Santiago Echeverri
Biographic Data
| ID | 1059438 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Santiago Echeverri |
| GIVEN NAMES | Santiago |
| FAMILY NAME | Echeverri |
| SIGNATURE | ECHEVERRI S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Geneva |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0701-8214 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Nota del editor
Nota del editor
Moderatism and Truth
According to moderatism , perceptual justification requires that one independently takes for granted propositional hinges. This view faces the truth problem: to offer an account of truth for hinges that is not threatened by skepticism. Annalisa Coliva has tried to solve the truth problem by developing a new form of alethic pluralism. I argue that the resulting view cannot offer a coherent characterization of “skeptical switch scenarios” while pro…
A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism
According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, a subject, S , has perceptual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of reasons for her belief that p which are both factive and reflectively accessible to S . It has been argued that ED is better placed than both knowledge internalism and knowledge externalism to undercut underdetermination‐based skepticism. I identify several principles th…
Putting I-Thoughts to Work
A traditional view holds that the self-concept is essentially indexical. In a highly influential article, Ruth Millikan famously held that the self-concept should be understood as a Millian name with a sui generis functional role. This article presents a novel explanatory argument against the Millian view and in favor of the indexical view. The argument starts from a characterization of the self-concept as a device of information integration. It …
Guarantee and Reflexivity
The rule account of self-conscious thought holds that a thought is self-conscious if and only if it contains a token of a concept-type that is governed by a reflexive rule. An account along these lines was discussed in the late 1970s. Nevertheless, very few philosophers endorse it nowadays. I shall argue that this summary dismissal is partly unjustified. There is one version of the rule account that can explain a key epistemic property of self-co…
Visual Reference and Iconic Content
Evidence from cognitive science supports the claim that humans and other animals see the world as divided into objects. Although this claim is widely accepted, it remains unclear whether the mechanisms of visual reference have representational content or are directly instantiated in the functional architecture. I put forward a version of the former approach that construes object files as icons for objects. This view is consistent with the evidenc…
Emotional Justification
Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justificati…
Indexing the World? Visual Tracking, Modularity, and the Perception–Cognition Interface
Research in vision science, developmental psychology, and the foundations of cognitive science has led some theorists to posit referential mechanisms similar to indices. This hypothesis has been framed within a Fodorian conception of the early vision module. The article shows that this conception is mistaken, for it cannot handle the ‘interface problem’—roughly, how indexing mechanisms relate to higher cognition and conceptual thought. As a resul…
La connaissance et ses raisons
Cet ouvrage est le produit des premiers travaux du Groupe de Recherche en Épistémologie (GRÉ), porté par Claudine Tiercelin au sein de la chaire de Métaphysique et philosophie de la connaissance du Collège de France. Les textes qui s’y trouvent réunis traitent de questions particulièrement discutées de l’épistémologie contemporaine, entendue comme élucidation philosophique de la nature de la connaissance, de sa valeur et de ses modalités, ainsi q…
Is Perception a Source of Reasons
It is widely assumed that perception is a source of reasons (SR). There is a weak sense in which this claim is trivially true: even if one characterizes perception in purely causal terms, perceptual beliefs originate from the mind's interaction with the world. When philosophers argue for (SR), however, they have a stronger view in mind: they claim that perception provides pre‐ or non‐ doxastic reasons for belief. In this article I examine some wa…
McDowell's Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism
In Mind and World, McDowell conceives of the content of perceptual experiences as conceptual. This picture is supposed to provide a therapy for skepticism, by showing that empirical thinking is objectively and normatively constrained. The paper offers a reconstruction of McDowell's view and shows that the therapy fails. This claim is based on three arguments: 1) the identity conception of truth he exploits is unable to sustain the idea that perce…
Emotional Justification
Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justificati…
McDowell's Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism
In Mind and World, McDowell conceives of the content of perceptual experiences as conceptual. This picture is supposed to provide a therapy for skepticism, by showing that empirical thinking is objectively and normatively constrained. The paper offers a reconstruction of McDowell's view and shows that the therapy fails. This claim is based on three arguments: 1) the identity conception of truth he exploits is unable to sustain the idea that perce…
Is Perception a Source of Reasons
It is widely assumed that perception is a source of reasons (SR). There is a weak sense in which this claim is trivially true: even if one characterizes perception in purely causal terms, perceptual beliefs originate from the mind's interaction with the world. When philosophers argue for (SR), however, they have a stronger view in mind: they claim that perception provides pre‐ or non‐ doxastic reasons for belief. In this article I examine some wa…
Indexing the World? Visual Tracking, Modularity, and the Perception–Cognition Interface
Research in vision science, developmental psychology, and the foundations of cognitive science has led some theorists to posit referential mechanisms similar to indices. This hypothesis has been framed within a Fodorian conception of the early vision module. The article shows that this conception is mistaken, for it cannot handle the ‘interface problem’—roughly, how indexing mechanisms relate to higher cognition and conceptual thought. As a resul…
La connaissance et ses raisons
Cet ouvrage est le produit des premiers travaux du Groupe de Recherche en Épistémologie (GRÉ), porté par Claudine Tiercelin au sein de la chaire de Métaphysique et philosophie de la connaissance du Collège de France. Les textes qui s’y trouvent réunis traitent de questions particulièrement discutées de l’épistémologie contemporaine, entendue comme élucidation philosophique de la nature de la connaissance, de sa valeur et de ses modalités, ainsi q…
Visual Reference and Iconic Content
Evidence from cognitive science supports the claim that humans and other animals see the world as divided into objects. Although this claim is widely accepted, it remains unclear whether the mechanisms of visual reference have representational content or are directly instantiated in the functional architecture. I put forward a version of the former approach that construes object files as icons for objects. This view is consistent with the evidenc…
Emotional Justification
Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justificati…
Guarantee and Reflexivity
The rule account of self-conscious thought holds that a thought is self-conscious if and only if it contains a token of a concept-type that is governed by a reflexive rule. An account along these lines was discussed in the late 1970s. Nevertheless, very few philosophers endorse it nowadays. I shall argue that this summary dismissal is partly unjustified. There is one version of the rule account that can explain a key epistemic property of self-co…
Putting I-Thoughts to Work
A traditional view holds that the self-concept is essentially indexical. In a highly influential article, Ruth Millikan famously held that the self-concept should be understood as a Millian name with a sui generis functional role. This article presents a novel explanatory argument against the Millian view and in favor of the indexical view. The argument starts from a characterization of the self-concept as a device of information integration. It …
A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism
According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, a subject, S , has perceptual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of reasons for her belief that p which are both factive and reflectively accessible to S . It has been argued that ED is better placed than both knowledge internalism and knowledge externalism to undercut underdetermination‐based skepticism. I identify several principles th…
Moderatism and Truth
According to moderatism , perceptual justification requires that one independently takes for granted propositional hinges. This view faces the truth problem: to offer an account of truth for hinges that is not threatened by skepticism. Annalisa Coliva has tried to solve the truth problem by developing a new form of alethic pluralism. I argue that the resulting view cannot offer a coherent characterization of “skeptical switch scenarios” while pro…
Nota del editor
Nota del editor
Philosophy (9 works) · Epistemology (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Perception (6 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Cognitive psychology (4 works) · Skepticism (4 works) · Cognition (3 works)