists have devoted a great deal of attention to the English word “know” and to English sentences used to attribute knowledge. Many contemporary epistemologists, including contextualists and subject-sensitive invariantists, are concerned with the truth-conditions of “S knows that p ,” or the proposition it expresses. However, there are over 6,000 languages in the world. Thus, it is not clear why we should think that subtle fac…

  • The Contribution of Confucius to Virtue Epistemology

    Sarah Ryan, Eric Mccready et al.•BOOK•Epistemology for the Rest of the…•2018

    Scholars have typically regarded Confucius as an ethical thinker broadly construed and not as an epistemological thinker. This chapter seeks to overturn that view and, in doing so, has three basic goals. The first goal is to make the case that Confucian thought is of epistemological significance. Goal two is to locate the significance of Confucian thought within epistemology while accounting for the past overlooking of this significance. The thir…

  • Philosophy

    Stephen Stich, Tom Donaldson•BOOK•Philosophy•2018

  • Small-scale societies exhibit fundamental variation in the role of intentions in moral judgment

    Open Access•H Clark Barrett, Alex Bolyanatz et al.•ARTICLE•Proceedings of the National…•2016

    Significance It is widely considered a universal feature of human moral psychology that reasons for actions are taken into account in most moral judgments. However, most evidence for this moral intent hypothesis comes from large-scale industrialized societies. We used a standardized methodology to test the moral intent hypothesis across eight traditional small-scale societies (ranging from hunter-gatherer to pastoralist to horticulturalist) and t…

  • Why there might not be an evolutionary explanation for psychological altruism

    Open Access•Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•Studies in History and Philosophy…•2015•Cited by: 1•References: 3

  • Collected Papers, Volume 2

    Stephen Stich, Stephen G W Stich•BOOK•Stephen Stich Collected Papers,…•2012

    This volume collects the best and most influential essays on knowledge, rationality and morality that Stephen Stich has published in the last 40 years. The volume includes a new introductory essay that offers an overview of the papers and traces the history of how they emerged.

  • Stephen Stich Collected Papers, 1978-2010 Vol. 2

    Stephen Stich•BOOK•Stephen Stich Collected Papers,…•2012

  • Do Different Groups Have Different Epistemic Intuitions? A Reply to Jennifer Nagel 1

    Open Access•Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012•Cited by: 5•References: 5

  • Against Arguments from Reference

    Open Access•Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2009•Cited by: 18•References: 5

    It is common in various quarters of philosophy to derive philosophically significant conclusions from theories of reference. In this paper, we argue that philosophers should give up on such ‘arguments from reference.’ Intuitions play a central role in establishing theories of reference, and recent cross‐cultural work suggests that intuitions about reference vary across cultures and between individuals within a culture ( Machery et al. 2004 ). We …

  • The Innate Mind, Volume 3

    Stephen Stich, Stephen G W Stich et al.•BOOK•The Innate Mind•2008

    This book is the third of a three-volume set on the innate mind. It provides an assessment of nativist thought and definitive reference point for future inquiry. Nativists have long been interested in a variety of foundational topics relating to the study of cognitive development and the historical opposition between nativism and empiricism. Among the issues here are questions about what it is for something to be innate in the first place; how in…

  • Some Questions About The Evolution of Morality 1

    Open Access•Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2008•Cited by: 1•References: 1

  • Is Morality an Elegant Machine or a Kludge

    Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•Journal of Cognition and Culture•2006•Cited by: 3•References: 1

    In a passage in A Theory of Justice , which has become increasingly in uentialin recent years, John Rawls (1971) noted an analogy between moral phi-losophy and grammar. Moral philosophy, or at least the rst stage ofmoral philosophy, Rawls maintained, can be thought of as the attemptto describe our moral capacity Ð the capacity which underlies Othe poten-tially in nite number and variety of [moral] judgments we are preparedto make.O In order to de…

  • Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions

    Jonathan M Weinberg, Shaun Nichol et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophical Topics•2001

  • Jackson's Empirical Assumptions

    Stephen Stich, Jonathan M Weinberg et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2001•Cited by: 11•References: 2

  • Eliminating emotions

    Open Access•Russell Brown, Dominic Murphy et al.•ARTICLE•Metascience•1999

  • Connectionism, Eliminativism and The Future of Folk Psychology

    Warren Ramsey, Stephen Stich et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophical Perspectives•1990•Cited by: 11

    William Ramsey, Stephen Stich, Joseph Garon, Connectionism, Eliminativism and The Future of Folk Psychology, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4, Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (1990), pp. 499-533

  • Connectionism and three levels of nativism

    Open Access•Warren Ramsey, William Ramsey et al.•ARTICLE•Synthese•1990•Cited by: 1•References: 11

  • Reflective equilibrium, analytic epistemology and the problem of cognitive diversity

    Open Access•Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•Synthese•1988•Cited by: 7•References: 15

