Lauren N Ro
Biographic Data
| ID | 1065979 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lauren N Ro |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lauren N |
| FAMILY NAME | Ro |
| SIGNATURE | RO L N |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Irvine |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0771-7189 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 61 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Brains, Networks and Dynamics
This paper argues that when brain networks figure in explanations of cognition and behavior they often do so in conjunction with independent dynamical assumptions about signal transmission in the brain. In such cases explanation does not depend on network structure alone but on network structure operating in conjunction with dynamical assumptions. Moreover, dynamical assumptions embody causal information, so that the resulting explanations are no…
Cascade Versus Mechanism
According to mainstream philosophical views causal explanation in biology and neuroscience is mechanistic.As the term 'mechanism' gets regular use in these fields it is unsurprising that philosophers consider it important to scientific explanation.What is surprising is that they consider it the only causal term of importance.This paper provides an analysis of a new causal concept-it examines the cascade concept in science and the causal structure…
What is social structural explanation? A causal account
Social scientists appeal to various “structures” in their explanations including public policies, economic systems, and social hierarchies. Significant debate surrounds the explanatory relevance of these factors for various outcomes such as health, behavioral, and economic patterns. This paper provides a causal account of social structural explanation that is motivated by Haslanger (2016). This account suggests that social structure can be explan…
Causal Constraints in the Life and Social Sciences
This paper examines constraints and their role in scientific explanation. Common views in the philosophical literature suggest that constraints are non-causal and that they provide non-causal explanations. While much of this work focuses on examples from physics, this paper explores constraints from other fields, including neuroscience, physiology, and the social sciences. I argue that these cases involve constraints that are causal and that prov…
The explanatory nature of constraints
This paper provides an analysis of explanatory constraints and their role in scientific explanation. This analysis clarifies main characteristics of explanatory constraints, ways in which they differ from “standard” explanatory factors, and the unique roles they play in scientific explanation. While current philosophical work appreciates two main types of explanatory constraints, this paper suggests a new taxonomy: law-based constraints, mathemat…
Irreversible (One-hit) and Reversible (Sustaining) Causation
This paper explores a distinction among causal relationships that has yet to receive attention in the philosophical literature, namely, whether causal relationships are reversible or irreversible. We provide an analysis of this distinction and show how it has important implications for causal inference and modeling. This work also clarifies how various familiar puzzles involving preemption and over-determination play out differently depending on …
Tracers in neuroscience
Distinguishing topological and causal explanation
Causal explanation and the periodic table
Causal Concepts in Biology
Over the last two decades few topics in philosophy of science have received as much attention as mechanistic explanation. A significant motivation for these accounts is that scientists frequently use the term ‘mechanism’ in their explanations of biological phenomena. Of course, biologists use a variety of causal concepts in their explanations, including concepts like pathways, cascades, triggers, and processes. Despite this variety, mainstream ph…
Multiple Realizability from a Causal Perspective
This article examines the multiple realizability thesis within a causal framework. The beginnings of this framework are found in Elliott Sober’s “Multiple Realizability Argument against Reduction,” which argues that the multiple realizability thesis poses no challenge to reductive explanation. While Sober’s causal approach has the potential to reveal new insights, I argue that his setup fails to capture important aspects of the multiple realizabi…
Causal Selection and the Pathway Concept
Most philosophical work on causal selection examines the selection of single causes and aims to clarify what grounds, if any, justify this selection. Such analyses overlook the fact that in scientific contexts multiple factors are often selected as the important causes of some outcome. This analysis examines a multicausal case in which factors in causal pathways are selected in biological explanations. This work provides a novel analysis of the p…
Koch’s postulates
Dynamical Models and Explanation in Neuroscience
Kaplan and Craver claim that all explanations in neuroscience appeal to mechanisms. They extend this view to the use of mathematical models in neuroscience and propose a constraint such models must meet in order to be explanatory. I analyze a mathematical model used to provide explanations in dynamical systems neuroscience and indicate how this explanation cannot be accommodated by the mechanist framework. I argue that this explanation is well ch…
Dynamical Models and Explanation in Neuroscience
Kaplan and Craver claim that all explanations in neuroscience appeal to mechanisms. They extend this view to the use of mathematical models in neuroscience and propose a constraint such models must meet in order to be explanatory. I analyze a mathematical model used to provide explanations in dynamical systems neuroscience and indicate how this explanation cannot be accommodated by the mechanist framework. I argue that this explanation is well ch…
Causal Concepts in Biology
Over the last two decades few topics in philosophy of science have received as much attention as mechanistic explanation. A significant motivation for these accounts is that scientists frequently use the term ‘mechanism’ in their explanations of biological phenomena. Of course, biologists use a variety of causal concepts in their explanations, including concepts like pathways, cascades, triggers, and processes. Despite this variety, mainstream ph…
Distinguishing topological and causal explanation
Koch’s postulates
The explanatory nature of constraints
This paper provides an analysis of explanatory constraints and their role in scientific explanation. This analysis clarifies main characteristics of explanatory constraints, ways in which they differ from “standard” explanatory factors, and the unique roles they play in scientific explanation. While current philosophical work appreciates two main types of explanatory constraints, this paper suggests a new taxonomy: law-based constraints, mathemat…
Causal explanation and the periodic table
Causal Selection and the Pathway Concept
Most philosophical work on causal selection examines the selection of single causes and aims to clarify what grounds, if any, justify this selection. Such analyses overlook the fact that in scientific contexts multiple factors are often selected as the important causes of some outcome. This analysis examines a multicausal case in which factors in causal pathways are selected in biological explanations. This work provides a novel analysis of the p…
