Christopher Pincock
Biographic Data
| ID | 1062436 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Christopher Pincock |
| GIVEN NAMES | Christopher |
| FAMILY NAME | Pincock |
| SIGNATURE | PINCOCK C |
| AFFILIATIONS | The Ohio State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0602-9333 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 22 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 81 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 22 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Non-causal Explanations of Social and Biological Networks
One argument that all explanations are causal explanations is that no extant analysis of non-causal explanations can respect mandatory restrictions on explanation. After articulating two such restrictions, Asymmetry and Directionality, we consider how they work with respect to an explanation from network theory that applies to both social and brain networks. We argue that there are two viable ways to make sense of this explanation. One approach i…
Non-Representational Models and Objectual Understanding
This paper argues that investigations into how to best make something often provide researchers with an objectual understanding of their target phenomena. This argument starts with an extended investigation into the non-representational uses of models. In particular, we identify a special sort of “design model” whose aim is to guide the production of phenomena. Clarifying how these design models are evaluated shows that they are evaluated in diff…
A Defense of Truth as a Necessary Condition on Scientific Explanation
Concrete Scale Models, Essential Idealization, and Causal Explanation
This paper defends three claims about concrete or physical models: (i) these models remain important in science and engineering, (ii) they are often essentially idealized, in a sense to be made precise, and (iii) despite these essential idealizations, some of these models may be reliably used for the purpose of causal explanation. This discussion of concrete models is pursued using a detailed case study of some recent models of landslide generate…
Reichenbach, Russell and scientific realism
The derivation of Poiseuille’s law
Explanatory Relevance and Contrastive Explanation
A pluralist about explanation posits many explanatory relevance relations, while an invariantist denies any substantial role for context in fixing genuine explanation. This article summarizes one approach to combining pluralism and invariantism that emphasizes the contrastive nature of explanation. If explanations always take contrasts as their objects and contrasts come in types, then the role for the context in which an explanation is given can…
Abstract Explanations in Science
This article focuses on a case that expert practitioners count as an explanation: a mathematical account of Plateau’s laws for soap films. I argue that this example falls into a class of explanations that I call abstract explanations. Abstract explanations involve an appeal to a more abstract entity than the state of affairs being explained. I show that the abstract entity need not be causally relevant to the explanandum for its features to be ex…
How to avoid inconsistent idealizations
Mathematics and Scientific Representation
Mathematics plays a central role in much of contemporary science, but philosophers have struggled to understand what this role is or how significant it might be for mathematics and science. Pincock tackles this perennial question by asking how mathematics contributes to the success of our best scientific representations.
Mathematical explanations of the rainbow
Bas C. Van Fraassen Scientific Representation
Modeling reality
On Batterman's ‘On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science’
This discussion note of (Batterman [2010]) clarifies the modest aims of my ‘mapping account' of applications of mathematics in science. Once these aims are clarified it becomes clear that Batterman's ‘completely new approach' (Batterman [2010], p. 24) is not needed to make sense of his cases of idealized mathematical explanations. Instead, a positive proposal for the explanatory power of such cases can be reconciled with the mapping account.
