Guillaume Cheikbossian
Biographic Data
| ID | 1065628 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Guillaume Cheikbossian |
| GIVEN NAMES | Guillaume |
| FAMILY NAME | Cheikbossian |
| SIGNATURE | CHEIKBOSSIAN G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Université de Montpellier |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7461-1467 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Environmental tax competition and welfare: The good news about lobbies
Productive and Destructive Group Contests: An Experimental Investigation
In this study, we experimentally test the theoretical results of a contest game between groups when the value of the prize is fixed and when it is endogenously determined. It can decrease with contest efforts of all groups as in the case of an armed conflict or a lawsuit. The value of the prize can also increase with contest efforts as in the case of a patent race. We also analyze the impact of different groupings of players on contest efforts. W…
Group cooperation against a hegemon
In this paper, I study the ability of a group of citizens to cooperate against a hegemon in a repeated contest game and where group members and the hegemon have different valuations of the prize. I first consider that group members use grim trigger strategies (GTSs) to support cooperative behavior and show that full cooperation within the group is more easily sustained as a stationary subgame perfect (Nash) equilibrium (SSPE) as either group size…
On the Difficulty of Collusion in the Presence of a More Efficient Outsider
We study the ability of several identical firms to collude in the presence of a more efficient firm, which does not take part in their collusive agreement. The cartel firms adopt stick-and-carrot strategies, while the efficient firm plays its one-period best-response function, regardless of the history of play. We characterize the most collusive symmetric punishment, which maximizes the scope for collusion. We then find that either a lower cost d…
Pourquoi certains lobbies sont-ils plus puissants que d’autres ? L’analyse économique des groupes d’influence hétérogènes
Dans cet article, nous présentons plusieurs analyses économiques récentes des groupes d’intérêts hétérogènes. Nous nous concentrons sur deux types d’hétérogénéité des groupes de pression : en termes de taille, mesurée par le nombre de membres, et en termes de préférences – intra- et inter-groupes – de leurs membres. En ce qui concerne la taille, nous insistons sur le problème de l’action collective et le paradoxe selon lequel les grands groupes s…
Trade Policy, Mergers, and Product Differentiation
We analyze the welfare effects of mergers in a strategic trade-policy environment. A merger in one country changes the strategic behavior of all firms in the markets, which in turn modifies the strategic interaction between governments in the policy game. Consequently, the results strongly contrast with those obtained in a laissez-faire economy. Under quantity competition, a merger is always profitable to the host country and can also be profitab…
La coordination des politiques environnementales entre deux pays de taille asymétrique
Dans cet article, nous étudions la politique environnementale stratégique dans un modèle à deux pays de taille asymétrique. Les intéractions stratégiques ont pour origine, d’une part, la situation de concurrence imparfaite entre les entreprises des deux pays sur le marché commun, et d’autre part, l’aspect transfrontalier de la production polluante. Nous montrons qu’à l’équilibre de Nash, le grand pays choisit un taux de taxe sur la production pol…
The Collective Action Problem: Within-group Cooperation and Between-group Competition in a Repeated Rent-Seeking Game
Rent-seeking, spillovers and the benefits of decentralization
Why is Law Enforcement Decentralized
Seigniorage, Delegation and Common Currency: Why Monetary Unions May Fail
Seigniorage, Delegation and Common Currency: Why Monetary Unions May Fail
Why is Law Enforcement Decentralized
The Collective Action Problem: Within-group Cooperation and Between-group Competition in a Repeated Rent-Seeking Game
Rent-seeking, spillovers and the benefits of decentralization
La coordination des politiques environnementales entre deux pays de taille asymétrique
Dans cet article, nous étudions la politique environnementale stratégique dans un modèle à deux pays de taille asymétrique. Les intéractions stratégiques ont pour origine, d’une part, la situation de concurrence imparfaite entre les entreprises des deux pays sur le marché commun, et d’autre part, l’aspect transfrontalier de la production polluante. Nous montrons qu’à l’équilibre de Nash, le grand pays choisit un taux de taxe sur la production pol…
Trade Policy, Mergers, and Product Differentiation
We analyze the welfare effects of mergers in a strategic trade-policy environment. A merger in one country changes the strategic behavior of all firms in the markets, which in turn modifies the strategic interaction between governments in the policy game. Consequently, the results strongly contrast with those obtained in a laissez-faire economy. Under quantity competition, a merger is always profitable to the host country and can also be profitab…
Pourquoi certains lobbies sont-ils plus puissants que d’autres ? L’analyse économique des groupes d’influence hétérogènes
Dans cet article, nous présentons plusieurs analyses économiques récentes des groupes d’intérêts hétérogènes. Nous nous concentrons sur deux types d’hétérogénéité des groupes de pression : en termes de taille, mesurée par le nombre de membres, et en termes de préférences – intra- et inter-groupes – de leurs membres. En ce qui concerne la taille, nous insistons sur le problème de l’action collective et le paradoxe selon lequel les grands groupes s…
On the Difficulty of Collusion in the Presence of a More Efficient Outsider
We study the ability of several identical firms to collude in the presence of a more efficient firm, which does not take part in their collusive agreement. The cartel firms adopt stick-and-carrot strategies, while the efficient firm plays its one-period best-response function, regardless of the history of play. We characterize the most collusive symmetric punishment, which maximizes the scope for collusion. We then find that either a lower cost d…
Group cooperation against a hegemon
In this paper, I study the ability of a group of citizens to cooperate against a hegemon in a repeated contest game and where group members and the hegemon have different valuations of the prize. I first consider that group members use grim trigger strategies (GTSs) to support cooperative behavior and show that full cooperation within the group is more easily sustained as a stationary subgame perfect (Nash) equilibrium (SSPE) as either group size…
Productive and Destructive Group Contests: An Experimental Investigation
In this study, we experimentally test the theoretical results of a contest game between groups when the value of the prize is fixed and when it is endogenously determined. It can decrease with contest efforts of all groups as in the case of an armed conflict or a lawsuit. The value of the prize can also increase with contest efforts as in the case of a patent race. We also analyze the impact of different groupings of players on contest efforts. W…
Environmental tax competition and welfare: The good news about lobbies
Economics (7 works) · Microeconomics (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Economic theories and models (3 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (3 works) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (3 works) · Market economy (3 works)