Keir A Lieber
Biographic Data
| ID | 1054973 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Keir A Lieber |
| GIVEN NAMES | Keir A |
| FAMILY NAME | Lieber |
| SIGNATURE | LIEBER K A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Keir A. Lieber is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 171 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 15 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution
Leading analysts have predicted for decades that nuclear weapons would help pacify international politics. The core notion is that countries protected by these fearsome weapons can stop competing so intensely with their adversaries: they can end their arms races, scale back their alliances, and stop jockeying for strategic territory. But rarely have theory and practice been so opposed. Why do international relations in the nuclear age remain so c…
Myth of the Nuclear Revolution
How durable is the nuclear weapons taboo
The nuclear weapons taboo is considered one of the strongest norms in international politics. A prohibition against using nuclear weapons has seemingly shaped state behavior for nearly seven decades and, according to some observers, made nuclear use ‘unthinkable’ today or in the future. Although scholars have shown that nuclear aversion has affected decision-making behavior, important questions about the nuclear taboo remain unanswered. This arti…
The New Era of Counterforce
Nuclear deterrence rests on the survivability of nuclear arsenals. For much of the nuclear age, “counterforce” disarming attacks—those aimed at eliminating an opponent's nuclear forces—were nearly impossible because of the ability of potential victims to hide and protect their weapons. Technological developments, however, are eroding this foundation of nuclear deterrence. Advances rooted in the computer revolution have made nuclear forces around …
Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists
Many experts consider nuclear terrorism the single greatest threat to U.S. security. The fear that a state might transfer nuclear materials to terrorists was a core justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, more recently, for a strike against Iran's nuclear program. The logical basis for this concern is sound: if a state could orchestrate an anonymous nuclear terror attack, it could destroy an enemy yet avoid retaliation. But how likely…
Mission Impossible
Defensive Realism and the “New” History of World War I
July 01 2008 Defensive Realism and the “New” History of World War I Jack Snyder, Jack Snyder Jack Snyder is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science and the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Keir A. Lieber Keir A. Lieber Keir A. Lieber is Assistant Professor of Political Science …
The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy
January 01 2007 The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy? Jeffrey S. Lantis, Jeffrey S. Lantis Jeffrey S. Lantis is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The College of Wooster. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Tom Sauer, Tom Sauer Tom Sauer is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Antwerp and a postdoctoral Research Fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders at the Katholieke Un…
The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory
World War I looms large in international relations theory. The core concepts of defensive realism—the security dilemma, spiral model, and offense-defense balance—were largely inspired by this single historical case, and evidence from the war is frequently used to test explanations built on those concepts. The new historiography of World War I, however, challenges many of the long-held assumptions about the origins of the conflict. Newly available…
Lieber and Alexander Reply
January 01 2006 Lieber and Alexander Reply Keir A. Lieber, Keir A. Lieber Notre Dame, Indiana Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Gerard Alexander Gerard Alexander Charlottesville, Virginia Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Keir A. Lieber Notre Dame, Indiana Gerard Alexander Charlottesville, Virginia Online Issn: 1531-4804 Print Issn: 0162-2889 © 2006 b…
The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy
For nearly half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear-armed states have been locked in a condition of mutual assured destruction. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the nuclear balance has shifted dramatically. The U.S. nuclear arsenal has steadily improved; the Russian force has sharply eroded; and Chinese nuclear modernization has progressed at a glacial pace. As a result, the United States now stands on the verge of attaining nucle…
War and the Engineers
The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy
FOR ALMOST half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear states have been locked in a military stalemate known as mutual assured destruction (MAD). By the early 196os, the nuclear arsenals ofthe United States and the Soviet Union had grown so large and sophisticated that neither country could entirely destroy the other's retaliatory force by launching first, even with a surprise attack. Starting a nuclear war was therefore tantamount to commi…
Waiting for Balancing
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many observers predicted a rise in balancing against the United States. More recently, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has generated renewed warnings of an incipient global backlash. Indeed, some analysts claim that signs of traditional hard balancing can already be detected, while others argue that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. grand strategy has generated …
