Patricia Marechal
Biographic Data
| ID | 1054111 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Patricia Marechal |
| GIVEN NAMES | Patricia |
| FAMILY NAME | Marechal |
| SIGNATURE | MARECHAL P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Northwestern University Department of Philosophy 1880 Campus Drive, Kresge 3-415 Evanston IL 60208-0888 Evanston USA |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0670-109X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Aristotle on Softness and Endurance
In Nicomachean Ethics 7.7 (= Eudemian Ethics 6.7), Aristotle distinguishes softness ( malakia ) from lack of self-control ( akrasia ) and endurance ( karteria ) from self-control ( enkrateia ). This paper argues that unqualified softness consists of a disposition to give up acting to avoid the painful toil ( ponos ) required to execute practical resolutions, and (coincidentally) to enjoy the pleasures of rest and relaxation. The enduring person, …
Temperance and Epistemic Purity in Plato’s Phaedo
In this paper I examine the moral psychology of the Phaedo and argue that the philosophical life in this dialogue is a temperate life, and that temperance consists in exercising epistemic discernment by actively withdrawing assent from incorrect evaluations the body inclines us to make. Philosophers deal with bodily affections by taking a correct epistemic stance. Exercising temperance thus understood is a necessary condition both for developing …
Practical wisdom as conviction in Aristotle's ethics
This paper argues that Aristotelian practical wisdom ( phronēsis ) is a state of conviction ( pistis ) in the goodness of our goals based on proper grounds. This state of conviction can only be achieved if rational arguments and principles agree with how things appear to us. Since, for Aristotle, passions influence appearances, they can support or undermine our conviction in the goodness of ends. For this reason, we cannot be practically wise wit…
Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good
Selección de grupo y altruismo
Uno de los problemas más discutidos en la biología evolutiva es la identificación de los niveles sobre los que opera la selección natural. Usualmente se acepta que Darwin sostenía que la selección natural actúa a nivel del individuo. Sin embargo, otra línea de interpretación sugiere que Darwin concibió que la selección natural podía actuar a nivel de grupo, específicamente, que se vió obligado a sostener esto para explicar el comportamiento altru…
Practical wisdom as conviction in Aristotle's ethics
This paper argues that Aristotelian practical wisdom ( phronēsis ) is a state of conviction ( pistis ) in the goodness of our goals based on proper grounds. This state of conviction can only be achieved if rational arguments and principles agree with how things appear to us. Since, for Aristotle, passions influence appearances, they can support or undermine our conviction in the goodness of ends. For this reason, we cannot be practically wise wit…
Selección de grupo y altruismo
Uno de los problemas más discutidos en la biología evolutiva es la identificación de los niveles sobre los que opera la selección natural. Usualmente se acepta que Darwin sostenía que la selección natural actúa a nivel del individuo. Sin embargo, otra línea de interpretación sugiere que Darwin concibió que la selección natural podía actuar a nivel de grupo, específicamente, que se vió obligado a sostener esto para explicar el comportamiento altru…
Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good
Temperance and Epistemic Purity in Plato’s Phaedo
In this paper I examine the moral psychology of the Phaedo and argue that the philosophical life in this dialogue is a temperate life, and that temperance consists in exercising epistemic discernment by actively withdrawing assent from incorrect evaluations the body inclines us to make. Philosophers deal with bodily affections by taking a correct epistemic stance. Exercising temperance thus understood is a necessary condition both for developing …
Practical wisdom as conviction in Aristotle's ethics
This paper argues that Aristotelian practical wisdom ( phronēsis ) is a state of conviction ( pistis ) in the goodness of our goals based on proper grounds. This state of conviction can only be achieved if rational arguments and principles agree with how things appear to us. Since, for Aristotle, passions influence appearances, they can support or undermine our conviction in the goodness of ends. For this reason, we cannot be practically wise wit…
Aristotle on Softness and Endurance
In Nicomachean Ethics 7.7 (= Eudemian Ethics 6.7), Aristotle distinguishes softness ( malakia ) from lack of self-control ( akrasia ) and endurance ( karteria ) from self-control ( enkrateia ). This paper argues that unqualified softness consists of a disposition to give up acting to avoid the painful toil ( ponos ) required to execute practical resolutions, and (coincidentally) to enjoy the pleasures of rest and relaxation. The enduring person, …
Philosophy (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works) · Sociology (2 works)