Accounting for the Unity of Experience in Dilthey, Rickert, Bradley and Ward
Mathematics, Science, and Confirmation Theory
This article begins by distinguishing intrinsic and extrinsic contributions of mathematics to scientific representation. This leads to two investigations into how these different sorts of contributions relate to confirmation. I present a way of accommodating both contributions that complicates the traditional assumptions of confirmation theory. In particular, I argue that subjective Bayesianism does best in accounting for extrinsic contributions,…
From sunspots to the Southern Oscillation
Carnap's Logical Structure of the World
This article aims to give an overview of Carnap's 1928 book Logical Structure of the World or Aufbau and the most influential interpretations of its significance. After giving an outline of the book in Section 2, I turn to the first sustained interpretations of the book offered by Goodman and Quine in Section 3. Section 4 explains how this empirical reductionist interpretation was largely displaced by its main competitor. This is the line of inte…
Mathematical Idealization
Mathematical idealizations are scientific representations that result from assumptions that are believed to be false, and where mathematics plays a crucial role. I propose a two stage account of how to rank mathematical idealizations that is largely inspired by the semantic view of scientific theories. The paper concludes by considering how this approach to idealization allows for a limited form of scientific realism
Overextending Partial Structures
The partial structures program of da Costa, French and others offers a unified framework within which to handle a wide range of issues central to contemporary philosophy of science. I argue that the program is inadequately equipped to account for simple cases where idealizations are used to construct abstract, mathematical models of physical systems. These problems show that da Costa and French have not overcome the objections raised by Cartwrigh…
A Revealing Flaw in Colyvan's Indispensability Argument
Mark Colyvan uses applications of mathematics to argue that mathematical entities exist. I claim that his argument is invalid based on the assumption that a certain way of thinking about applications, called ‘the mapping account,’ is correct. My main contention is that successful applications depend only on there being appropriate structural relations between physical situations and the mathematical domain. As a variety of non-realist interpretat…
Russell's Influence On Carnap's Aufbau
Abstract Explanations in Science
This article focuses on a case that expert practitioners count as an explanation: a mathematical account of Plateau’s laws for soap films. I argue that this example falls into a class of explanations that I call abstract explanations. Abstract explanations involve an appeal to a more abstract entity than the state of affairs being explained. I show that the abstract entity need not be causally relevant to the explanandum for its features to be ex…
A Revealing Flaw in Colyvan's Indispensability Argument
Mark Colyvan uses applications of mathematics to argue that mathematical entities exist. I claim that his argument is invalid based on the assumption that a certain way of thinking about applications, called ‘the mapping account,’ is correct. My main contention is that successful applications depend only on there being appropriate structural relations between physical situations and the mathematical domain. As a variety of non-realist interpretat…
Mathematical Idealization
Mathematical idealizations are scientific representations that result from assumptions that are believed to be false, and where mathematics plays a crucial role. I propose a two stage account of how to rank mathematical idealizations that is largely inspired by the semantic view of scientific theories. The paper concludes by considering how this approach to idealization allows for a limited form of scientific realism
Overextending Partial Structures
The partial structures program of da Costa, French and others offers a unified framework within which to handle a wide range of issues central to contemporary philosophy of science. I argue that the program is inadequately equipped to account for simple cases where idealizations are used to construct abstract, mathematical models of physical systems. These problems show that da Costa and French have not overcome the objections raised by Cartwrigh…
Modeling reality
How to avoid inconsistent idealizations
Concrete Scale Models, Essential Idealization, and Causal Explanation
This paper defends three claims about concrete or physical models: (i) these models remain important in science and engineering, (ii) they are often essentially idealized, in a sense to be made precise, and (iii) despite these essential idealizations, some of these models may be reliably used for the purpose of causal explanation. This discussion of concrete models is pursued using a detailed case study of some recent models of landslide generate…
On Batterman's ‘On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science’
This discussion note of (Batterman [2010]) clarifies the modest aims of my ‘mapping account' of applications of mathematics in science. Once these aims are clarified it becomes clear that Batterman's ‘completely new approach' (Batterman [2010], p. 24) is not needed to make sense of his cases of idealized mathematical explanations. Instead, a positive proposal for the explanatory power of such cases can be reconciled with the mapping account.