Grasping the Technological Peace
July 01 2000 Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security Keir A. Lieber Keir A. Lieber Research Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Keir A. Lieber Research Fellow in the Forei…
The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy
For nearly half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear-armed states have been locked in a condition of mutual assured destruction. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the nuclear balance has shifted dramatically. The U.S. nuclear arsenal has steadily improved; the Russian force has sharply eroded; and Chinese nuclear modernization has progressed at a glacial pace. As a result, the United States now stands on the verge of attaining nucle…
The New Era of Counterforce
Nuclear deterrence rests on the survivability of nuclear arsenals. For much of the nuclear age, “counterforce” disarming attacks—those aimed at eliminating an opponent's nuclear forces—were nearly impossible because of the ability of potential victims to hide and protect their weapons. Technological developments, however, are eroding this foundation of nuclear deterrence. Advances rooted in the computer revolution have made nuclear forces around …
Waiting for Balancing
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many observers predicted a rise in balancing against the United States. More recently, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has generated renewed warnings of an incipient global backlash. Indeed, some analysts claim that signs of traditional hard balancing can already be detected, while others argue that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. grand strategy has generated …
The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory
World War I looms large in international relations theory. The core concepts of defensive realism—the security dilemma, spiral model, and offense-defense balance—were largely inspired by this single historical case, and evidence from the war is frequently used to test explanations built on those concepts. The new historiography of World War I, however, challenges many of the long-held assumptions about the origins of the conflict. Newly available…
Grasping the Technological Peace
July 01 2000 Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security Keir A. Lieber Keir A. Lieber Research Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Keir A. Lieber Research Fellow in the Forei…
The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy
FOR ALMOST half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear states have been locked in a military stalemate known as mutual assured destruction (MAD). By the early 196os, the nuclear arsenals ofthe United States and the Soviet Union had grown so large and sophisticated that neither country could entirely destroy the other's retaliatory force by launching first, even with a surprise attack. Starting a nuclear war was therefore tantamount to commi…
Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists
Many experts consider nuclear terrorism the single greatest threat to U.S. security. The fear that a state might transfer nuclear materials to terrorists was a core justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, more recently, for a strike against Iran's nuclear program. The logical basis for this concern is sound: if a state could orchestrate an anonymous nuclear terror attack, it could destroy an enemy yet avoid retaliation. But how likely…
How durable is the nuclear weapons taboo
The nuclear weapons taboo is considered one of the strongest norms in international politics. A prohibition against using nuclear weapons has seemingly shaped state behavior for nearly seven decades and, according to some observers, made nuclear use ‘unthinkable’ today or in the future. Although scholars have shown that nuclear aversion has affected decision-making behavior, important questions about the nuclear taboo remain unanswered. This arti…
Defensive Realism and the “New” History of World War I
July 01 2008 Defensive Realism and the “New” History of World War I Jack Snyder, Jack Snyder Jack Snyder is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science and the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Keir A. Lieber Keir A. Lieber Keir A. Lieber is Assistant Professor of Political Science …
Mission Impossible
The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy
January 01 2007 The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy? Jeffrey S. Lantis, Jeffrey S. Lantis Jeffrey S. Lantis is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The College of Wooster. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Tom Sauer, Tom Sauer Tom Sauer is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Antwerp and a postdoctoral Research Fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders at the Katholieke Un…
Lieber and Alexander Reply
January 01 2006 Lieber and Alexander Reply Keir A. Lieber, Keir A. Lieber Notre Dame, Indiana Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Gerard Alexander Gerard Alexander Charlottesville, Virginia Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Keir A. Lieber Notre Dame, Indiana Gerard Alexander Charlottesville, Virginia Online Issn: 1531-4804 Print Issn: 0162-2889 © 2006 b…
War and the Engineers
Grasping the Technological Peace
July 01 2000 Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security Keir A. Lieber Keir A. Lieber Research Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Keir A. Lieber Research Fellow in the Forei…
Waiting for Balancing
