Tomoji Shogenji
Biographic Data
| ID | 1078818 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Tomoji Shogenji |
| GIVEN NAMES | Tomoji |
| FAMILY NAME | Shogenji |
| SIGNATURE | SHOGENJI T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Providence College |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8859-3960 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 48 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Reshaping values for your own good
A Twofold Tension in Schurz’s Meta-Inductive Solution to Hume’s Problem of Induction
Probability and proximity in surprise
A unified account of the conjunction fallacy by coherence
Information and Inaccuracy
This article proposes a new interpretation of mutual information (MI). We examine three extant interpretations of MI by reduction in doubt, by reduction in uncertainty, and by divergence. We argue that the first two are inconsistent with the epistemic value of information (EVI) assumed in many applications of MI: the greater is the amount of information we acquire, the better is our epistemic position, other things being equal. The third interpre…
Mediated Confirmation
This article aims to achieve two things: to identify the conditions for transitivity in probabilistic support in various settings, and to uncover the components and structure of the mediated probabilistic relation. It is shown that when the probabilistic relation between the two propositions, x and z, is mediated by multiple layers of partitions of propositions, the impact x has on z consists of the purely indirect impact, the purely bypass impac…
Dwindling Confirmation
We show that as a chain of confirmation becomes longer, confirmation dwindles under screening-off. For example, if E confirms H1, H1 confirms H2, and H1 screens off E from H2, then the degree to which E confirms H2 is less than the degree to which E confirms H1. Although there are many measures of confirmation, our result holds on any measure that satisfies the Weak Law of Likelihood. We apply our result to testimony cases, relate it to the Data-…
Coherence of the contents and the transmission of probabilistic support
The degree of epistemic justification and the conjunction fallacy
Against Coherence
Why does coherence appear truth-conducive
Can We Trust Our Memories? C. I. Lewis's Coherence Argument
A Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support
It is well known that probabilistic support is not transitive. But it can be shown that probabilistic support is transitive provided the intermediary proposition screens off the original evidence with respect to the hypothesis in question. This has the consequence that probabilistic support is transitive when the original evidence is testimonial, memorial or perceptual (i.e., to the effect that such and such was testified to, remembered, or perce…
The Problem of the Criterion in Rule-Following
This paper addresses the issue of rule-following in the context of the problem of the criterion. It presents a line of reasoning which concludes we do not know what rule we follow, but which develops independently of the problem of extrapolation that plays a major role in many recent discussions of rule-following. The basis of the argument is the normativity of rules, but the problem is also distinct from the issue of the gap between facts and va…
Self-Dependent Justification Without Circularity
This paper disputes the widely held view that one cannot establish the reliability of a belief-forming process with the use of belief's that are obtained by that very process since such self-dependent justification is circular. Harold Brown ([1993]) argued in this journal that some cases of self-dependent justification are legitimate despite their circularity. I argue instead that under appropriate construal many cases of self-dependent justifica…
The degree of epistemic justification and the conjunction fallacy
A Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support
It is well known that probabilistic support is not transitive. But it can be shown that probabilistic support is transitive provided the intermediary proposition screens off the original evidence with respect to the hypothesis in question. This has the consequence that probabilistic support is transitive when the original evidence is testimonial, memorial or perceptual (i.e., to the effect that such and such was testified to, remembered, or perce…
Information and Inaccuracy
This article proposes a new interpretation of mutual information (MI). We examine three extant interpretations of MI by reduction in doubt, by reduction in uncertainty, and by divergence. We argue that the first two are inconsistent with the epistemic value of information (EVI) assumed in many applications of MI: the greater is the amount of information we acquire, the better is our epistemic position, other things being equal. The third interpre…
Dwindling Confirmation
