David Martimort

Biographic Data

ID1055439
NAMEDavid Martimort
GIVEN NAMESDavid
FAMILY NAMEMartimort
SIGNATUREMARTIMORT D
AFFILIATIONSParis School of Economics
ORCID0000-0002-4185-8703
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS50
TOTAL CITATIONS30
AUTHOR COUNT50
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2002
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX3

  • Collusion in bidding markets

    Open AccessPhilippe Gagnepain, David MartimortARTICLEInternational Review of Law and…2025

  • Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory

    Pierre Fleckinger, David Martimort et al.ARTICLEJournal of Economic Literature2024

    What is the most efficient way of designing incentives in an organization? Over the past five decades, agency theory has provided various answers to this crucial question. This line of research suggests that, depending on the organizational context, the optimal approach to providing incentives may involve either relying on collective compensations or, conversely, employing relative performance evaluations. In the first scenario, cooperation among…

  • Regards économiques sur le lobbying

    Perrin Lefebvre, David MartimortARTICLEÉtudes2023

    La pratique du lobbying interroge le fonctionnement démocratique. L'analyse économique permet de se faire une idée plus précise de ses apports et de ses limites. L'exemple d'Uber est significatif et plaide en faveur d'une meilleure régulation politique de telles pratiques

  • Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models

    Open AccessDavid Martimort, Lars StoleARTICLETheoretical Economics2022

    We present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a class of optimal control problems with pure state constraints for which the objective function is linear in the state variable but the objective function is only required to be upper semicontinuous in the control variable. We apply those conditions to economic environments in contract theory where discontinuities in objectives prevail. Examples of applications include nonlinear pricing…

  • Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures

    Open AccessPerrin Lefebvre, David MartimortARTICLEJournal of Theoretical Politics2022References: 56

    A substantial literature has been devoted to analyzing how legislators delegate regulatory power to a more knowledgeable agency. Yet, much less attention has been paid to understand how this delegation process is shaped by the environment in which this agency operates, and more specifically by the actions of interest groups. We propose a model of regulatory capture to assess how the distribution of information across interest groups and agencies …

  • L’État régulateur

    David MartimortARTICLEPouvoirs2021

    À la lumière de la théorie des incitations, l’État est ici envisagé comme un nœud de contrats entre le citoyen, le politique, le bureaucrate et la sphère économique. Or le caractère incomplet de ces contrats structure les formes prises par l’action publique. Cet essai montre comment le lien entre le citoyen et le politique s’en trouve délité et, par là même, l’implication démocratique du premier menacée

  • Contracts as a barrier to entry

    Open AccessDavid Martimort, Jérôme Pouyet et al.ARTICLEInternational Journal of…2021

  • From Inefficient Behind-the-Border Policies to Inefficient Trade Agreements

    Open AccessAntoine Bouët, David Laborde et al.ARTICLEThe Economic Journal2021Cited by: 1References: 61

    We consider a general equilibrium model of international trade with two layers of informational asymmetries. Private information of Home producers on costs affects the design of ‘behind-the-border’ policies reflecting the political influence of inefficient producers. Home's supply is contracted, causing trade, and motivating the use of tariffs. Eliminating those instruments by means of a trade agreement may become impossible once Home has also pr…

  • Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice

    Open AccessDavid Bardey, Denis Gromb et al.ARTICLEJournal of Industrial Economics2020

    A monopoly seller advising buyers about which of two goods fits their needs may be tempted to recommend the higher margin good. For the seller to collect information about a buyer’s needs and provide truthful advice, the profits from selling both goods must be similar enough, i.e ., within an implementability cone . The optimal regulation controls pricing distortions and information‐collection incentives separately via price regulation and fixed …

  • When Olson Meets Dahl

    Perrin Lefebvre, David MartimortARTICLEThe Journal of Politics2020Cited by: 2References: 62

    International audience

  • Funding and financing infrastructure

    Stéphane Straub, Marianne Fay et al.BOOKRePEc: Research Papers in Economics2018

    The paper addresses the issue of the feasible level of private finance in a contracting model of infrastructure finding and financing. It characterizes the structure of financial contracts, deriving the conditions under which both public and private finance coexist. A key feature is that access to outside finance and the regulatory decision on pricing and the amount of public subsidy, hence the extent of price recovery, are jointly determined. Mo…

  • A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game

    Open AccessDavid Martimort, Aggey Semenov et al.ARTICLETheoretical Economics2018

    We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to an intrinsic common agency screening game as the set of solutions to self-generating optimization programs. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes for regular environments by relying on techniques developed elsewhere for aggregate games and for the mechanism design delegation literature. The set of equilibria include those with non-differentiable payoffs and di…