  • The Withering Away of the Cognitive State

    Flint Schier, Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1986

    Journal Article The Withering Away of the Cognitive State Get access Stephen Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. London: MIT Press, 1983. pp. xii + 266. Price £18.25 (pb £8.95) Flint Schier Flint Schier University of Glasgow Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 36, Issue 143, April 1986, Pages 261–278, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219773 Published: 01 April 1986

  • Against Arguments from Reference

    Open Access•Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2009•Cited by: 18•References: 5

    It is common in various quarters of philosophy to derive philosophically significant conclusions from theories of reference. In this paper, we argue that philosophers should give up on such ‘arguments from reference.’ Intuitions play a central role in establishing theories of reference, and recent cross‐cultural work suggests that intuitions about reference vary across cultures and between individuals within a culture ( Machery et al. 2004 ). We …

  • Jackson's Empirical Assumptions

    Stephen Stich, Jonathan M Weinberg et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2001•Cited by: 11•References: 2

  • Connectionism, Eliminativism and The Future of Folk Psychology

    Warren Ramsey, Stephen Stich et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophical Perspectives•1990•Cited by: 11

    William Ramsey, Stephen Stich, Joseph Garon, Connectionism, Eliminativism and The Future of Folk Psychology, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4, Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (1990), pp. 499-533

  • Reflective equilibrium, analytic epistemology and the problem of cognitive diversity

    Open Access•Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•Synthese•1988•Cited by: 7•References: 15

  • Do Different Groups Have Different Epistemic Intuitions? A Reply to Jennifer Nagel 1

    Open Access•Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012•Cited by: 5•References: 5

  • Is Morality an Elegant Machine or a Kludge

    Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•Journal of Cognition and Culture•2006•Cited by: 3•References: 1

    In a passage in A Theory of Justice , which has become increasingly in uentialin recent years, John Rawls (1971) noted an analogy between moral phi-losophy and grammar. Moral philosophy, or at least the rst stage ofmoral philosophy, Rawls maintained, can be thought of as the attemptto describe our moral capacity Ð the capacity which underlies Othe poten-tially in nite number and variety of [moral] judgments we are preparedto make.O In order to de…

  • Why there might not be an evolutionary explanation for psychological altruism

    Open Access•Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•Studies in History and Philosophy…•2015•Cited by: 1•References: 3

  • Some Questions About The Evolution of Morality 1

    Open Access•Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2008•Cited by: 1•References: 1

  • Connectionism and three levels of nativism

    Open Access•Warren Ramsey, William Ramsey et al.•ARTICLE•Synthese•1990•Cited by: 1•References: 11

  • The Withering Away of the Cognitive State

    Flint Schier, Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1986

    Journal Article The Withering Away of the Cognitive State Get access Stephen Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. London: MIT Press, 1983. pp. xii + 266. Price £18.25 (pb £8.95) Flint Schier Flint Schier University of Glasgow Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 36, Issue 143, April 1986, Pages 261–278, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219773 Published: 01 April 1986

  • Reflective equilibrium, analytic epistemology and the problem of cognitive diversity

    Open Access•Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•Synthese•1988•Cited by: 7•References: 15

  • Connectionism, Eliminativism and The Future of Folk Psychology

    Warren Ramsey, Stephen Stich et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophical Perspectives•1990•Cited by: 11

    William Ramsey, Stephen Stich, Joseph Garon, Connectionism, Eliminativism and The Future of Folk Psychology, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4, Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (1990), pp. 499-533

  • Connectionism and three levels of nativism

    Open Access•Warren Ramsey, William Ramsey et al.•ARTICLE•Synthese•1990•Cited by: 1•References: 11

  • Eliminating emotions

    Open Access•Russell Brown, Dominic Murphy et al.•ARTICLE•Metascience•1999

  • Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions

    Jonathan M Weinberg, Shaun Nichol et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophical Topics•2001

  • Jackson's Empirical Assumptions

    Stephen Stich, Jonathan M Weinberg et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2001•Cited by: 11•References: 2

  • Is Morality an Elegant Machine or a Kludge

    Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•Journal of Cognition and Culture•2006•Cited by: 3•References: 1

    In a passage in A Theory of Justice , which has become increasingly in uentialin recent years, John Rawls (1971) noted an analogy between moral phi-losophy and grammar. Moral philosophy, or at least the rst stage ofmoral philosophy, Rawls maintained, can be thought of as the attemptto describe our moral capacity Ð the capacity which underlies Othe poten-tially in nite number and variety of [moral] judgments we are preparedto make.O In order to de…

  • The Innate Mind, Volume 3

    Stephen Stich, Stephen G W Stich et al.•BOOK•The Innate Mind•2008

    This book is the third of a three-volume set on the innate mind. It provides an assessment of nativist thought and definitive reference point for future inquiry. Nativists have long been interested in a variety of foundational topics relating to the study of cognitive development and the historical opposition between nativism and empiricism. Among the issues here are questions about what it is for something to be innate in the first place; how in…

