Tudor M Baetu
Biographic Data
| ID | 1055993 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Tudor M Baetu |
| GIVEN NAMES | Tudor M |
| FAMILY NAME | Baetu |
| SIGNATURE | BAETU T M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2500-4433 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 18 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 31 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 18 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Pluralistic and Monistic Tendencies in the Life Sciences
Informational Models of the Phenomenon of Consciousness and the Mechanistic Project in Neuroscience
The epistemic problem of singular causation
Extrapolating animal consciousness
I argue that the question of animal consciousness is an extrapolation problem and, as such, is best tackled by deploying currently accepted methodology for validating experimental models of a phenomenon of interest. This methodology relies on an assessment of similarities and dissimilarities between experimental models, the partial replication of findings across complementary models, and evidence from the successes and failures of explanations, t…
The Problem of Hard and Easy Problems
David Chalmers advocates the view that the phenomenon of consciousness is fundamentally different from all other phenomena studied in the life sciences, positing a uniquely hard problem that precludes the possibility of a mechanistic explanation. In this paper, I evaluate three demarcation criteria for dividing phenomena into hard and easy problems: functional definability, the puzzle of the accompanying phenomenon, and the first-person data of s…
How interventionist accounts of causation work in experimental practice and why there is no need to worry about supervenience
Pain in psychology, biology and medicine
Beate Krickel, The Mechanical World
On pain experience, multidisciplinary integration and the level-laden conception of science
Multidisciplinary models aggregating ‘lower-level’ biological and ‘higher-level’ psychological and social determinants of a phenomenon raise a puzzle. How is the interaction between the physical, the psychological and the social conceptualized and explained? Using biopsychosocial models of pain as an illustration, I argue that these models are in fact level-neutral compilations of empirical findings about correlated and causally relevant factors,…
On the Possibility of Crucial Experiments in Biology
The article analyses in detail the Meselson–Stahl experiment, identifying two novel difficulties for the crucial experiment account, namely, the fragility of the experimental results and the fact that the hypotheses under scrutiny were not mutually exclusive. The crucial experiment account is rejected in favour of an experimental-mechanistic account of the historical significance of the experiment, emphasizing that the experiment generated data a…
From interventions to mechanistic explanations
The ‘Big Picture’
Both clinical research and basic science rely on the epistemic practice of extrapolation from surrogate models, to the point that explanatory accounts presented in review papers and biology textbooks are in fact composite pictures reconstituted from data gathered in a variety of distinct experimental setups. This raises two new challenges to previously proposed mechanistic-similarity solutions to the problem of extrapolation: one pertaining to th…
The Completeness of Mechanistic Explanations
The paper discusses methodological guidelines for evaluating mechanistic explanations. According to current accounts, a satisfactory mechanistic explanation should include all of the relevant features of the mechanism, its component entities and activities, and their properties and organization, as well as exhibit productive continuity. It is not specified, however, how this kind of mechanistic completeness can be demonstrated. I argue that param…
Models and the mosaic of scientific knowledge. The case of immunology
Genes after the human genome project
Mechanistic Constraints on Evolutionary Outcomes
Understanding the role mechanistic constraints play in shaping evolution can relieve the tension between the generally accepted intuition that there are no strict laws in biology and empirical findings showing that evolutionary processes are biased toward preferred outcomes. Mechanistic constraints explain why some evolutionary outcomes are more probable than others and allow for predictions in specific lineages. At the same time, mechanistic con…
Genomic Programs as Mechanism Schemas
In this article, I argue that genomic programs are not substitutes for multi-causal molecular mechanistic explanations of inheritance, but abstract representations of the same sort as mechanism schemas already described in the philosophical literature. On this account, the program analogy is not reductionistic and does not ignore or underestimate the active contribution of epigenetic elements to phenotypes and development. Rather, genomic program…
A Defense of Syntax-Based Gene Concepts in Postgenomics
The purpose of this article is to update and defend syntax-based (conserved DNA-sequence motifs) gene concepts. I show how syntax-based concepts have been and can be extended to accommodate complex cases of genome expression, regulation, and processing. In response to difficult cases and causal parity objections, I argue that the syntax-based approach fleshes out a deflationary concept that defines genes in terms of sequences and organizational f…
The ‘Big Picture’
Both clinical research and basic science rely on the epistemic practice of extrapolation from surrogate models, to the point that explanatory accounts presented in review papers and biology textbooks are in fact composite pictures reconstituted from data gathered in a variety of distinct experimental setups. This raises two new challenges to previously proposed mechanistic-similarity solutions to the problem of extrapolation: one pertaining to th…
Models and the mosaic of scientific knowledge. The case of immunology
From interventions to mechanistic explanations
The Completeness of Mechanistic Explanations
The paper discusses methodological guidelines for evaluating mechanistic explanations. According to current accounts, a satisfactory mechanistic explanation should include all of the relevant features of the mechanism, its component entities and activities, and their properties and organization, as well as exhibit productive continuity. It is not specified, however, how this kind of mechanistic completeness can be demonstrated. I argue that param…