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many observers predicted a rise in balancing against the United States. More recently, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has generated renewed warnings of an incipient global backlash. Indeed, some analysts claim that signs of traditional hard balancing can already be detected, while others argue that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. grand strategy has generated …
Lieber and Alexander Reply
January 01 2006 Lieber and Alexander Reply Keir A. Lieber, Keir A. Lieber Notre Dame, Indiana Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Gerard Alexander Gerard Alexander Charlottesville, Virginia Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Keir A. Lieber Notre Dame, Indiana Gerard Alexander Charlottesville, Virginia Online Issn: 1531-4804 Print Issn: 0162-2889 © 2006 b…
The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy
For nearly half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear-armed states have been locked in a condition of mutual assured destruction. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the nuclear balance has shifted dramatically. The U.S. nuclear arsenal has steadily improved; the Russian force has sharply eroded; and Chinese nuclear modernization has progressed at a glacial pace. As a result, the United States now stands on the verge of attaining nucle…
War and the Engineers
The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy
FOR ALMOST half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear states have been locked in a military stalemate known as mutual assured destruction (MAD). By the early 196os, the nuclear arsenals ofthe United States and the Soviet Union had grown so large and sophisticated that neither country could entirely destroy the other's retaliatory force by launching first, even with a surprise attack. Starting a nuclear war was therefore tantamount to commi…
The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy
January 01 2007 The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy? Jeffrey S. Lantis, Jeffrey S. Lantis Jeffrey S. Lantis is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The College of Wooster. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Tom Sauer, Tom Sauer Tom Sauer is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Antwerp and a postdoctoral Research Fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders at the Katholieke Un…
The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory
World War I looms large in international relations theory. The core concepts of defensive realism—the security dilemma, spiral model, and offense-defense balance—were largely inspired by this single historical case, and evidence from the war is frequently used to test explanations built on those concepts. The new historiography of World War I, however, challenges many of the long-held assumptions about the origins of the conflict. Newly available…
Defensive Realism and the “New” History of World War I
July 01 2008 Defensive Realism and the “New” History of World War I Jack Snyder, Jack Snyder Jack Snyder is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science and the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Keir A. Lieber Keir A. Lieber Keir A. Lieber is Assistant Professor of Political Science …
Mission Impossible
Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists
Many experts consider nuclear terrorism the single greatest threat to U.S. security. The fear that a state might transfer nuclear materials to terrorists was a core justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, more recently, for a strike against Iran's nuclear program. The logical basis for this concern is sound: if a state could orchestrate an anonymous nuclear terror attack, it could destroy an enemy yet avoid retaliation. But how likely…
The New Era of Counterforce
Nuclear deterrence rests on the survivability of nuclear arsenals. For much of the nuclear age, “counterforce” disarming attacks—those aimed at eliminating an opponent's nuclear forces—were nearly impossible because of the ability of potential victims to hide and protect their weapons. Technological developments, however, are eroding this foundation of nuclear deterrence. Advances rooted in the computer revolution have made nuclear forces around …
How durable is the nuclear weapons taboo
The nuclear weapons taboo is considered one of the strongest norms in international politics. A prohibition against using nuclear weapons has seemingly shaped state behavior for nearly seven decades and, according to some observers, made nuclear use ‘unthinkable’ today or in the future. Although scholars have shown that nuclear aversion has affected decision-making behavior, important questions about the nuclear taboo remain unanswered. This arti…
The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution
Leading analysts have predicted for decades that nuclear weapons would help pacify international politics. The core notion is that countries protected by these fearsome weapons can stop competing so intensely with their adversaries: they can end their arms races, scale back their alliances, and stop jockeying for strategic territory. But rarely have theory and practice been so opposed. Why do international relations in the nuclear age remain so c…
Myth of the Nuclear Revolution
Political science (13 works) · Law (12 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (10 works) · Law (10 works) · Economics (8 works) · Political economy (8 works) · Politics (8 works) · Nuclear Issues and Defense (6 works) · Nuclear weapon (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works)