Nahomi Ichino
Biographic Data
| ID | 108532 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nahomi Ichino |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nahomi |
| FAMILY NAME | Ichino |
| SIGNATURE | ICHINO N |
| AFFILIATIONS | Harvard University Press |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8057-3244 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 293 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Democratizing the Party: The Effects of Primary Election Reforms in Ghana
The recent expansion of the primary electorate by one of Ghana's major parties offers a rare opportunity to assess the effects of franchise extensions in contemporary new democracies. Using an original dataset on candidate entry and nominations, this article shows that expanding the primary electorate opened paths to office for politicians from social groups that were previously excluded, such as women and ethnic groups outside the party's core n…
Models, methods and network topology: Experimental design for the study of interference
Increasing Inferential Leverage in the Comparative Method: Placebo Tests in Small-n Research
We delineate the underlying homogeneity assumption, procedural variants, and implications of the comparative method and distinguish this from Mill's method of difference. We demonstrate that additional units can provide 'placebo' tests for the comparative method even if the scope of inference is limited to the two units under comparison. Moreover, such tests may be available even when these units are the most similar pair of units on the control …
Using Qualitative Information to Improve Causal Inference
Using the Rosenbaum (2002, 2009) approach to observational studies, we show how qualitative information can be incorporated into quantitative analyses to improve causal inference in three ways. First, by including qualitative information on outcomes within matched sets, we can ameliorate the consequences of the difficulty of measuring those outcomes, sometimes reducing p‐values. Second, additional information across matched sets enables the const…
Do Primaries Improve Electoral Performance? Clientelism and Intra‐Party Conflict in Ghana
We consider the effect of legislative primaries on the electoral performance of political parties in a new democracy. While existing literature suggests that primaries may either hurt a party by selecting extremist candidates or improve performance by selecting high valence candidates or improving a party’s image, these mechanisms may not apply where clientelism is prevalent. A theory of primaries built instead on a logic of clientelism with intr…
Primaries on Demand? Intra-Party Politics and Nominations in Ghana – Corrigendum
Crossing the Line: Local Ethnic Geography and Voting in Ghana
Theories of instrumental ethnic voting in new democracies propose that voters support co-ethnic politicians because they expect politicians to favor their co-ethnics once in office. But many goods that politicians deliver to voters are locally nonexcludable in rural areas, so the local presence of an ethnic group associated with a politician should affect a rural voter's assessment of how likely she is to benefit from that politician's election. …
Deterring or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects of Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in Ghana
This article studies the effect of domestic observers deployed to reduce irregularities in voter registration in a new democracy, and in particular, the response of political parties’ agents to these observers. Because political parties operate over large areas and party agents may relocate away from observed registration centers, observers may displace rather than deter irregularities. We design and implement a large-scale two-level randomized f…
Primaries on Demand? Intra-Party Politics and Nominations in Ghana
In new democracies, why do political party leaders relinquish power over nominations and allow legislative candidates to be selected by primary elections? Where the legislature is weak and politics is clientelistic, democratization of candidate selection is driven by local party members seeking benefits from primary contestants. Analysis of an original dataset on legislative nominations and political interference by party leaders for the 2004 and…
Crossing the Line: Local Ethnic Geography and Voting in Ghana
Theories of instrumental ethnic voting in new democracies propose that voters support co-ethnic politicians because they expect politicians to favor their co-ethnics once in office. But many goods that politicians deliver to voters are locally nonexcludable in rural areas, so the local presence of an ethnic group associated with a politician should affect a rural voter's assessment of how likely she is to benefit from that politician's election. …
Deterring or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects of Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in Ghana
This article studies the effect of domestic observers deployed to reduce irregularities in voter registration in a new democracy, and in particular, the response of political parties’ agents to these observers. Because political parties operate over large areas and party agents may relocate away from observed registration centers, observers may displace rather than deter irregularities. We design and implement a large-scale two-level randomized f…
Do Primaries Improve Electoral Performance? Clientelism and Intra‐Party Conflict in Ghana
We consider the effect of legislative primaries on the electoral performance of political parties in a new democracy. While existing literature suggests that primaries may either hurt a party by selecting extremist candidates or improve performance by selecting high valence candidates or improving a party’s image, these mechanisms may not apply where clientelism is prevalent. A theory of primaries built instead on a logic of clientelism with intr…
Primaries on Demand? Intra-Party Politics and Nominations in Ghana
