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Giancarlo Spagnolo

Biographic Data

ID1080106
NAMEGiancarlo Spagnolo
GIVEN NAMESGiancarlo
FAMILY NAMESpagnolo
SIGNATURESPAGNOLO G
AFFILIATIONSStockholm School of Economics
ORCID0000-0003-4117-6283
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS7
TOTAL CITATIONS9
WORKS AS AUTHOR7
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2010
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2024
H-INDEX2
  • Procurement cartels and the fight against (outsider) bribing

    Open Access•Roberto Burguet, Elisabetta Iossa et al.•ARTICLE•European Journal of Political…•2024

  • Whistleblower rewards, false reports, and corporate fraud

    Open Access•Paolo Buccirossi, Giovanni Immordino et al.•ARTICLE•European Journal of Law and…•2021

    It is often claimed that rewards for whistleblowers lead to fraudulent reports, but for several US programs this has not been a major problem. We model the interaction between rewards for whistleblowers, sanctions against fraudulent reporting, judicial errors, and standards of proof in the court case on a whistleblower’s allegations and the possible follow-up for fraudulent allegations. Balancing whistleblower rewards, sanctions against fraudulen…

  • Myths and numbers on whistleblower rewards

    Open Access•Theo Nyreröd, Giancarlo Spagnolo•ARTICLE•Regulation & Governance•2021•Cited by: 6•References: 26

    Whistleblower rewards have been used extensively in the United States to limit procurement fraud and tax evasion, and since the financial crisis their use has been extended to fight financial fraud. There is currently debate over their introduction in Europe, but authorities there appear considerably less enthusiastic than their American counterparts. While it is important that these tools are scrutinized in a lively democratic debate, much has b…

  • Leniency and Damages

    Open Access•Paolo Buccirossi, Catarina Marvão et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Legal Studies•2020

    Damage actions may reduce leniency programs’ attractiveness for cartel participants if their cooperation with the competition authority increases the chance that the cartel’s victims will sue them. This apparent conflict between public and private antitrust enforcement led to calls for a legal compromise. We show that the conflict is due to the legislation, and a compromise is not required: limiting the victims’ ability to recover their losses is…

  • Competition Policy and Productivity Growth

    Paolo Buccirossi, Lorenzo Ciari et al.•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•2013

    This paper estimates the impact of competition policy on total factor productivity growth for 22 industries in twelve OECD countries over 1995 to 2005. We find a positive and significant effect of competition policy as measured by created indexes. We provide results based on instrumental variables estimators and heterogeneous effects to support the causal nature of the established link. The effect is particularly strong for specific aspects of co…

  • The Distortive Effects of Antitrust Fines Based on Revenue

    Open Access•Vasiliki Bageri, Yannis Katsoulacos et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2013•Cited by: 3•References: 7

    In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of distortions that these policies generate, propose simple models to characterize their comparative static properties, and quantify them with simulations based on market data. We conclude by discussing the obvious ne…

  • Networks of Relations and Word-of-Mouth Communication

    Open Access•Giancarlo Spagnolo, Steffen Lippert•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2010

  • Myths and numbers on whistleblower rewards

    Open Access•Theo Nyreröd, Giancarlo Spagnolo•ARTICLE•Regulation & Governance•2021•Cited by: 6•References: 26

    Whistleblower rewards have been used extensively in the United States to limit procurement fraud and tax evasion, and since the financial crisis their use has been extended to fight financial fraud. There is currently debate over their introduction in Europe, but authorities there appear considerably less enthusiastic than their American counterparts. While it is important that these tools are scrutinized in a lively democratic debate, much has b…

  • The Distortive Effects of Antitrust Fines Based on Revenue

    Open Access•Vasiliki Bageri, Yannis Katsoulacos et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2013•Cited by: 3•References: 7

    In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of distortions that these policies generate, propose simple models to characterize their comparative static properties, and quantify them with simulations based on market data. We conclude by discussing the obvious ne…

  • Networks of Relations and Word-of-Mouth Communication

    Open Access•Giancarlo Spagnolo, Steffen Lippert•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2010

  • Competition Policy and Productivity Growth

    Paolo Buccirossi, Lorenzo Ciari et al.•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•2013

    This paper estimates the impact of competition policy on total factor productivity growth for 22 industries in twelve OECD countries over 1995 to 2005. We find a positive and significant effect of competition policy as measured by created indexes. We provide results based on instrumental variables estimators and heterogeneous effects to support the causal nature of the established link. The effect is particularly strong for specific aspects of co…

  • The Distortive Effects of Antitrust Fines Based on Revenue

    Open Access•Vasiliki Bageri, Yannis Katsoulacos et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2013•Cited by: 3•References: 7

    In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of distortions that these policies generate, propose simple models to characterize their comparative static properties, and quantify them with simulations based on market data. We conclude by discussing the obvious ne…

  • Leniency and Damages

    Open Access•Paolo Buccirossi, Catarina Marvão et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Legal Studies•2020

    Damage actions may reduce leniency programs’ attractiveness for cartel participants if their cooperation with the competition authority increases the chance that the cartel’s victims will sue them. This apparent conflict between public and private antitrust enforcement led to calls for a legal compromise. We show that the conflict is due to the legislation, and a compromise is not required: limiting the victims’ ability to recover their losses is…

  • Whistleblower rewards, false reports, and corporate fraud

    Open Access•Paolo Buccirossi, Giovanni Immordino et al.•ARTICLE•European Journal of Law and…•2021

    It is often claimed that rewards for whistleblowers lead to fraudulent reports, but for several US programs this has not been a major problem. We model the interaction between rewards for whistleblowers, sanctions against fraudulent reporting, judicial errors, and standards of proof in the court case on a whistleblower’s allegations and the possible follow-up for fraudulent allegations. Balancing whistleblower rewards, sanctions against fraudulen…

  • Myths and numbers on whistleblower rewards

    Open Access•Theo Nyreröd, Giancarlo Spagnolo•ARTICLE•Regulation & Governance•2021•Cited by: 6•References: 26

    Whistleblower rewards have been used extensively in the United States to limit procurement fraud and tax evasion, and since the financial crisis their use has been extended to fight financial fraud. There is currently debate over their introduction in Europe, but authorities there appear considerably less enthusiastic than their American counterparts. While it is important that these tools are scrutinized in a lively democratic debate, much has b…

  • Procurement cartels and the fight against (outsider) bribing

    Open Access•Roberto Burguet, Elisabetta Iossa et al.•ARTICLE•European Journal of Political…•2024

Business (6 works) · Economics (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Accounting (3 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (3 works) · Industrial organization (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Law and economics (3 works)

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