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Arthur W Collins

Biographic Data

ID1070643
NAMEArthur W Collins
GIVEN NAMESArthur W
FAMILY NAMECollins
SIGNATURECOLLINS A W
AFFILIATIONSCity University of New York
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS20
TOTAL CITATIONS24
WORKS AS AUTHOR20
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1923
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2001
H-INDEX3
  • Possible Experience

    Michelle Grier, Arthur W Collins et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2001

  • Possible Experience

    Manfred Kuehn, Arthur W Collins et al.•ARTICLE•German Studies Review•2001•Cited by: 3

  • Possible Experience

    Arthur W Collins, Arthur Collins•BOOK•Possible Experience•1999•Cited by: 14

    Arthur Collins's succinct, revisionist exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason brings a new clarity to this notoriously difficult text. Until recently most readers, ascribing broadly Cartesian assumptions to Kant, have concluded that the Critique advances an idealist philosophy, because Kant calls it "transcendental idealism" and because the work abounds in apparent confirmations of that interpretation. Collins maintains not only that this r…

  • On the Question 'Do Numbers Exist

    Arthur W Collins•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1998•References: 1

    Since we know that there are four prime numbers less than 8 we know that there are numbers. This ‘short argument’ is correct but it is not an ontological claim or part of philosophy of mathematics. Both realists (Quine) and nominalists (Field) reject the short argument and adopt the idea that the existence of numbers might be posited to explain known mathematical truths. Philosophers operate with a negative conception of what numbers are: they ar…

  • Beastly Experience

    Arthur W Collins, John Mcdowell•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1998

  • Personal Identity and the Coherence of Q-Memory

    Arthur W Collins•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1997•References: 3

    Journal Article Personal Identity and the Coherence of Q-Memory Get access Arthur W. Collins Arthur W. Collins City University of New York, USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 47, Issue 186, January 1997, Pages 73–80, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00047 Published: 07 January 2003

  • Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Risk

    Arthur W Collins•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1996•Cited by: 4

    Journal Article Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Risk Get access Arthur W. Collins Arthur W. Collins City University of New York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 46, Issue 184, July 1996, Pages 308–319, https://doi.org/10.2307/2956443 Published: 01 July 1996

  • The Puzzle of Experience

    Arthur W Collins, J J Valberg•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1995

  • Arthur Collins's The Nature of Mental Things

    Ryan Moran, Richard Moran et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1994

    If I believe that my friend Pierre is fond of me, this means that his friendship appears to me as the meaning of all his acts. [...] But if I know that I believe, the belief appears to me as pure subjective determination without external correlative. This is what makes the very word 'to believe' a term utilized indifferently to indicate the unwavering firmness of belief (My God, I believe in you) and its character as dis armed and strictly subjec…

  • Precis of The Nature of Mental Things

    Arthur W Collins•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1994

    The Nature of Mental Things (NMT) examines the concepts of belief, consciousness, perceptual experience and reason-giving explanation from the standpoint of the conviction that all the prevailing schools of contemporary philosophy of mind share a stultifying commitment to an essentially Cartesian conception of mental realities. Descartes and the classical empiricists thought of the conscious mind as an inner realm of non-material private phenomen…

  • Psychological Externalism and Psychological Explanation

    Joseph Owens, Arthur W Collins et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1994

    Arthur Collins' The Nature of Mental Things is a profound and provocative book, one that challenges much that passes as contemporary wisdom in the philosophy of mind.' The book naturally divides into three sections: In the opening chapters he takes on the prevailing view that mental states are internal states, offering in its place a novel externalist analysis of belief ascription. The middle chapters are concerned with consciousness and percepti…

  • Expressing and Attributing Beliefs

    Robert B Brandom, Robert Brandom et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1994

  • An Apprentice Argument

    Elijah Millgram, Arthur W Collins•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1994

  • Reply to Commentators

    William P Alston, Michael Slote et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1994

    Wittgenstein means that the point of the assertion may not be to convey the information that p, but, rather, to let others know under what circumstance the speaker will be right or wrong. Commonly, the assertion I believe that p is an assertion of with an attached indication of guardedness or insecurity, but sometimes the focus of I believe that p is on the speaker and emphasizes his epistemic risk. The same may be said of the unqualified asserti…

  • The Nature of Mental Things

    Robert B Brandom, Robert Brandom et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1990

  • The Epistemological Status of the Concept of Perception

    Arthur W Collins•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1967

  • The Use of Statistics in Explanation

    Arthur W Collins•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1966•Cited by: 3

  • Philosophy and the Historical Understanding.