In new democracies, why do political party leaders relinquish power over nominations and allow legislative candidates to be selected by primary elections? Where the legislature is weak and politics is clientelistic, democratization of candidate selection is driven by local party members seeking benefits from primary contestants. Analysis of an original dataset on legislative nominations and political interference by party leaders for the 2004 and…
Democratizing the Party: The Effects of Primary Election Reforms in Ghana
The recent expansion of the primary electorate by one of Ghana's major parties offers a rare opportunity to assess the effects of franchise extensions in contemporary new democracies. Using an original dataset on candidate entry and nominations, this article shows that expanding the primary electorate opened paths to office for politicians from social groups that were previously excluded, such as women and ethnic groups outside the party's core n…
Using Qualitative Information to Improve Causal Inference
Using the Rosenbaum (2002, 2009) approach to observational studies, we show how qualitative information can be incorporated into quantitative analyses to improve causal inference in three ways. First, by including qualitative information on outcomes within matched sets, we can ameliorate the consequences of the difficulty of measuring those outcomes, sometimes reducing p‐values. Second, additional information across matched sets enables the const…
Increasing Inferential Leverage in the Comparative Method: Placebo Tests in Small-n Research
We delineate the underlying homogeneity assumption, procedural variants, and implications of the comparative method and distinguish this from Mill's method of difference. We demonstrate that additional units can provide 'placebo' tests for the comparative method even if the scope of inference is limited to the two units under comparison. Moreover, such tests may be available even when these units are the most similar pair of units on the control …
Deterring or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects of Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in Ghana
This article studies the effect of domestic observers deployed to reduce irregularities in voter registration in a new democracy, and in particular, the response of political parties’ agents to these observers. Because political parties operate over large areas and party agents may relocate away from observed registration centers, observers may displace rather than deter irregularities. We design and implement a large-scale two-level randomized f…
Primaries on Demand? Intra-Party Politics and Nominations in Ghana
In new democracies, why do political party leaders relinquish power over nominations and allow legislative candidates to be selected by primary elections? Where the legislature is weak and politics is clientelistic, democratization of candidate selection is driven by local party members seeking benefits from primary contestants. Analysis of an original dataset on legislative nominations and political interference by party leaders for the 2004 and…
Do Primaries Improve Electoral Performance? Clientelism and Intra‐Party Conflict in Ghana
We consider the effect of legislative primaries on the electoral performance of political parties in a new democracy. While existing literature suggests that primaries may either hurt a party by selecting extremist candidates or improve performance by selecting high valence candidates or improving a party’s image, these mechanisms may not apply where clientelism is prevalent. A theory of primaries built instead on a logic of clientelism with intr…
Primaries on Demand? Intra-Party Politics and Nominations in Ghana – Corrigendum
Crossing the Line: Local Ethnic Geography and Voting in Ghana
Theories of instrumental ethnic voting in new democracies propose that voters support co-ethnic politicians because they expect politicians to favor their co-ethnics once in office. But many goods that politicians deliver to voters are locally nonexcludable in rural areas, so the local presence of an ethnic group associated with a politician should affect a rural voter's assessment of how likely she is to benefit from that politician's election. …
Using Qualitative Information to Improve Causal Inference
Using the Rosenbaum (2002, 2009) approach to observational studies, we show how qualitative information can be incorporated into quantitative analyses to improve causal inference in three ways. First, by including qualitative information on outcomes within matched sets, we can ameliorate the consequences of the difficulty of measuring those outcomes, sometimes reducing p‐values. Second, additional information across matched sets enables the const…
Increasing Inferential Leverage in the Comparative Method: Placebo Tests in Small-n Research
We delineate the underlying homogeneity assumption, procedural variants, and implications of the comparative method and distinguish this from Mill's method of difference. We demonstrate that additional units can provide 'placebo' tests for the comparative method even if the scope of inference is limited to the two units under comparison. Moreover, such tests may be available even when these units are the most similar pair of units on the control …
Models, methods and network topology: Experimental design for the study of interference
Democratizing the Party: The Effects of Primary Election Reforms in Ghana
The recent expansion of the primary electorate by one of Ghana's major parties offers a rare opportunity to assess the effects of franchise extensions in contemporary new democracies. Using an original dataset on candidate entry and nominations, this article shows that expanding the primary electorate opened paths to office for politicians from social groups that were previously excluded, such as women and ethnic groups outside the party's core n…
Law (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Politics (5 works) · Democracy (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (4 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (4 works) · Political economy (4 works) · Advanced Causal Inference Techniques (3 works)