  • Contract Theory in the Spotlight

    Pierre Fleckinger, David MartimortARTICLERevue d économie politique2018

    Oliver Hart et Bengt Holmström ont reçu le Prix de la Banque de Suède en sciences économiques en mémoire d’Alfred Nobel pour leurs contributions à la Théorie des Contrats. Leurs travaux établissent une Théorie de la Firme et des organisations fondée sur deux piliers. (1) Les parties contractantes exercent des efforts ou accomplissent des investissements qui accroissent la valeur de leur relation, mais ces actions sont parfois cachées, ne peuvent …

  • Extracting information or resource? The Hotelling rule revisited under asymmetric information

    Open AccessDavid Martimort, Jérôme Pouyet et al.ARTICLEThe RAND Journal of Economics2018

    A concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. A “virtual Hotelling rule” describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costs along the optimal extraction path. Fields which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow different extraction paths. Resource might be left unexploited in the long run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contra…

  • Funding and Financing Infrastructure

    Open AccessMarianne Fay, David Martimort et al.ARTICLEJournal of Development Economics2018Cited by: 3References: 5

  • Une revue critique de la théorie de l’agence commune appliquée aux jeux de lobbies

    David MartimortARTICLERevue économique2018References: 5

    L’objet de cet article est de remettre en question la vision optimiste du jeu politique entre groupes de pression qui est offerte par la théorie de l’agence commune. Si l’on croit les leçons de cette théorie, le processus de concurrence entre groupes de pression conduit à des choix équilibrés ; une vision associée au mouvement du pluralistic politics dont l’étendard fut porté par Dahl [1963]. Si le paradigme de l’agence commune est renouvelé par …

  • Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection

    Open AccessDavid Martimort, Aggey Semenov et al.ARTICLEEconomics Letters2017

  • A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement

    David Martimort, Aggey Semenov et al.ARTICLEThe Review of Economic Studies2016

    We present a Theory of Contracts under costly enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship between an uninformed buyer and a seller who is privately informed on his persistent cost at the outset. Public enforcement relies on remedies for breach. Private enforcement comes from severing relationships. We first characterize aggregate enforcement constraints ensuring that trading partners do not breach contracts unduly. Whether a long-term co…

  • Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty

    Malin Arve, David MartimortARTICLEAmerican Economic Review2016

    We characterize the optimal dynamic contract for a long-term basic service when an uncertain add-on is required later on. Introducing firm risk aversion has two impacts. Profits for the basic service can be backloaded to induce cheaper information revelation for this service: an Income Effect which reduces output distortions. The firm must also bear some risk to induce information revelation for the add-on. This Risk Effect reduces the level of t…

  • Merger Guidelines for Bidding Markets

    Philippe Gagnepain, David MartimortARTICLERevue économique2016Cited by: 1

    Nous proposons un test simple qui détermine si une fusion entre entreprises devrait ou non être autorisée dans une industrie qui sélectionne les candidats à l’exploitation par des appels d’offres. Ce test est appliqué dans le cas particulier de l’industrie du transport urbain en France. Il élabore l’enchère optimale et tient compte de deux effets antagonistes : d’une part, la fusion est préjudiciable, car elle entraîne une perte de concurrence ; …

  • Corruption in public–private partnerships

    Elisabetta Iossa, David MartimortCHAPTERThe Routledge companion to…2015

    In this paper we discuss the potential scope and cost of corruption in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs).We argue that the level of complexity of these procurement mechanisms leaves scope for corruption at each stage of the procurement process : the decision stage, the tender stage and the contract execution stage.The procurement of public services through PPPs should therefore be accompanied by measures that ensure transparency of decision proc…

  • Menu Auctions and Influence Games with Private Information

    Open AccessDavid Martimort, Lars StoleARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2015

  • Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism

    Vianney Dequiedt, David MartimortARTICLEAmerican Economic Review2015

    We consider vertical contracting arrangements between a manufacturer and a retailing network when retailers have private information and the organization is run through bilateral contracts. We highlight a new form of informational opportunism arising when the manufacturer manipulates information learned separately in each relationship. We characterize the set of allocations robust to such opportunism by means of simple ex post incentive compatibi…

  • A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements

    Open AccessDavid Martimort, Wilfried Sand‐Zantman et al.ARTICLEJournal of the European Economic…2015

  • Pessimistic information gathering

    Open AccessElisabetta Iossa, David MartimortARTICLEGames and Economic Behavior2015