Katherine Brading
Biographic Data
| ID | 1079690 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Katherine Brading |
| GIVEN NAMES | Katherine |
| FAMILY NAME | Brading |
| SIGNATURE | BRADING K |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Notre Dame |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9477-0596 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 35 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Du Châtelet on the metaphysics and epistemology of time
Du Châtelet’s Foundations of Physics contains important interventions in the eighteenth-century debates over the metaphysics and epistemology time. At the heart of her view, I argue, is an analysis of temporal experience that rests on our ability to represent pluralities of non-coexisting things. The upshot is an account of time that is deeply analogous to her account of space, with important exceptions that pinpoint exactly where time differs fr…
In search of the historical Newton
How physics flew the philosophers' nest
A note on rods and clocks in Newton's Principia
Émilie Du Châtelet and the Foundations of Physical Science
The centerpiece of Émilie Du Châtelet’s philosophy of science is her Foundations of Physics, first published in 1740. The Foundations contains epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, mechanics, and physics, including such pressing issues of the time as whether there are atoms, the appropriate roles of God and of hypotheses in scientific theorizing, how (if at all) bodies are capable of acting on one another, and whether gravity is an action-at-a-…
Émilie Du Châtelet and the Problem of Bodies
Physically locating the present
David Hilbert
Three principles of unity in Newton
Presentism as an Empirical Hypothesis
Within philosophy of physics it is broadly accepted that presentism as an empirical hypothesis has been falsified by the development of special relativity. In this article, I identify and reject an assumption common to both presentists and advocates of the block universe and then offer an alternative version of presentism that does not begin from spatiotemporal structure, which is an empirical hypothesis, and which has yet to be falsified. While …
Autonomous Patterns and Scientific Realism
Taking Bogen and Woodward's discussion of data and phenomena as his starting point, McAllister presents a challenge to scientific realism. I discuss this challenge and offer a suggestion for how the scientific realist could respond to both its epistemic and ontological aspects. In so doing, I urge that the scientific realist should not reject ontological pluralism from the start, but should seek to explore versions of scientific realism that leav…
Hilbert's ‘Foundations of Physics’
Scientific Structuralism
This paper explores varieties of scientific structuralism. Central to our investigation is the notion of ‘shared structure’. We begin with a description of mathematical structuralism and use this to point out analogies and disanalogies with scientific structuralism. Our particular focus is the semantic structuralist's attempt to use the notion of shared structure to account for the theory-world connection, this use being crucially important to bo…
Are Gauge Symmetry Transformations Observable
In a recent paper in this journal, Kosso ([2000]) discussed the observational status of continuous symmetries of physics. While we are in broad agreement with his approach, we disagree with his analysis. In the discussion of the status of gauge symmetry, a set of examples offered by 't Hooft ([1980]) has influenced several philosophers, including Kosso; in all cases the interpretation of the examples is mistaken. In this paper, we present our pre…
Which symmetry? Noether, Weyl, and conservation of electric charge
Are Gauge Symmetry Transformations Observable
In a recent paper in this journal, Kosso ([2000]) discussed the observational status of continuous symmetries of physics. While we are in broad agreement with his approach, we disagree with his analysis. In the discussion of the status of gauge symmetry, a set of examples offered by 't Hooft ([1980]) has influenced several philosophers, including Kosso; in all cases the interpretation of the examples is mistaken. In this paper, we present our pre…
Scientific Structuralism
This paper explores varieties of scientific structuralism. Central to our investigation is the notion of ‘shared structure’. We begin with a description of mathematical structuralism and use this to point out analogies and disanalogies with scientific structuralism. Our particular focus is the semantic structuralist's attempt to use the notion of shared structure to account for the theory-world connection, this use being crucially important to bo…
Émilie Du Châtelet and the Foundations of Physical Science
The centerpiece of Émilie Du Châtelet’s philosophy of science is her Foundations of Physics, first published in 1740. The Foundations contains epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, mechanics, and physics, including such pressing issues of the time as whether there are atoms, the appropriate roles of God and of hypotheses in scientific theorizing, how (if at all) bodies are capable of acting on one another, and whether gravity is an action-at-a-…
Three principles of unity in Newton
Autonomous Patterns and Scientific Realism
Taking Bogen and Woodward's discussion of data and phenomena as his starting point, McAllister presents a challenge to scientific realism. I discuss this challenge and offer a suggestion for how the scientific realist could respond to both its epistemic and ontological aspects. In so doing, I urge that the scientific realist should not reject ontological pluralism from the start, but should seek to explore versions of scientific realism that leav…
Which symmetry? Noether, Weyl, and conservation of electric charge
Are Gauge Symmetry Transformations Observable
In a recent paper in this journal, Kosso ([2000]) discussed the observational status of continuous symmetries of physics. While we are in broad agreement with his approach, we disagree with his analysis. In the discussion of the status of gauge symmetry, a set of examples offered by 't Hooft ([1980]) has influenced several philosophers, including Kosso; in all cases the interpretation of the examples is mistaken. In this paper, we present our pre…
Scientific Structuralism
This paper explores varieties of scientific structuralism. Central to our investigation is the notion of ‘shared structure’. We begin with a description of mathematical structuralism and use this to point out analogies and disanalogies with scientific structuralism. Our particular focus is the semantic structuralist's attempt to use the notion of shared structure to account for the theory-world connection, this use being crucially important to bo…
Hilbert's ‘Foundations of Physics’
Autonomous Patterns and Scientific Realism
Taking Bogen and Woodward's discussion of data and phenomena as his starting point, McAllister presents a challenge to scientific realism. I discuss this challenge and offer a suggestion for how the scientific realist could respond to both its epistemic and ontological aspects. In so doing, I urge that the scientific realist should not reject ontological pluralism from the start, but should seek to explore versions of scientific realism that leav…
Three principles of unity in Newton
Presentism as an Empirical Hypothesis
Within philosophy of physics it is broadly accepted that presentism as an empirical hypothesis has been falsified by the development of special relativity. In this article, I identify and reject an assumption common to both presentists and advocates of the block universe and then offer an alternative version of presentism that does not begin from spatiotemporal structure, which is an empirical hypothesis, and which has yet to be falsified. While …
David Hilbert
Physically locating the present
Émilie Du Châtelet and the Problem of Bodies
A note on rods and clocks in Newton's Principia
Émilie Du Châtelet and the Foundations of Physical Science
The centerpiece of Émilie Du Châtelet’s philosophy of science is her Foundations of Physics, first published in 1740. The Foundations contains epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, mechanics, and physics, including such pressing issues of the time as whether there are atoms, the appropriate roles of God and of hypotheses in scientific theorizing, how (if at all) bodies are capable of acting on one another, and whether gravity is an action-at-a-…
How physics flew the philosophers' nest
Du Châtelet on the metaphysics and epistemology of time
Du Châtelet’s Foundations of Physics contains important interventions in the eighteenth-century debates over the metaphysics and epistemology time. At the heart of her view, I argue, is an analysis of temporal experience that rests on our ability to represent pluralities of non-coexisting things. The upshot is an account of time that is deeply analogous to her account of space, with important exceptions that pinpoint exactly where time differs fr…
In search of the historical Newton
Philosophy (10 works) · Epistemology (8 works) · Physics (8 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (7 works) · Theoretical physics (7 works) · Mathematics (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Historical and Literary Studies (4 works) · Historical Philosophy and Science (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works)