Peter J Hammond
Biographic Data
| ID | 1065430 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Peter J Hammond |
| GIVEN NAMES | Peter J |
| FAMILY NAME | Hammond |
| SIGNATURE | HAMMOND P J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Stanford University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1125-3612 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 27 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1959 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Bounded rationality with subjective evaluations in enlivened but truncated decision trees
In normative models a decision-maker is usually assumed to be Bayesian rational, and so to maximize subjective expected utility, within a complete and correctly specified decision model. Following the discussion in Hammond (HEI 179–195, 2007) of Schumpeter’s (Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung; Eine Untersuchung über Unternehmergewinn, Kapital, Kredit, Zins und den Konjunkturzyklus, Leipzig, 1911; The Theory of Economic Development: An Inqu…
Prerationality as Avoiding Predictably Regrettable Consequences
À la suite de travaux antérieurs sur la théorie conséquentialiste de la décision, on considère un domaine non restreint d’arbres de décision finis, y compris les sous-arbres de continuation, qui peuvent avoir : 1) des nœuds de décision où le décideur doit agir ; 2) des nœuds aléatoires où une « loterie à la roulette » avec des probabilités antérieurement definies et strictement positives est résolue ; 3) des nœuds d’événements où une « course de …
Fundamental utilitarianism and intergenerational equity with extinction discounting
Ramsey famously condemned discounting “future enjoyments” as “ethically indefensible”. Suppes enunciated an equity criterion which, when social choice is utilitarian, implies giving equal weight to all individuals’ utilities. By contrast, Arrow (Contemporary economic issues. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1999a; Discounting and Intergenerational Effects, Resources for the Future Press, Washington DC, 1999b)…
Non-Archimedean subjective probabilities in decision theory and games
Consequentialism and Bayesian Rationality in Normal Form Games
Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange
In smooth exchange economies with a continuum of agents, any Walrasian mechanism is Pareto efficient, individually rational, anonymous, and strategy-proof. Barberà and Jackson's recent results imply that no such efficient mechanism is the limit of resource-balanced, individually rational, anonymous and non-bossy strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for an expanding sequence of finite economies. For a broad class of smooth random exchange economie…
Limits to the Potential Gains from Economic Integration and Other Supply Side Policies
Classical welfare economics demonstrates potential Pareto improvements from `supply side' policy changes that increase the efficiency of aggregate production. Special cases reviewed here concern market integration through customs unions and the gains from international trade. These classical results require incentive incompatible lump-sum transfers. Generally, other policies must compensate deserving losers. Following Dixit and Norman, we conside…
Liberalism, Independent Rights and the Pareto Principle
Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Welfare Optimality under Uncertainty
It is widely believed by economic theorists that, if there were no transactions costs, and if all information about the economy were perfectly shared by all, then Arrow-Debreu commodity markets should bring about an ideal allocation. The basis for this belief seems clear. We have the two efficiency theorems of welfare economics which assure us that, in the absence of external effects, any competitive allocation is Pareto-efficient, and that any P…
Incentives in Public Decision-Making
Journal Article Incentives in Public Decision-Making Get access Incentives in Public Decision-Making. By Jerry R. GREEN and JEAN-JACCHJES LAFFONT. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979. Pp. xviii + 293. $48.75, Dfl 100.00.) Peter J. Hammond Peter J. Hammond Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 90, Issue 358, 1 June 1980, Pages 407–408, https://doi.org/10.2307/2231809 P…
Dynamic Restrictions on Metastatic Choice
shall call the model, and the second the dynamic model. The model has an agent making a single once-and-for-all lifetime plan, which never needs to be revised. It is the standard economist's technique for handling problems of choice over time, which is described in Irving Fisher's Theory of Interest, in Hicks' Value and Capital, in Allais' Economie et Interet and many others. A good textbook treatment may be found in Malinvaud (1972, Chapter 10).…
Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle
An Arrow social welfare function was designed not to incorporate any interpersonal comparisons. But some notions of equity rest on interpersonal comparisons. It is shown that a generalized social welfare function, incorporating interpersonal comparisons, can satisfy modifications of the Arrow conditions, and also a strong version of an equity axiom due to Sen. One such generalized social welfare function is the lexicographic form of Rawls' ARRow …
Lectures on Microeconomic Theory
Journal Article Lectures on Microeconomic Theory Get access Lectures on Microeconomic Theory. By E. Malinvaud. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1972. Pp. ix + 318. Dfl. 40.00.) Peter Hammond Peter Hammond University of Essex Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 83, Issue 330, 1 June 1973, Pages 543–545, https://doi.org/10.2307/2231201 Published: 01 June 1973
Ethnology and Ethnography: Le Groupe dit Pahouin (Fang-Boulou-Beti). Pierre ALEXANDRE and Jacques Binet
Incentives in Public Decision-Making
Journal Article Incentives in Public Decision-Making Get access Incentives in Public Decision-Making. By Jerry R. GREEN and JEAN-JACCHJES LAFFONT. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979. Pp. xviii + 293. $48.75, Dfl 100.00.) Peter J. Hammond Peter J. Hammond Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 90, Issue 358, 1 June 1980, Pages 407–408, https://doi.org/10.2307/2231809 P…
Limits to the Potential Gains from Economic Integration and Other Supply Side Policies
Classical welfare economics demonstrates potential Pareto improvements from `supply side' policy changes that increase the efficiency of aggregate production. Special cases reviewed here concern market integration through customs unions and the gains from international trade. These classical results require incentive incompatible lump-sum transfers. Generally, other policies must compensate deserving losers. Following Dixit and Norman, we conside…
Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Welfare Optimality under Uncertainty