Bas C. Van Fraassen Scientific Representation
Explanatory Relevance and Contrastive Explanation
A pluralist about explanation posits many explanatory relevance relations, while an invariantist denies any substantial role for context in fixing genuine explanation. This article summarizes one approach to combining pluralism and invariantism that emphasizes the contrastive nature of explanation. If explanations always take contrasts as their objects and contrasts come in types, then the role for the context in which an explanation is given can…
From sunspots to the Southern Oscillation
Russell's Influence On Carnap's Aufbau
A Revealing Flaw in Colyvan's Indispensability Argument
Mark Colyvan uses applications of mathematics to argue that mathematical entities exist. I claim that his argument is invalid based on the assumption that a certain way of thinking about applications, called ‘the mapping account,’ is correct. My main contention is that successful applications depend only on there being appropriate structural relations between physical situations and the mathematical domain. As a variety of non-realist interpretat…
Overextending Partial Structures
The partial structures program of da Costa, French and others offers a unified framework within which to handle a wide range of issues central to contemporary philosophy of science. I argue that the program is inadequately equipped to account for simple cases where idealizations are used to construct abstract, mathematical models of physical systems. These problems show that da Costa and French have not overcome the objections raised by Cartwrigh…
Mathematical Idealization
Mathematical idealizations are scientific representations that result from assumptions that are believed to be false, and where mathematics plays a crucial role. I propose a two stage account of how to rank mathematical idealizations that is largely inspired by the semantic view of scientific theories. The paper concludes by considering how this approach to idealization allows for a limited form of scientific realism
From sunspots to the Southern Oscillation
Carnap's Logical Structure of the World
This article aims to give an overview of Carnap's 1928 book Logical Structure of the World or Aufbau and the most influential interpretations of its significance. After giving an outline of the book in Section 2, I turn to the first sustained interpretations of the book offered by Goodman and Quine in Section 3. Section 4 explains how this empirical reductionist interpretation was largely displaced by its main competitor. This is the line of inte…
Accounting for the Unity of Experience in Dilthey, Rickert, Bradley and Ward
Mathematics, Science, and Confirmation Theory
This article begins by distinguishing intrinsic and extrinsic contributions of mathematics to scientific representation. This leads to two investigations into how these different sorts of contributions relate to confirmation. I present a way of accommodating both contributions that complicates the traditional assumptions of confirmation theory. In particular, I argue that subjective Bayesianism does best in accounting for extrinsic contributions,…
Mathematical explanations of the rainbow
Bas C. Van Fraassen Scientific Representation
Modeling reality
On Batterman's ‘On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science’
This discussion note of (Batterman [2010]) clarifies the modest aims of my ‘mapping account' of applications of mathematics in science. Once these aims are clarified it becomes clear that Batterman's ‘completely new approach' (Batterman [2010], p. 24) is not needed to make sense of his cases of idealized mathematical explanations. Instead, a positive proposal for the explanatory power of such cases can be reconciled with the mapping account.
Mathematics and Scientific Representation
Mathematics plays a central role in much of contemporary science, but philosophers have struggled to understand what this role is or how significant it might be for mathematics and science. Pincock tackles this perennial question by asking how mathematics contributes to the success of our best scientific representations.
How to avoid inconsistent idealizations
Abstract Explanations in Science
This article focuses on a case that expert practitioners count as an explanation: a mathematical account of Plateau’s laws for soap films. I argue that this example falls into a class of explanations that I call abstract explanations. Abstract explanations involve an appeal to a more abstract entity than the state of affairs being explained. I show that the abstract entity need not be causally relevant to the explanandum for its features to be ex…
Explanatory Relevance and Contrastive Explanation
A pluralist about explanation posits many explanatory relevance relations, while an invariantist denies any substantial role for context in fixing genuine explanation. This article summarizes one approach to combining pluralism and invariantism that emphasizes the contrastive nature of explanation. If explanations always take contrasts as their objects and contrasts come in types, then the role for the context in which an explanation is given can…
Reichenbach, Russell and scientific realism
The derivation of Poiseuille’s law
Concrete Scale Models, Essential Idealization, and Causal Explanation
This paper defends three claims about concrete or physical models: (i) these models remain important in science and engineering, (ii) they are often essentially idealized, in a sense to be made precise, and (iii) despite these essential idealizations, some of these models may be reliably used for the purpose of causal explanation. This discussion of concrete models is pursued using a detailed case study of some recent models of landslide generate…
A Defense of Truth as a Necessary Condition on Scientific Explanation
Non-Representational Models and Objectual Understanding
This paper argues that investigations into how to best make something often provide researchers with an objectual understanding of their target phenomena. This argument starts with an extended investigation into the non-representational uses of models. In particular, we identify a special sort of “design model” whose aim is to guide the production of phenomena. Clarifying how these design models are evaluated shows that they are evaluated in diff…
Non-causal Explanations of Social and Biological Networks
One argument that all explanations are causal explanations is that no extant analysis of non-causal explanations can respect mandatory restrictions on explanation. After articulating two such restrictions, Asymmetry and Directionality, we consider how they work with respect to an explanation from network theory that applies to both social and brain networks. We argue that there are two viable ways to make sense of this explanation. One approach i…
Philosophy (21 works) · Epistemology (20 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (20 works) · Computer Science (13 works) · Mathematics (10 works) · Philosophy of science (9 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Physics (6 works) · Idealization (5 works) · Law (5 works)