We show that as a chain of confirmation becomes longer, confirmation dwindles under screening-off. For example, if E confirms H1, H1 confirms H2, and H1 screens off E from H2, then the degree to which E confirms H2 is less than the degree to which E confirms H1. Although there are many measures of confirmation, our result holds on any measure that satisfies the Weak Law of Likelihood. We apply our result to testimony cases, relate it to the Data-…
Self-Dependent Justification Without Circularity
This paper disputes the widely held view that one cannot establish the reliability of a belief-forming process with the use of belief's that are obtained by that very process since such self-dependent justification is circular. Harold Brown ([1993]) argued in this journal that some cases of self-dependent justification are legitimate despite their circularity. I argue instead that under appropriate construal many cases of self-dependent justifica…
Can We Trust Our Memories? C. I. Lewis's Coherence Argument
Mediated Confirmation
This article aims to achieve two things: to identify the conditions for transitivity in probabilistic support in various settings, and to uncover the components and structure of the mediated probabilistic relation. It is shown that when the probabilistic relation between the two propositions, x and z, is mediated by multiple layers of partitions of propositions, the impact x has on z consists of the purely indirect impact, the purely bypass impac…
Why does coherence appear truth-conducive
Coherence of the contents and the transmission of probabilistic support
Against Coherence
The Problem of the Criterion in Rule-Following
This paper addresses the issue of rule-following in the context of the problem of the criterion. It presents a line of reasoning which concludes we do not know what rule we follow, but which develops independently of the problem of extrapolation that plays a major role in many recent discussions of rule-following. The basis of the argument is the normativity of rules, but the problem is also distinct from the issue of the gap between facts and va…
Self-Dependent Justification Without Circularity
This paper disputes the widely held view that one cannot establish the reliability of a belief-forming process with the use of belief's that are obtained by that very process since such self-dependent justification is circular. Harold Brown ([1993]) argued in this journal that some cases of self-dependent justification are legitimate despite their circularity. I argue instead that under appropriate construal many cases of self-dependent justifica…
A Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support
It is well known that probabilistic support is not transitive. But it can be shown that probabilistic support is transitive provided the intermediary proposition screens off the original evidence with respect to the hypothesis in question. This has the consequence that probabilistic support is transitive when the original evidence is testimonial, memorial or perceptual (i.e., to the effect that such and such was testified to, remembered, or perce…
Can We Trust Our Memories? C. I. Lewis's Coherence Argument
Why does coherence appear truth-conducive
Against Coherence
The degree of epistemic justification and the conjunction fallacy
Coherence of the contents and the transmission of probabilistic support
Dwindling Confirmation
We show that as a chain of confirmation becomes longer, confirmation dwindles under screening-off. For example, if E confirms H1, H1 confirms H2, and H1 screens off E from H2, then the degree to which E confirms H2 is less than the degree to which E confirms H1. Although there are many measures of confirmation, our result holds on any measure that satisfies the Weak Law of Likelihood. We apply our result to testimony cases, relate it to the Data-…
Mediated Confirmation
This article aims to achieve two things: to identify the conditions for transitivity in probabilistic support in various settings, and to uncover the components and structure of the mediated probabilistic relation. It is shown that when the probabilistic relation between the two propositions, x and z, is mediated by multiple layers of partitions of propositions, the impact x has on z consists of the purely indirect impact, the purely bypass impac…
Information and Inaccuracy
This article proposes a new interpretation of mutual information (MI). We examine three extant interpretations of MI by reduction in doubt, by reduction in uncertainty, and by divergence. We argue that the first two are inconsistent with the epistemic value of information (EVI) assumed in many applications of MI: the greater is the amount of information we acquire, the better is our epistemic position, other things being equal. The third interpre…
A unified account of the conjunction fallacy by coherence
Probability and proximity in surprise
A Twofold Tension in Schurz’s Meta-Inductive Solution to Hume’s Problem of Induction
Reshaping values for your own good
Mathematics (13 works) · Computer Science (12 works) · Epistemology (12 works) · Philosophy (12 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (11 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Mathematical economics (7 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (7 works) · Artificial Intelligence (5 works) · Metaphysics (5 works)