Richard E Aquila
Biographic Data
| ID | 1082846 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Richard E Aquila |
| GIVEN NAMES | Richard E |
| FAMILY NAME | Aquila |
| SIGNATURE | AQUILA R E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Tennessee at Knoxville |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 17 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 17 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1974 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Kant's Anatomy of the Intelligent Mind
This study of Kant's first Critique is astounding in its originality. Wayne Waxman rightly asks readers “to unlearn virtually everything they think they know about the doctrines of the Transcendental Analytic and their role in the critical philosophy as a whole” (viii). Extending his previous work on Kant—Waxman's (1991) first book was focused more on Kantian imagination—the present book turns on a radically “New Understanding of Understanding” (…
The singularity and the unity of transcendental consciousness in Kant
Transcendental consciousness is described by Kant as “the one single thing” in which “as in the transcendental subject, our perceptions must be encountered.” The unity of that subject depends on intellectual functions. I argue that its singularity is just the same as that of Kant's pre-intellectual “form” of spatiotemporal “intuition.” This may seem excluded by Kant's claim that it is through intellect that “space or time are first given as intui…
Hans Vaihinger and Some Recent Intentionalist Readings of Kant
A standard view in contemporary moral philosophy is that a naturalistic account of human nature cannot be normative because there is an unbridgeable gap between explanations of what is the case and accounts of what ought to be. However, in Hume's account of the passions, specifically the passion of pride, he offers an account of our passional life that is descriptive yet value-laden. This enables what is a naturalistic account of human nature to,…
Unity of Apperception and the Division of Labour in the Transcendental Analytic
In the Critique of Fure Reason Kant distinguishes two sorts of conditions of knowledge. First, there are the space and time of pure intuition, introduced in the Transcendental Aesthetic. They are grounded in our dependence on a special sort of perceptual (or imaginative) field for the location of objects. Second, there are pure concepts of the understanding, or categories, introduced in the Analytic. In one respect these are grounded in the logic…
On Plotinus and the "Togetherness" of Consciousness
On Plotinus and the "Togetherness" of Consciousness RICHARD E. AQUILA PLOTINUS IS OFTEN assigned a special position in regard to the history of the concept of consciousness: "In Plotinus, for the first time in its history, psychology becomes the science of the phenomena of consciousness, conceived as selfconsciousness ",; before Plotinus, the notions of consciousness and self (moo had passed practically unnoticed among Greek philosophers;' Plotin…
The Circle of Acquaintance
Introduction: Acquaintance and Intentionality.- One: The Experience of Acquaintance.- I: Perceptual Awareness.- II: Consciousness and Self-Awareness.- III: Empathy and Other-Awareness.- Two: The Relation of Acquaintance.- IV: Content in Context.- V: A Sense of Presence.- VI: Grounds of Acquaintance.- Index of Names.- Index of Topics
Representational Mind
Matter in Mind
Intentionality, Content, and Primitive Mental Directedness
I propose a way of looking at the opaque intentionality of sensory and certain sorts of imaginative mental states: as I shall put it, at the kind of that is, in such states, compatible with directedness toward what does not exist. The proposal requires a primitive quality of mental directedness. I show how this differs from certain conceptions of qualia in consciousness. I also show how it is consonant with some recently fashionable linguistic vi…
The Cartesian and a Certain "Poetic" Notion of Consciousness
Representational Mind
Intentionality
Limerick Philosophy
Intentionality
Two Problems of Being and Nonbeing in Sartre's Being and Nothingness
Causes and Constituents of Occurrent Emotion
Journal Article Causes and Constituents of Occurrent Emotion Get access Richard E. Aquila Richard E. Aquila University of Tennessee, Knoxville Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 25, Issue 101, October 1975, Pages 346–349, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218979 Published: 01 October 1975
Brentano, Descartes, and Hume on Awareness
The Circle of Acquaintance
Introduction: Acquaintance and Intentionality.- One: The Experience of Acquaintance.- I: Perceptual Awareness.- II: Consciousness and Self-Awareness.- III: Empathy and Other-Awareness.- Two: The Relation of Acquaintance.- IV: Content in Context.- V: A Sense of Presence.- VI: Grounds of Acquaintance.- Index of Names.- Index of Topics
Representational Mind
Intentionality
Hans Vaihinger and Some Recent Intentionalist Readings of Kant
A standard view in contemporary moral philosophy is that a naturalistic account of human nature cannot be normative because there is an unbridgeable gap between explanations of what is the case and accounts of what ought to be. However, in Hume's account of the passions, specifically the passion of pride, he offers an account of our passional life that is descriptive yet value-laden. This enables what is a naturalistic account of human nature to,…
Matter in Mind
The Cartesian and a Certain "Poetic" Notion of Consciousness
Representational Mind
Brentano, Descartes, and Hume on Awareness
Brentano, Descartes, and Hume on Awareness
Causes and Constituents of Occurrent Emotion
Journal Article Causes and Constituents of Occurrent Emotion Get access Richard E. Aquila Richard E. Aquila University of Tennessee, Knoxville Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 25, Issue 101, October 1975, Pages 346–349, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218979 Published: 01 October 1975
Two Problems of Being and Nonbeing in Sartre's Being and Nothingness
Intentionality
Limerick Philosophy
Intentionality
Representational Mind
The Cartesian and a Certain "Poetic" Notion of Consciousness
Intentionality, Content, and Primitive Mental Directedness
I propose a way of looking at the opaque intentionality of sensory and certain sorts of imaginative mental states: as I shall put it, at the kind of that is, in such states, compatible with directedness toward what does not exist. The proposal requires a primitive quality of mental directedness. I show how this differs from certain conceptions of qualia in consciousness. I also show how it is consonant with some recently fashionable linguistic vi…
Representational Mind
Matter in Mind
On Plotinus and the "Togetherness" of Consciousness
On Plotinus and the "Togetherness" of Consciousness RICHARD E. AQUILA PLOTINUS IS OFTEN assigned a special position in regard to the history of the concept of consciousness: "In Plotinus, for the first time in its history, psychology becomes the science of the phenomena of consciousness, conceived as selfconsciousness ",; before Plotinus, the notions of consciousness and self (moo had passed practically unnoticed among Greek philosophers;' Plotin…
The Circle of Acquaintance
Introduction: Acquaintance and Intentionality.- One: The Experience of Acquaintance.- I: Perceptual Awareness.- II: Consciousness and Self-Awareness.- III: Empathy and Other-Awareness.- Two: The Relation of Acquaintance.- IV: Content in Context.- V: A Sense of Presence.- VI: Grounds of Acquaintance.- Index of Names.- Index of Topics
Unity of Apperception and the Division of Labour in the Transcendental Analytic
In the Critique of Fure Reason Kant distinguishes two sorts of conditions of knowledge. First, there are the space and time of pure intuition, introduced in the Transcendental Aesthetic. They are grounded in our dependence on a special sort of perceptual (or imaginative) field for the location of objects. Second, there are pure concepts of the understanding, or categories, introduced in the Analytic. In one respect these are grounded in the logic…
Hans Vaihinger and Some Recent Intentionalist Readings of Kant
A standard view in contemporary moral philosophy is that a naturalistic account of human nature cannot be normative because there is an unbridgeable gap between explanations of what is the case and accounts of what ought to be. However, in Hume's account of the passions, specifically the passion of pride, he offers an account of our passional life that is descriptive yet value-laden. This enables what is a naturalistic account of human nature to,…
The singularity and the unity of transcendental consciousness in Kant
Transcendental consciousness is described by Kant as “the one single thing” in which “as in the transcendental subject, our perceptions must be encountered.” The unity of that subject depends on intellectual functions. I argue that its singularity is just the same as that of Kant's pre-intellectual “form” of spatiotemporal “intuition.” This may seem excluded by Kant's claim that it is through intellect that “space or time are first given as intui…
Kant's Anatomy of the Intelligent Mind
This study of Kant's first Critique is astounding in its originality. Wayne Waxman rightly asks readers “to unlearn virtually everything they think they know about the doctrines of the Transcendental Analytic and their role in the critical philosophy as a whole” (viii). Extending his previous work on Kant—Waxman's (1991) first book was focused more on Kantian imagination—the present book turns on a radically “New Understanding of Understanding” (…
Epistemology (14 works) · Philosophy (14 works) · Psychology (11 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophy of mind (6 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Analytic philosophy (4 works) · Consciousness (4 works)