  • Some Questions About The Evolution of Morality 1

    Open Access•Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2008•Cited by: 1•References: 1

  • Against Arguments from Reference

    Open Access•Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2009•Cited by: 18•References: 5

    It is common in various quarters of philosophy to derive philosophically significant conclusions from theories of reference. In this paper, we argue that philosophers should give up on such ‘arguments from reference.’ Intuitions play a central role in establishing theories of reference, and recent cross‐cultural work suggests that intuitions about reference vary across cultures and between individuals within a culture ( Machery et al. 2004 ). We …

  • Collected Papers, Volume 2

    Stephen Stich, Stephen G W Stich•BOOK•Stephen Stich Collected Papers,…•2012

    This volume collects the best and most influential essays on knowledge, rationality and morality that Stephen Stich has published in the last 40 years. The volume includes a new introductory essay that offers an overview of the papers and traces the history of how they emerged.

  • Stephen Stich Collected Papers, 1978-2010 Vol. 2

    Stephen Stich•BOOK•Stephen Stich Collected Papers,…•2012

  • Do Different Groups Have Different Epistemic Intuitions? A Reply to Jennifer Nagel 1

    Open Access•Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012•Cited by: 5•References: 5

  • Why there might not be an evolutionary explanation for psychological altruism

    Open Access•Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•Studies in History and Philosophy…•2015•Cited by: 1•References: 3

  • Small-scale societies exhibit fundamental variation in the role of intentions in moral judgment

    Open Access•H Clark Barrett, Alex Bolyanatz et al.•ARTICLE•Proceedings of the National…•2016

    Significance It is widely considered a universal feature of human moral psychology that reasons for actions are taken into account in most moral judgments. However, most evidence for this moral intent hypothesis comes from large-scale industrialized societies. We used a standardized methodology to test the moral intent hypothesis across eight traditional small-scale societies (ranging from hunter-gatherer to pastoralist to horticulturalist) and t…

  • Epistemology for the Rest of the World

    Stephen Stich, Masaharu Mizumoto et al.•BOOK•Epistemology for the Rest of the…•2018

    Anglophone epistemologists have devoted a great deal of attention to the English word “know” and to English sentences used to attribute knowledge. Many contemporary epistemologists, including contextualists and subject-sensitive invariantists, are concerned with the truth-conditions of “S knows that p ,” or the proposition it expresses. However, there are over 6,000 languages in the world. Thus, it is not clear why we should think that subtle fac…

  • The Contribution of Confucius to Virtue Epistemology

    Sarah Ryan, Eric Mccready et al.•BOOK•Epistemology for the Rest of the…•2018

    Scholars have typically regarded Confucius as an ethical thinker broadly construed and not as an epistemological thinker. This chapter seeks to overturn that view and, in doing so, has three basic goals. The first goal is to make the case that Confucian thought is of epistemological significance. Goal two is to locate the significance of Confucian thought within epistemology while accounting for the past overlooking of this significance. The thir…

  • Philosophy

    Stephen Stich, Tom Donaldson•BOOK•Philosophy•2018

  • Kinship intensity and the use of mental states in moral judgment across societies

    Open Access•Cameron M Curtin, H Clark Barrett et al.•ARTICLE•Evolution and Human Behavior•2020

  • Did religion play a role in the evolution of morality

    Stephen Stich•ARTICLE•Religion Brain & Behavior•2020

    The question of whether religion played a role in the evolution of morality can be interpreted in different ways. I consider three. On the first interpretation, “morality” is understood as an evolved faculty for making moral judgments, where moral judgments are a special category of normative judgments. For seventy years, philosophers and psychologists have sought to characterize this special subset of normative judgments in a well-motivated way.…

  • A puzzle about knowledge ascriptions

    Open Access•Brian Porter, Kelli Barr et al.•ARTICLE•Noûs•2025

    Philosophers have argued that stakes affect knowledge: a given amount of evidence may suffice for knowledge if the stakes are low, but not if the stakes are high. By contrast, empirical work on the influence of stakes on ordinary knowledge ascriptions has been divided along methodological lines: “evidence‐fixed” prompts rarely find stakes effects, while “evidence‐seeking” prompts consistently find them. We present a cross‐cultural study using bot…

  • Analytic atheism and analytic apostasy across cultures

    Open Access•Nick Byrd, Stephen Stich et al.•ARTICLE•Religious Studies•2025•References: 50

    Reflective thinking often predicts less belief in God or less religiosity – so-called analytic atheism. However, those correlations involve limitations: widely used tests of reflection confound reflection with ancillary abilities such as numeracy; some studies do not detect analytic atheism in every country; experimentally encouraging reflection makes some non-believers more open to believing in God; and one of the most common online research par…

Philosophy (17 works) · Epistemology (16 works) · Psychology (12 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (6 works) · Cultural Differences and Values (5 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (5 works)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae