Mark Mccullagh
Biographic Data
| ID | 1074774 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mark Mccullagh |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mark |
| FAMILY NAME | Mccullagh |
| SIGNATURE | MCCULLAGH M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Guelph |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0804-6495 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Pulling Down the Hierarchy
This paper is about the hierarchy view: that each word has infinitely many meanings, arranged into levels, with the level n meaning serving as its semantic value when it occurs embedded to degree n in indirect or attitude reporting verbs. Departing from the famous debates over the bare tenability of the hierarchy view, I focus on whether there is any positive reason to endorse it. Philosophers have offered two such reasons. One appeals to intersu…
Inferentialism and collaged assertions
Thank You to Referees
An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Interpretative Modesty
Philosophers have wanted to work with conceptions of word-competence, or concept-possession, on which being a competent practitioner with a word amounts to being a competent judge of its uses by others. I argue that our implicit conception of competence with a word does not have this presupposition built into it. One implication of this is what I call "modesty" in interpretation: we allow for others, uses of words that we would not allow for ours…
How to Use a Concept You Reject
Inferentialist accounts of concept possession are often supported by examples in which rejection of some inference seems to amount to rejection of some concept, with the apparently implausible consequence that anyone who rejects the inference cannot so much as understand those who use the concept. This consequence can be avoided by distinguishing conditions necessary for direct uses of a concept (to describe the non‐cognitive world) from conditio…
Do Inferential Roles Compose?
Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore have argued that inferential roles are not compositional.It is unclear, however, whether the theories at which they aim their objection are obliged to meet the strong compositionality requirement they have in mind.But even if that requirement is accepted, the data they adduce can in fact be derived from an inferential-role theory that meets it.I explain this in terms of Robert Brandom's substitutional conception of in…
Self‐Knowledge Failures and First Person Authority 1
Davidson and Burge have claimed that the conditions under which self‐knowledge is possessed are such that externalism poses no obstacle to their being met by ordinary speakers and thinkers. On their accounts, no such person could fail to possess self‐knowledge. But we do from time to time attribute to each other such failures; so we should prefer to their accounts an account that preserves first person authority while allowing us to make sense of…
How to Use a Concept You Reject
Inferentialist accounts of concept possession are often supported by examples in which rejection of some inference seems to amount to rejection of some concept, with the apparently implausible consequence that anyone who rejects the inference cannot so much as understand those who use the concept. This consequence can be avoided by distinguishing conditions necessary for direct uses of a concept (to describe the non‐cognitive world) from conditio…
Self‐Knowledge Failures and First Person Authority 1
Davidson and Burge have claimed that the conditions under which self‐knowledge is possessed are such that externalism poses no obstacle to their being met by ordinary speakers and thinkers. On their accounts, no such person could fail to possess self‐knowledge. But we do from time to time attribute to each other such failures; so we should prefer to their accounts an account that preserves first person authority while allowing us to make sense of…
Do Inferential Roles Compose?
Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore have argued that inferential roles are not compositional.It is unclear, however, whether the theories at which they aim their objection are obliged to meet the strong compositionality requirement they have in mind.But even if that requirement is accepted, the data they adduce can in fact be derived from an inferential-role theory that meets it.I explain this in terms of Robert Brandom's substitutional conception of in…
How to Use a Concept You Reject
Inferentialist accounts of concept possession are often supported by examples in which rejection of some inference seems to amount to rejection of some concept, with the apparently implausible consequence that anyone who rejects the inference cannot so much as understand those who use the concept. This consequence can be avoided by distinguishing conditions necessary for direct uses of a concept (to describe the non‐cognitive world) from conditio…
Thank You to Referees
An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Interpretative Modesty
Philosophers have wanted to work with conceptions of word-competence, or concept-possession, on which being a competent practitioner with a word amounts to being a competent judge of its uses by others. I argue that our implicit conception of competence with a word does not have this presupposition built into it. One implication of this is what I call "modesty" in interpretation: we allow for others, uses of words that we would not allow for ours…
Pulling Down the Hierarchy
This paper is about the hierarchy view: that each word has infinitely many meanings, arranged into levels, with the level n meaning serving as its semantic value when it occurs embedded to degree n in indirect or attitude reporting verbs. Departing from the famous debates over the bare tenability of the hierarchy view, I focus on whether there is any positive reason to endorse it. Philosophers have offered two such reasons. One appeals to intersu…
Inferentialism and collaged assertions
Computer Science (6 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 works)