It is widely believed by economic theorists that, if there were no transactions costs, and if all information about the economy were perfectly shared by all, then Arrow-Debreu commodity markets should bring about an ideal allocation. The basis for this belief seems clear. We have the two efficiency theorems of welfare economics which assure us that, in the absence of external effects, any competitive allocation is Pareto-efficient, and that any P…
Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange
In smooth exchange economies with a continuum of agents, any Walrasian mechanism is Pareto efficient, individually rational, anonymous, and strategy-proof. Barberà and Jackson's recent results imply that no such efficient mechanism is the limit of resource-balanced, individually rational, anonymous and non-bossy strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for an expanding sequence of finite economies. For a broad class of smooth random exchange economie…
Lectures on Microeconomic Theory
Journal Article Lectures on Microeconomic Theory Get access Lectures on Microeconomic Theory. By E. Malinvaud. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1972. Pp. ix + 318. Dfl. 40.00.) Peter Hammond Peter Hammond University of Essex Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 83, Issue 330, 1 June 1973, Pages 543–545, https://doi.org/10.2307/2231201 Published: 01 June 1973
Ethnology and Ethnography: Le Groupe dit Pahouin (Fang-Boulou-Beti). Pierre ALEXANDRE and Jacques Binet
Lectures on Microeconomic Theory
Journal Article Lectures on Microeconomic Theory Get access Lectures on Microeconomic Theory. By E. Malinvaud. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1972. Pp. ix + 318. Dfl. 40.00.) Peter Hammond Peter Hammond University of Essex Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 83, Issue 330, 1 June 1973, Pages 543–545, https://doi.org/10.2307/2231201 Published: 01 June 1973
Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle
An Arrow social welfare function was designed not to incorporate any interpersonal comparisons. But some notions of equity rest on interpersonal comparisons. It is shown that a generalized social welfare function, incorporating interpersonal comparisons, can satisfy modifications of the Arrow conditions, and also a strong version of an equity axiom due to Sen. One such generalized social welfare function is the lexicographic form of Rawls' ARRow …
Dynamic Restrictions on Metastatic Choice
shall call the model, and the second the dynamic model. The model has an agent making a single once-and-for-all lifetime plan, which never needs to be revised. It is the standard economist's technique for handling problems of choice over time, which is described in Irving Fisher's Theory of Interest, in Hicks' Value and Capital, in Allais' Economie et Interet and many others. A good textbook treatment may be found in Malinvaud (1972, Chapter 10).…
Incentives in Public Decision-Making
Journal Article Incentives in Public Decision-Making Get access Incentives in Public Decision-Making. By Jerry R. GREEN and JEAN-JACCHJES LAFFONT. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979. Pp. xviii + 293. $48.75, Dfl 100.00.) Peter J. Hammond Peter J. Hammond Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 90, Issue 358, 1 June 1980, Pages 407–408, https://doi.org/10.2307/2231809 P…
Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Welfare Optimality under Uncertainty
It is widely believed by economic theorists that, if there were no transactions costs, and if all information about the economy were perfectly shared by all, then Arrow-Debreu commodity markets should bring about an ideal allocation. The basis for this belief seems clear. We have the two efficiency theorems of welfare economics which assure us that, in the absence of external effects, any competitive allocation is Pareto-efficient, and that any P…
Liberalism, Independent Rights and the Pareto Principle
Limits to the Potential Gains from Economic Integration and Other Supply Side Policies
Classical welfare economics demonstrates potential Pareto improvements from `supply side' policy changes that increase the efficiency of aggregate production. Special cases reviewed here concern market integration through customs unions and the gains from international trade. These classical results require incentive incompatible lump-sum transfers. Generally, other policies must compensate deserving losers. Following Dixit and Norman, we conside…
Consequentialism and Bayesian Rationality in Normal Form Games
Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange
In smooth exchange economies with a continuum of agents, any Walrasian mechanism is Pareto efficient, individually rational, anonymous, and strategy-proof. Barberà and Jackson's recent results imply that no such efficient mechanism is the limit of resource-balanced, individually rational, anonymous and non-bossy strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for an expanding sequence of finite economies. For a broad class of smooth random exchange economie…
Non-Archimedean subjective probabilities in decision theory and games
Fundamental utilitarianism and intergenerational equity with extinction discounting
Ramsey famously condemned discounting “future enjoyments” as “ethically indefensible”. Suppes enunciated an equity criterion which, when social choice is utilitarian, implies giving equal weight to all individuals’ utilities. By contrast, Arrow (Contemporary economic issues. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1999a; Discounting and Intergenerational Effects, Resources for the Future Press, Washington DC, 1999b)…
Prerationality as Avoiding Predictably Regrettable Consequences
À la suite de travaux antérieurs sur la théorie conséquentialiste de la décision, on considère un domaine non restreint d’arbres de décision finis, y compris les sous-arbres de continuation, qui peuvent avoir : 1) des nœuds de décision où le décideur doit agir ; 2) des nœuds aléatoires où une « loterie à la roulette » avec des probabilités antérieurement definies et strictement positives est résolue ; 3) des nœuds d’événements où une « course de …
Bounded rationality with subjective evaluations in enlivened but truncated decision trees
In normative models a decision-maker is usually assumed to be Bayesian rational, and so to maximize subjective expected utility, within a complete and correctly specified decision model. Following the discussion in Hammond (HEI 179–195, 2007) of Schumpeter’s (Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung; Eine Untersuchung über Unternehmergewinn, Kapital, Kredit, Zins und den Konjunkturzyklus, Leipzig, 1911; The Theory of Economic Development: An Inqu…
Computer Science (8 works) · Economic theories and models (8 works) · Economics (8 works) · Mathematical economics (8 works) · Mathematics (6 works) · Microeconomics (6 works) · Game Theory and Applications (5 works) · Pareto principle (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Sociology (4 works)