Jennifer Corns
Biographic Data
| ID | 1066474 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jennifer Corns |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jennifer |
| FAMILY NAME | Corns |
| SIGNATURE | CORNS J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Glasgow |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1997-1881 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Pain fallibility
Call the idea that we are sometimes mistaken about our occurrent pains [italicize] pain fallibility. According to pain fallibility, there is nothing that is plausibly painful about which we are plausibly infallible. While we might assume the truth or falsity of pain's fallibility, direct arguments are thin on the ground. This paper addresses this lacuna and argues for pain fallibility through careful attention to the literature on the philosophy …
Pain and Suffering
In this contribution, I focus on three key questions that arise when engaging with Ricœur’s lecture, “Suffering is Not Pain.” The first is the methodological issue concerning the philosopher’s role, particularly in taxonomizing. I will examine mental taxonomy, as well as taxonomy more broadly, before turning to pain and suffering more specifically. I then move to Ricœur’s characterization and contrast of suffering and pain throughout the lecture.…
Moral motivation and the affective appeal
Proponents of “the affective appeal” (e.g. Dancy in Ethics 124(4):787–812, 2014; Zagzebski in Philos Phenomenol Res 66(1):104–124, 2003) argue that we can make progress in the longstanding debate about the nature of moral motivation by appealing to the affective dimension of affective episodes such as emotions, which allegedly play either a causal or constitutive role in moral judgements. Specifically, they claim that appealing to affect vindicat…
Suffering as significantly disrupted agency
This article offers a new theory of suffering as significantly disrupted agency. In presenting it, I here make three significant contributions. First, I subject the leading account of suffering as undesired unpleasant experience (Brady, 2018) to its first dose of sustained scrutiny. Second and drawing on this discussion, I identify and liberate eight desiderata for any account of suffering. Third, I present the novel account of suffering as signi…
Philosophy of Suffering
Pain eliminativism
Showing, Sensing, and Seeming
No abstract available.
When is a reason properly pragmatic
Suffering as significantly disrupted agency
This article offers a new theory of suffering as significantly disrupted agency. In presenting it, I here make three significant contributions. First, I subject the leading account of suffering as undesired unpleasant experience (Brady, 2018) to its first dose of sustained scrutiny. Second and drawing on this discussion, I identify and liberate eight desiderata for any account of suffering. Third, I present the novel account of suffering as signi…
Pain eliminativism
When is a reason properly pragmatic
Showing, Sensing, and Seeming
No abstract available.
Pain eliminativism
Philosophy of Suffering
Moral motivation and the affective appeal
Proponents of “the affective appeal” (e.g. Dancy in Ethics 124(4):787–812, 2014; Zagzebski in Philos Phenomenol Res 66(1):104–124, 2003) argue that we can make progress in the longstanding debate about the nature of moral motivation by appealing to the affective dimension of affective episodes such as emotions, which allegedly play either a causal or constitutive role in moral judgements. Specifically, they claim that appealing to affect vindicat…
Suffering as significantly disrupted agency
This article offers a new theory of suffering as significantly disrupted agency. In presenting it, I here make three significant contributions. First, I subject the leading account of suffering as undesired unpleasant experience (Brady, 2018) to its first dose of sustained scrutiny. Second and drawing on this discussion, I identify and liberate eight desiderata for any account of suffering. Third, I present the novel account of suffering as signi…
Pain and Suffering
In this contribution, I focus on three key questions that arise when engaging with Ricœur’s lecture, “Suffering is Not Pain.” The first is the methodological issue concerning the philosopher’s role, particularly in taxonomizing. I will examine mental taxonomy, as well as taxonomy more broadly, before turning to pain and suffering more specifically. I then move to Ricœur’s characterization and contrast of suffering and pain throughout the lecture.…
Pain fallibility
Call the idea that we are sometimes mistaken about our occurrent pains [italicize] pain fallibility. According to pain fallibility, there is nothing that is plausibly painful about which we are plausibly infallible. While we might assume the truth or falsity of pain's fallibility, direct arguments are thin on the ground. This paper addresses this lacuna and argues for pain fallibility through careful attention to the literature on the philosophy …
Psychology (7 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Mental Health and Psychiatry (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Pain Management and Placebo Effect (2 works) · Philosophy of mind (2 works)