    Arthur W Collins, W B Gallie•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•1965

  • Central Bodies for Local Purposes

    Open Access•Arthur W Collins, Arthur Collins et al.•ARTICLE•Public Administration•1928

  • Local Rating

    Open Access•Arthur W Collins, Arthur Collins•ARTICLE•Public Administration•1923

  • Possible Experience

    Arthur W Collins, Arthur Collins•BOOK•Possible Experience•1999•Cited by: 14

    Arthur Collins's succinct, revisionist exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason brings a new clarity to this notoriously difficult text. Until recently most readers, ascribing broadly Cartesian assumptions to Kant, have concluded that the Critique advances an idealist philosophy, because Kant calls it "transcendental idealism" and because the work abounds in apparent confirmations of that interpretation. Collins maintains not only that this r…

  • Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Risk

    Arthur W Collins•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1996•Cited by: 4

    Journal Article Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Risk Get access Arthur W. Collins Arthur W. Collins City University of New York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 46, Issue 184, July 1996, Pages 308–319, https://doi.org/10.2307/2956443 Published: 01 July 1996

  • Possible Experience

    Manfred Kuehn, Arthur W Collins et al.•ARTICLE•German Studies Review•2001•Cited by: 3

  • The Use of Statistics in Explanation

    Arthur W Collins•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1966•Cited by: 3

  • Local Rating

    Open Access•Arthur W Collins, Arthur Collins•ARTICLE•Public Administration•1923

  • Central Bodies for Local Purposes

    Open Access•Arthur W Collins, Arthur Collins et al.•ARTICLE•Public Administration•1928

  • Philosophy and the Historical Understanding.

    Arthur W Collins, W B Gallie•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•1965

  • The Use of Statistics in Explanation

    Arthur W Collins•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1966•Cited by: 3

  • The Epistemological Status of the Concept of Perception

    Arthur W Collins•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1967

  • The Nature of Mental Things

    Robert B Brandom, Robert Brandom et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1990

  • Arthur Collins's The Nature of Mental Things

    Ryan Moran, Richard Moran et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1994

    If I believe that my friend Pierre is fond of me, this means that his friendship appears to me as the meaning of all his acts. [...] But if I know that I believe, the belief appears to me as pure subjective determination without external correlative. This is what makes the very word 'to believe' a term utilized indifferently to indicate the unwavering firmness of belief (My God, I believe in you) and its character as dis armed and strictly subjec…

  • Precis of The Nature of Mental Things

    Arthur W Collins•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1994

    The Nature of Mental Things (NMT) examines the concepts of belief, consciousness, perceptual experience and reason-giving explanation from the standpoint of the conviction that all the prevailing schools of contemporary philosophy of mind share a stultifying commitment to an essentially Cartesian conception of mental realities. Descartes and the classical empiricists thought of the conscious mind as an inner realm of non-material private phenomen…

  • Psychological Externalism and Psychological Explanation

    Joseph Owens, Arthur W Collins et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1994

    Arthur Collins' The Nature of Mental Things is a profound and provocative book, one that challenges much that passes as contemporary wisdom in the philosophy of mind.' The book naturally divides into three sections: In the opening chapters he takes on the prevailing view that mental states are internal states, offering in its place a novel externalist analysis of belief ascription. The middle chapters are concerned with consciousness and percepti…

  • Expressing and Attributing Beliefs

    Robert B Brandom, Robert Brandom et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1994

  • An Apprentice Argument

    Elijah Millgram, Arthur W Collins•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1994

  • Reply to Commentators

    William P Alston, Michael Slote et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1994

    Wittgenstein means that the point of the assertion may not be to convey the information that p, but, rather, to let others know under what circumstance the speaker will be right or wrong. Commonly, the assertion I believe that p is an assertion of with an attached indication of guardedness or insecurity, but sometimes the focus of I believe that p is on the speaker and emphasizes his epistemic risk. The same may be said of the unqualified asserti…

  • The Puzzle of Experience

    Arthur W Collins, J J Valberg•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1995

  • Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Risk

    Arthur W Collins•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1996•Cited by: 4

    Journal Article Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Risk Get access Arthur W. Collins Arthur W. Collins City University of New York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 46, Issue 184, July 1996, Pages 308–319, https://doi.org/10.2307/2956443 Published: 01 July 1996

  • Personal Identity and the Coherence of Q-Memory

    Arthur W Collins•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1997•References: 3

    Journal Article Personal Identity and the Coherence of Q-Memory Get access Arthur W. Collins Arthur W. Collins City University of New York, USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 47, Issue 186, January 1997, Pages 73–80, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00047 Published: 07 January 2003

  • On the Question 'Do Numbers Exist

    Arthur W Collins•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1998•References: 1

    Since we know that there are four prime numbers less than 8 we know that there are numbers. This ‘short argument’ is correct but it is not an ontological claim or part of philosophy of mathematics. Both realists (Quine) and nominalists (Field) reject the short argument and adopt the idea that the existence of numbers might be posited to explain known mathematical truths. Philosophers operate with a negative conception of what numbers are: they ar…

  • Beastly Experience

    Arthur W Collins, John Mcdowell•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1998

  • Possible Experience

    Arthur W Collins, Arthur Collins•BOOK•Possible Experience•1999•Cited by: 14

    Arthur Collins's succinct, revisionist exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason brings a new clarity to this notoriously difficult text. Until recently most readers, ascribing broadly Cartesian assumptions to Kant, have concluded that the Critique advances an idealist philosophy, because Kant calls it "transcendental idealism" and because the work abounds in apparent confirmations of that interpretation. Collins maintains not only that this r…

  • Possible Experience

    Michelle Grier, Arthur W Collins et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2001

  • Possible Experience

    Manfred Kuehn, Arthur W Collins et al.•ARTICLE•German Studies Review•2001•Cited by: 3

Philosophy (15 works) · Epistemology (13 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Contemporary philosophy (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Analytic philosophy (3 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 works)

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