Multiple Realizability from a Causal Perspective
This article examines the multiple realizability thesis within a causal framework. The beginnings of this framework are found in Elliott Sober’s “Multiple Realizability Argument against Reduction,” which argues that the multiple realizability thesis poses no challenge to reductive explanation. While Sober’s causal approach has the potential to reveal new insights, I argue that his setup fails to capture important aspects of the multiple realizabi…
Cascade Versus Mechanism
According to mainstream philosophical views causal explanation in biology and neuroscience is mechanistic.As the term 'mechanism' gets regular use in these fields it is unsurprising that philosophers consider it important to scientific explanation.What is surprising is that they consider it the only causal term of importance.This paper provides an analysis of a new causal concept-it examines the cascade concept in science and the causal structure…
Irreversible (One-hit) and Reversible (Sustaining) Causation
This paper explores a distinction among causal relationships that has yet to receive attention in the philosophical literature, namely, whether causal relationships are reversible or irreversible. We provide an analysis of this distinction and show how it has important implications for causal inference and modeling. This work also clarifies how various familiar puzzles involving preemption and over-determination play out differently depending on …
Tracers in neuroscience
Causal Constraints in the Life and Social Sciences
This paper examines constraints and their role in scientific explanation. Common views in the philosophical literature suggest that constraints are non-causal and that they provide non-causal explanations. While much of this work focuses on examples from physics, this paper explores constraints from other fields, including neuroscience, physiology, and the social sciences. I argue that these cases involve constraints that are causal and that prov…
Dynamical Models and Explanation in Neuroscience
Kaplan and Craver claim that all explanations in neuroscience appeal to mechanisms. They extend this view to the use of mathematical models in neuroscience and propose a constraint such models must meet in order to be explanatory. I analyze a mathematical model used to provide explanations in dynamical systems neuroscience and indicate how this explanation cannot be accommodated by the mechanist framework. I argue that this explanation is well ch…
Koch’s postulates
Causal Selection and the Pathway Concept
Most philosophical work on causal selection examines the selection of single causes and aims to clarify what grounds, if any, justify this selection. Such analyses overlook the fact that in scientific contexts multiple factors are often selected as the important causes of some outcome. This analysis examines a multicausal case in which factors in causal pathways are selected in biological explanations. This work provides a novel analysis of the p…
Multiple Realizability from a Causal Perspective
This article examines the multiple realizability thesis within a causal framework. The beginnings of this framework are found in Elliott Sober’s “Multiple Realizability Argument against Reduction,” which argues that the multiple realizability thesis poses no challenge to reductive explanation. While Sober’s causal approach has the potential to reveal new insights, I argue that his setup fails to capture important aspects of the multiple realizabi…
Tracers in neuroscience
Distinguishing topological and causal explanation
Causal explanation and the periodic table
Causal Concepts in Biology
Over the last two decades few topics in philosophy of science have received as much attention as mechanistic explanation. A significant motivation for these accounts is that scientists frequently use the term ‘mechanism’ in their explanations of biological phenomena. Of course, biologists use a variety of causal concepts in their explanations, including concepts like pathways, cascades, triggers, and processes. Despite this variety, mainstream ph…
Irreversible (One-hit) and Reversible (Sustaining) Causation
This paper explores a distinction among causal relationships that has yet to receive attention in the philosophical literature, namely, whether causal relationships are reversible or irreversible. We provide an analysis of this distinction and show how it has important implications for causal inference and modeling. This work also clarifies how various familiar puzzles involving preemption and over-determination play out differently depending on …
The explanatory nature of constraints
This paper provides an analysis of explanatory constraints and their role in scientific explanation. This analysis clarifies main characteristics of explanatory constraints, ways in which they differ from “standard” explanatory factors, and the unique roles they play in scientific explanation. While current philosophical work appreciates two main types of explanatory constraints, this paper suggests a new taxonomy: law-based constraints, mathemat…
What is social structural explanation? A causal account
Social scientists appeal to various “structures” in their explanations including public policies, economic systems, and social hierarchies. Significant debate surrounds the explanatory relevance of these factors for various outcomes such as health, behavioral, and economic patterns. This paper provides a causal account of social structural explanation that is motivated by Haslanger (2016). This account suggests that social structure can be explan…
Causal Constraints in the Life and Social Sciences
This paper examines constraints and their role in scientific explanation. Common views in the philosophical literature suggest that constraints are non-causal and that they provide non-causal explanations. While much of this work focuses on examples from physics, this paper explores constraints from other fields, including neuroscience, physiology, and the social sciences. I argue that these cases involve constraints that are causal and that prov…
Brains, Networks and Dynamics
This paper argues that when brain networks figure in explanations of cognition and behavior they often do so in conjunction with independent dynamical assumptions about signal transmission in the brain. In such cases explanation does not depend on network structure alone but on network structure operating in conjunction with dynamical assumptions. Moreover, dynamical assumptions embody causal information, so that the resulting explanations are no…
Cascade Versus Mechanism
According to mainstream philosophical views causal explanation in biology and neuroscience is mechanistic.As the term 'mechanism' gets regular use in these fields it is unsurprising that philosophers consider it important to scientific explanation.What is surprising is that they consider it the only causal term of importance.This paper provides an analysis of a new causal concept-it examines the cascade concept in science and the causal structure…
Computer Science (12 works) · Epistemology (12 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (12 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Mathematics (7 works) · Philosophy of science (6 works) · Causal structure (5 works) · Artificial Intelligence (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (4 works)