Douglas W Portmore
Biographic Data
| ID | 1060060 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Douglas W Portmore |
| GIVEN NAMES | Douglas W |
| FAMILY NAME | Portmore |
| SIGNATURE | PORTMORE D W |
| AFFILIATIONS | Arizona State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6180-457X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 29 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 33 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 28 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Deserving to Suffer
The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism
This handbook contains thirty-two previously unpublished contributions to consequentialist ethics by leading scholars, covering what’s happening in the field today as well as pointing to new directions for future research. Consequentialism is a rival to such moral theories as deontology, contractualism, and virtue ethics. But it’s more than just one rival among many, for every plausible moral theory must concede that the goodness of an act’s cons…
Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism
Opting for the Best
This chapter argues for the opting-for-the-best view: the view that, for any subject S and any member φ of a certain subset of S’s options, S ought to φ if and only if φ is the best member of this subset in terms of whatever ultimately matters. It’s argued that we need to restrict ourselves to a subset of the subject’s options because of the problem of act versions. This problem arises in the following sort of case. One’s best option is to kiss o…
Rationalist Teleological Maximalism
This chapter demonstrates how rationalism, maximalism, and teleology operate together to determine the deontic statuses of our options. And the chapter explains what rationalist teleological maximalism’s main virtues are. Last, the chapter explains why it’s important to work out the structure of our normative theories.
Rationalist Maximalism
Rationalism holds that our current options consist in all and only those events over which we presently exert rational control. Maximalism holds that the only options that have their deontic status in virtue of their own goodness are maximal options. When we combine these two, we get rationalist maximalism. This chapter argues that there are reasons to accept rationalist maximalism apart from the reasons that were already given for accepting each…
Which, if Either, Are We to Assess Directly in Terms of What Ultimately Matters: Our Options or Their Prospects?
This chapter argues that our uncertainty with respect to whether a subject has violated a constraint in φ-ing can stem not only from our limited knowledge of the actual world but also from the indeterminacy that’s inherent in certain possible worlds. And this means that constraint-accepting theorists will need to find a way to deal with such uncertainty even when it comes to giving an account of objective rightness. And it’s argued that the best …
What’s the Relevant Sort of Control?
Our options include all and only those events over which we exert the relevant sort of control. This chapter argues that the relevant sort of control must be complete as opposed to partial and synchronic as opposed to diachronic (i.e., the sort of control that we exercise at a moment in time rather than over a span of time). And it’s argued that the relevant sort of control is personal as opposed to subpersonal (i.e., the sort of control that mak…
Glossary
Maximalism and the Ought-Most-Reason View
Maximalism forces us to deny either that we ought to do whatever we have most reason to do or that how much reason there is to perform a given option is directly proportional to how good that option is. In this chapter, I argue that we should deny the latter. We should instead hold that how much reason there is to perform a given option is directly proportional to how good the best version of that option is. Thus, how much reason I have to kiss m…
Which Options Have Their Deontic Statuses in Virtue of Their Own Goodness?
The problem of act versions arises because one’s best option can be a version of a bad option. For instance, kissing passionately is a version of kissing. But it may be that although kissing passionately is one’s best option, kissing is a bad option. For it could be that, as a matter of fact, one would kiss nonpassionately if one were to kiss. This chapter argues that the best solution to this problem lies with adopting maximalism. On this view, …
What Are Our Options?
This chapter argues that whereas any event can be good or bad, only certain events can be obligatory. This, it’s argued, is because obligations have two additional roles to play beyond mere evaluation. One of these additional roles is a directive one. Obligations, unlike mere evaluations, must direct us to respond in certain ways, and for these directives to have any point at all, they must direct us to respond only in those ways that we have the…
Dedication
Copyright Page
Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options
The book concerns what is, perhaps, the least controversial normative principle concerning action: you ought to perform your best option—best, that is, in terms of whatever ultimately matters. The book sets aside the question of what ultimately matters so as to focus on the following questions. What are our options? Which options do we assess directly in terms of their own goodness and which do we assess in terms of the goodness of the more encom…
Transitivity, Moral Latitude, and Supererogation
On the standard account of supererogation, an act is supererogatory if and only if it is morally optional and there is more moral reason to perform it than to perform some permissible alternative. And, on this account, an agent has more moral reason to perform one act than to perform another if and only if she morally ought to prefer its outcome to that of the other. I argue that this account has two serious problems. The first, the latitude prob…
Maximalism and Moral Harmony
Maximalism is the view that an agent is permitted to perform a certain type of action (say, baking) if and only if she is permitted to perform some instance of this type (say, baking a pie), where φ‐ing is an instance of ψ‐ing if and only if φ‐ing entails ψ‐ing but not vice versa. Now, the aim of this paper is not to defend maximalism, but to defend a certain account of our options that when combined with maximalism results in a theory that accom…
Précis: Commonsense Consequentialism
Replies to Gert, Hurley, and Tenenbaum
Commonsense ConsequentialismWherein Morality Meets Rationality
This is a book about morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, Portmore defends a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons.
Commonsense consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality
The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons
The chapter argues that since our actions are the means by which we affect the way the world goes, and since our intentional actions aim at making the world go a certain way, we should hold that what agents have most reason to do is to act so as to make the world go as they have most reason to want it to go. More precisely, an agent's reasons for action are a function of her reasons for preferring certain possible worlds to others, such that what…
Ben Bradley, Well-Being and Death (Oxford: (Clarendon Press, 2009), pp. xxi + 198
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Rule-Consequentialism and Irrelevant Others
In this article, I argue that Brad Hooker's rule-consequentialism implausibly implies that what earthlings are morally required to sacrifice for the sake of helping their less fortunate brethren depends on whether or not other people exist on some distant planet even when these others would be too far away for earthlings to affect
Consequentializing
A growing trend of thought has it that any plausible nonconsequentialist theory can be consequentialized, which is to say that it can be given a consequentialist representation. In this essay, I explore both whether this claim is true and what its implications are. I also explain the procedure for consequentializing a nonconsequentialist theory and give an account of the motivation for doing so
Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options
The book concerns what is, perhaps, the least controversial normative principle concerning action: you ought to perform your best option—best, that is, in terms of whatever ultimately matters. The book sets aside the question of what ultimately matters so as to focus on the following questions. What are our options? Which options do we assess directly in terms of their own goodness and which do we assess in terms of the goodness of the more encom…
Combining Teleological Ethics With Evaluator Relativism: A Promising Result
Consequentialism is an agent-neutral teleological theory, and deontology is an agent-relative non-teleological theory. I argue that a certain hybrid of the two – namely, non-egoistic agent-relative teleological ethics (NATE) – is quite promising. This hybrid takes what is best from both consequentialism and deontology while leaving behind the problems associated with each. Like consequentialism and unlike deontology, NATE can accommodate the comp…
Transitivity, Moral Latitude, and Supererogation
On the standard account of supererogation, an act is supererogatory if and only if it is morally optional and there is more moral reason to perform it than to perform some permissible alternative. And, on this account, an agent has more moral reason to perform one act than to perform another if and only if she morally ought to prefer its outcome to that of the other. I argue that this account has two serious problems. The first, the latitude prob…
Consequentializing
A growing trend of thought has it that any plausible nonconsequentialist theory can be consequentialized, which is to say that it can be given a consequentialist representation. In this essay, I explore both whether this claim is true and what its implications are. I also explain the procedure for consequentializing a nonconsequentialist theory and give an account of the motivation for doing so
Rule-Consequentialism and Irrelevant Others
In this article, I argue that Brad Hooker's rule-consequentialism implausibly implies that what earthlings are morally required to sacrifice for the sake of helping their less fortunate brethren depends on whether or not other people exist on some distant planet even when these others would be too far away for earthlings to affect
Maximalism and Moral Harmony
Maximalism is the view that an agent is permitted to perform a certain type of action (say, baking) if and only if she is permitted to perform some instance of this type (say, baking a pie), where φ‐ing is an instance of ψ‐ing if and only if φ‐ing entails ψ‐ing but not vice versa. Now, the aim of this paper is not to defend maximalism, but to defend a certain account of our options that when combined with maximalism results in a theory that accom…
Précis: Commonsense Consequentialism
Ben Bradley, Well-Being and Death (Oxford: (Clarendon Press, 2009), pp. xxi + 198
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
McNaughton and Rawling on the Agent-relative/Agent-neutral Distinction
In this paper, I criticize David McNaughton and Piers Rawling's formalization of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction. I argue that their formalization is unable to accommodate an important ethical distinction between two types of conditional obligations. I then suggest a way of revising their formalization so as to fix the problem
Combining Teleological Ethics With Evaluator Relativism: A Promising Result
Consequentialism is an agent-neutral teleological theory, and deontology is an agent-relative non-teleological theory. I argue that a certain hybrid of the two – namely, non-egoistic agent-relative teleological ethics (NATE) – is quite promising. This hybrid takes what is best from both consequentialism and deontology while leaving behind the problems associated with each. Like consequentialism and unlike deontology, NATE can accommodate the comp…
Facing Death: Epicurus and His Critics
Welfare, Achievement, and Self-Sacrifice
Many philosophers hold that the achievement of one's goals can contribute to one's welfare apart from whatever independent contributions that the objects of those goals or the processes by which they are achieved make. Call this the Achievement View, and call those who accept it achievementists. In this paper, I argue that achievementists should accept both (a) that one factor that affects how much the achievement of a goal contributes to one’s w…
Rule-Consequentialism and Irrelevant Others
In this article, I argue that Brad Hooker's rule-consequentialism implausibly implies that what earthlings are morally required to sacrifice for the sake of helping their less fortunate brethren depends on whether or not other people exist on some distant planet even when these others would be too far away for earthlings to affect
Consequentializing
A growing trend of thought has it that any plausible nonconsequentialist theory can be consequentialized, which is to say that it can be given a consequentialist representation. In this essay, I explore both whether this claim is true and what its implications are. I also explain the procedure for consequentializing a nonconsequentialist theory and give an account of the motivation for doing so
Ben Bradley, Well-Being and Death (Oxford: (Clarendon Press, 2009), pp. xxi + 198
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Commonsense ConsequentialismWherein Morality Meets Rationality
This is a book about morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, Portmore defends a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons.
Commonsense consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality
The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons
The chapter argues that since our actions are the means by which we affect the way the world goes, and since our intentional actions aim at making the world go a certain way, we should hold that what agents have most reason to do is to act so as to make the world go as they have most reason to want it to go. More precisely, an agent's reasons for action are a function of her reasons for preferring certain possible worlds to others, such that what…
Précis: Commonsense Consequentialism
Replies to Gert, Hurley, and Tenenbaum
Transitivity, Moral Latitude, and Supererogation
On the standard account of supererogation, an act is supererogatory if and only if it is morally optional and there is more moral reason to perform it than to perform some permissible alternative. And, on this account, an agent has more moral reason to perform one act than to perform another if and only if she morally ought to prefer its outcome to that of the other. I argue that this account has two serious problems. The first, the latitude prob…
Maximalism and Moral Harmony
Maximalism is the view that an agent is permitted to perform a certain type of action (say, baking) if and only if she is permitted to perform some instance of this type (say, baking a pie), where φ‐ing is an instance of ψ‐ing if and only if φ‐ing entails ψ‐ing but not vice versa. Now, the aim of this paper is not to defend maximalism, but to defend a certain account of our options that when combined with maximalism results in a theory that accom…
Opting for the Best
This chapter argues for the opting-for-the-best view: the view that, for any subject S and any member φ of a certain subset of S’s options, S ought to φ if and only if φ is the best member of this subset in terms of whatever ultimately matters. It’s argued that we need to restrict ourselves to a subset of the subject’s options because of the problem of act versions. This problem arises in the following sort of case. One’s best option is to kiss o…
Rationalist Teleological Maximalism
This chapter demonstrates how rationalism, maximalism, and teleology operate together to determine the deontic statuses of our options. And the chapter explains what rationalist teleological maximalism’s main virtues are. Last, the chapter explains why it’s important to work out the structure of our normative theories.
Rationalist Maximalism
Rationalism holds that our current options consist in all and only those events over which we presently exert rational control. Maximalism holds that the only options that have their deontic status in virtue of their own goodness are maximal options. When we combine these two, we get rationalist maximalism. This chapter argues that there are reasons to accept rationalist maximalism apart from the reasons that were already given for accepting each…
Which, if Either, Are We to Assess Directly in Terms of What Ultimately Matters: Our Options or Their Prospects?
This chapter argues that our uncertainty with respect to whether a subject has violated a constraint in φ-ing can stem not only from our limited knowledge of the actual world but also from the indeterminacy that’s inherent in certain possible worlds. And this means that constraint-accepting theorists will need to find a way to deal with such uncertainty even when it comes to giving an account of objective rightness. And it’s argued that the best …
What’s the Relevant Sort of Control?
Our options include all and only those events over which we exert the relevant sort of control. This chapter argues that the relevant sort of control must be complete as opposed to partial and synchronic as opposed to diachronic (i.e., the sort of control that we exercise at a moment in time rather than over a span of time). And it’s argued that the relevant sort of control is personal as opposed to subpersonal (i.e., the sort of control that mak…
Glossary
Maximalism and the Ought-Most-Reason View
Maximalism forces us to deny either that we ought to do whatever we have most reason to do or that how much reason there is to perform a given option is directly proportional to how good that option is. In this chapter, I argue that we should deny the latter. We should instead hold that how much reason there is to perform a given option is directly proportional to how good the best version of that option is. Thus, how much reason I have to kiss m…
Which Options Have Their Deontic Statuses in Virtue of Their Own Goodness?
The problem of act versions arises because one’s best option can be a version of a bad option. For instance, kissing passionately is a version of kissing. But it may be that although kissing passionately is one’s best option, kissing is a bad option. For it could be that, as a matter of fact, one would kiss nonpassionately if one were to kiss. This chapter argues that the best solution to this problem lies with adopting maximalism. On this view, …
What Are Our Options?
This chapter argues that whereas any event can be good or bad, only certain events can be obligatory. This, it’s argued, is because obligations have two additional roles to play beyond mere evaluation. One of these additional roles is a directive one. Obligations, unlike mere evaluations, must direct us to respond in certain ways, and for these directives to have any point at all, they must direct us to respond only in those ways that we have the…
Dedication
Copyright Page
Philosophical Ethics and Theory (19 works) · Philosophy (18 works) · Epistemology (14 works) · Free Will and Agency (14 works) · Economics (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Law and economics (7 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (6 works)