Arthur W Collins
Biographic Data
| ID | 1070643 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Arthur W Collins |
| GIVEN NAMES | Arthur W |
| FAMILY NAME | Collins |
| SIGNATURE | COLLINS A W |
| AFFILIATIONS | City University of New York |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 20 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 24 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 20 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1923 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Possible Experience
Possible Experience
Possible Experience
Arthur Collins's succinct, revisionist exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason brings a new clarity to this notoriously difficult text. Until recently most readers, ascribing broadly Cartesian assumptions to Kant, have concluded that the Critique advances an idealist philosophy, because Kant calls it "transcendental idealism" and because the work abounds in apparent confirmations of that interpretation. Collins maintains not only that this r…
On the Question 'Do Numbers Exist
Since we know that there are four prime numbers less than 8 we know that there are numbers. This ‘short argument’ is correct but it is not an ontological claim or part of philosophy of mathematics. Both realists (Quine) and nominalists (Field) reject the short argument and adopt the idea that the existence of numbers might be posited to explain known mathematical truths. Philosophers operate with a negative conception of what numbers are: they ar…
Beastly Experience
Personal Identity and the Coherence of Q-Memory
Journal Article Personal Identity and the Coherence of Q-Memory Get access Arthur W. Collins Arthur W. Collins City University of New York, USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 47, Issue 186, January 1997, Pages 73–80, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00047 Published: 07 January 2003
Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Risk
Journal Article Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Risk Get access Arthur W. Collins Arthur W. Collins City University of New York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 46, Issue 184, July 1996, Pages 308–319, https://doi.org/10.2307/2956443 Published: 01 July 1996
The Puzzle of Experience
Arthur Collins's The Nature of Mental Things
If I believe that my friend Pierre is fond of me, this means that his friendship appears to me as the meaning of all his acts. [...] But if I know that I believe, the belief appears to me as pure subjective determination without external correlative. This is what makes the very word 'to believe' a term utilized indifferently to indicate the unwavering firmness of belief (My God, I believe in you) and its character as dis armed and strictly subjec…
Precis of The Nature of Mental Things
The Nature of Mental Things (NMT) examines the concepts of belief, consciousness, perceptual experience and reason-giving explanation from the standpoint of the conviction that all the prevailing schools of contemporary philosophy of mind share a stultifying commitment to an essentially Cartesian conception of mental realities. Descartes and the classical empiricists thought of the conscious mind as an inner realm of non-material private phenomen…
Psychological Externalism and Psychological Explanation
Arthur Collins' The Nature of Mental Things is a profound and provocative book, one that challenges much that passes as contemporary wisdom in the philosophy of mind.' The book naturally divides into three sections: In the opening chapters he takes on the prevailing view that mental states are internal states, offering in its place a novel externalist analysis of belief ascription. The middle chapters are concerned with consciousness and percepti…
Expressing and Attributing Beliefs
An Apprentice Argument
Reply to Commentators
Wittgenstein means that the point of the assertion may not be to convey the information that p, but, rather, to let others know under what circumstance the speaker will be right or wrong. Commonly, the assertion I believe that p is an assertion of with an attached indication of guardedness or insecurity, but sometimes the focus of I believe that p is on the speaker and emphasizes his epistemic risk. The same may be said of the unqualified asserti…
The Nature of Mental Things
The Epistemological Status of the Concept of Perception
The Use of Statistics in Explanation
Philosophy and the Historical Understanding.
Central Bodies for Local Purposes
Local Rating
Possible Experience
Arthur Collins's succinct, revisionist exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason brings a new clarity to this notoriously difficult text. Until recently most readers, ascribing broadly Cartesian assumptions to Kant, have concluded that the Critique advances an idealist philosophy, because Kant calls it "transcendental idealism" and because the work abounds in apparent confirmations of that interpretation. Collins maintains not only that this r…
Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Risk
Journal Article Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Risk Get access Arthur W. Collins Arthur W. Collins City University of New York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 46, Issue 184, July 1996, Pages 308–319, https://doi.org/10.2307/2956443 Published: 01 July 1996
Possible Experience
The Use of Statistics in Explanation
Local Rating
Central Bodies for Local Purposes
Philosophy and the Historical Understanding.
The Use of Statistics in Explanation
The Epistemological Status of the Concept of Perception
The Nature of Mental Things
Arthur Collins's The Nature of Mental Things
If I believe that my friend Pierre is fond of me, this means that his friendship appears to me as the meaning of all his acts. [...] But if I know that I believe, the belief appears to me as pure subjective determination without external correlative. This is what makes the very word 'to believe' a term utilized indifferently to indicate the unwavering firmness of belief (My God, I believe in you) and its character as dis armed and strictly subjec…
Precis of The Nature of Mental Things
The Nature of Mental Things (NMT) examines the concepts of belief, consciousness, perceptual experience and reason-giving explanation from the standpoint of the conviction that all the prevailing schools of contemporary philosophy of mind share a stultifying commitment to an essentially Cartesian conception of mental realities. Descartes and the classical empiricists thought of the conscious mind as an inner realm of non-material private phenomen…
Psychological Externalism and Psychological Explanation
Arthur Collins' The Nature of Mental Things is a profound and provocative book, one that challenges much that passes as contemporary wisdom in the philosophy of mind.' The book naturally divides into three sections: In the opening chapters he takes on the prevailing view that mental states are internal states, offering in its place a novel externalist analysis of belief ascription. The middle chapters are concerned with consciousness and percepti…
Expressing and Attributing Beliefs
An Apprentice Argument
Reply to Commentators
Wittgenstein means that the point of the assertion may not be to convey the information that p, but, rather, to let others know under what circumstance the speaker will be right or wrong. Commonly, the assertion I believe that p is an assertion of with an attached indication of guardedness or insecurity, but sometimes the focus of I believe that p is on the speaker and emphasizes his epistemic risk. The same may be said of the unqualified asserti…
The Puzzle of Experience
Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Risk
Journal Article Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Risk Get access Arthur W. Collins Arthur W. Collins City University of New York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 46, Issue 184, July 1996, Pages 308–319, https://doi.org/10.2307/2956443 Published: 01 July 1996
Personal Identity and the Coherence of Q-Memory
Journal Article Personal Identity and the Coherence of Q-Memory Get access Arthur W. Collins Arthur W. Collins City University of New York, USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 47, Issue 186, January 1997, Pages 73–80, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00047 Published: 07 January 2003
On the Question 'Do Numbers Exist
Since we know that there are four prime numbers less than 8 we know that there are numbers. This ‘short argument’ is correct but it is not an ontological claim or part of philosophy of mathematics. Both realists (Quine) and nominalists (Field) reject the short argument and adopt the idea that the existence of numbers might be posited to explain known mathematical truths. Philosophers operate with a negative conception of what numbers are: they ar…
Beastly Experience
Possible Experience
Arthur Collins's succinct, revisionist exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason brings a new clarity to this notoriously difficult text. Until recently most readers, ascribing broadly Cartesian assumptions to Kant, have concluded that the Critique advances an idealist philosophy, because Kant calls it "transcendental idealism" and because the work abounds in apparent confirmations of that interpretation. Collins maintains not only that this r…
Possible Experience
Possible Experience
Philosophy (15 works) · Epistemology (13 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Contemporary philosophy (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Analytic philosophy (3 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 works)