On pain experience, multidisciplinary integration and the level-laden conception of science
Multidisciplinary models aggregating ‘lower-level’ biological and ‘higher-level’ psychological and social determinants of a phenomenon raise a puzzle. How is the interaction between the physical, the psychological and the social conceptualized and explained? Using biopsychosocial models of pain as an illustration, I argue that these models are in fact level-neutral compilations of empirical findings about correlated and causally relevant factors,…
On the Possibility of Crucial Experiments in Biology
The article analyses in detail the Meselson–Stahl experiment, identifying two novel difficulties for the crucial experiment account, namely, the fragility of the experimental results and the fact that the hypotheses under scrutiny were not mutually exclusive. The crucial experiment account is rejected in favour of an experimental-mechanistic account of the historical significance of the experiment, emphasizing that the experiment generated data a…
Beate Krickel, The Mechanical World
A Defense of Syntax-Based Gene Concepts in Postgenomics
The purpose of this article is to update and defend syntax-based (conserved DNA-sequence motifs) gene concepts. I show how syntax-based concepts have been and can be extended to accommodate complex cases of genome expression, regulation, and processing. In response to difficult cases and causal parity objections, I argue that the syntax-based approach fleshes out a deflationary concept that defines genes in terms of sequences and organizational f…
Genes after the human genome project
Mechanistic Constraints on Evolutionary Outcomes
Understanding the role mechanistic constraints play in shaping evolution can relieve the tension between the generally accepted intuition that there are no strict laws in biology and empirical findings showing that evolutionary processes are biased toward preferred outcomes. Mechanistic constraints explain why some evolutionary outcomes are more probable than others and allow for predictions in specific lineages. At the same time, mechanistic con…
Genomic Programs as Mechanism Schemas
In this article, I argue that genomic programs are not substitutes for multi-causal molecular mechanistic explanations of inheritance, but abstract representations of the same sort as mechanism schemas already described in the philosophical literature. On this account, the program analogy is not reductionistic and does not ignore or underestimate the active contribution of epigenetic elements to phenotypes and development. Rather, genomic program…
Models and the mosaic of scientific knowledge. The case of immunology
The Completeness of Mechanistic Explanations
The paper discusses methodological guidelines for evaluating mechanistic explanations. According to current accounts, a satisfactory mechanistic explanation should include all of the relevant features of the mechanism, its component entities and activities, and their properties and organization, as well as exhibit productive continuity. It is not specified, however, how this kind of mechanistic completeness can be demonstrated. I argue that param…
From interventions to mechanistic explanations
The ‘Big Picture’
Both clinical research and basic science rely on the epistemic practice of extrapolation from surrogate models, to the point that explanatory accounts presented in review papers and biology textbooks are in fact composite pictures reconstituted from data gathered in a variety of distinct experimental setups. This raises two new challenges to previously proposed mechanistic-similarity solutions to the problem of extrapolation: one pertaining to th…
Beate Krickel, The Mechanical World
On pain experience, multidisciplinary integration and the level-laden conception of science
Multidisciplinary models aggregating ‘lower-level’ biological and ‘higher-level’ psychological and social determinants of a phenomenon raise a puzzle. How is the interaction between the physical, the psychological and the social conceptualized and explained? Using biopsychosocial models of pain as an illustration, I argue that these models are in fact level-neutral compilations of empirical findings about correlated and causally relevant factors,…
On the Possibility of Crucial Experiments in Biology
The article analyses in detail the Meselson–Stahl experiment, identifying two novel difficulties for the crucial experiment account, namely, the fragility of the experimental results and the fact that the hypotheses under scrutiny were not mutually exclusive. The crucial experiment account is rejected in favour of an experimental-mechanistic account of the historical significance of the experiment, emphasizing that the experiment generated data a…
Pain in psychology, biology and medicine
How interventionist accounts of causation work in experimental practice and why there is no need to worry about supervenience
The Problem of Hard and Easy Problems
David Chalmers advocates the view that the phenomenon of consciousness is fundamentally different from all other phenomena studied in the life sciences, positing a uniquely hard problem that precludes the possibility of a mechanistic explanation. In this paper, I evaluate three demarcation criteria for dividing phenomena into hard and easy problems: functional definability, the puzzle of the accompanying phenomenon, and the first-person data of s…
The epistemic problem of singular causation
Extrapolating animal consciousness
I argue that the question of animal consciousness is an extrapolation problem and, as such, is best tackled by deploying currently accepted methodology for validating experimental models of a phenomenon of interest. This methodology relies on an assessment of similarities and dissimilarities between experimental models, the partial replication of findings across complementary models, and evidence from the successes and failures of explanations, t…
Informational Models of the Phenomenon of Consciousness and the Mechanistic Project in Neuroscience
Pluralistic and Monistic Tendencies in the Life Sciences
Epistemology (16 works) · Philosophy (16 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (11 works) · Psychology (11 works) · Computer Science (9 works) · Phenomenon (8 works) · Mathematics (7 works) · Cognitive science (6 works) · Philosophy of science (6 works) · Metaphysics (5 works)