Eve-Angéline Lambert
Biographic Data
| ID | 1085901 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Eve-Angéline Lambert |
| GIVEN NAMES | Eve-Angéline |
| FAMILY NAME | Lambert |
| SIGNATURE | LAMBERT E |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0491-397X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Severance payments
Économie de la responsabilité et nouveaux risques
Efficiency of Liability-Sharing Rules
We investigate the relative performance of two liability-sharing rules for managing harms that are caused jointly by two firms. The firms can make investments to reduce the magnitude of the harm, but they face a limited solvency that can prevent them from paying for their share. We derive theoretical predictions, and compare them with observations made from a lab experiment. We show that insolvency leads to underinvestment, and that the relative …
Settlement implications of lawyer advertising
This paper explores how informative attorney advertising influences the settlement probability and/or offer, using a screening framework. Plaintiffs are privately informed about the expected judgment and their level of ability in controlling the lawyer. More attorney advertising increases case filings by plaintiffs with high or low ability to different extents such that the defendant's beliefs about the plaintiff's type change with the level of a…
Actions en justice et rémunération des avocats
Plusieurs pays européens ont désormais adopté (ou envisagent d’adopter) l’honoraire de résultat comme mécanisme de rémunération des avocats dans le cadre d’actions en responsabilité civile. Ce type d’honoraire implique que l’avocat ne soit rémunéré qu’en cas de transaction amiable ou de victoire au procès, percevant soit un bonus horaire (ou forfaitaire), soit une part de l’indemnisation obtenue par son client. Dans cet article, nous dressons un …
Lutte contre les cartels multimarchés
Cette expérience en laboratoire compare les programmes de clémence américain et européen concernant la lutte contre les cartels multimarchés. La clémence consiste à accorder à une entreprise, membre d’un cartel illicite, une réduction ou une annulation d’amende si elle coopère et apporte les preuves de ce cartel à l’Autorité de la concurrence. Lorsque ces cartels concernent plusieurs marchés, les États-Unis ont renforcé cette clémence pour incite…
Legal Advertising and Frivolous Lawsuits
Following a recent wave of deregulation, lawyers now use a large variety of media to advertise their services. A common argument against this increasing reliance on advertising is that it might stir up frivolous lawsuits. In this article, we investigate the relevance of this argument by developing an asymmetric information game of litigation. The main results show that this stirring-up effect does not necessarily occur in equilibrium and advertis…
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Legal Advertising and Frivolous Lawsuits
Following a recent wave of deregulation, lawyers now use a large variety of media to advertise their services. A common argument against this increasing reliance on advertising is that it might stir up frivolous lawsuits. In this article, we investigate the relevance of this argument by developing an asymmetric information game of litigation. The main results show that this stirring-up effect does not necessarily occur in equilibrium and advertis…
Lutte contre les cartels multimarchés
Cette expérience en laboratoire compare les programmes de clémence américain et européen concernant la lutte contre les cartels multimarchés. La clémence consiste à accorder à une entreprise, membre d’un cartel illicite, une réduction ou une annulation d’amende si elle coopère et apporte les preuves de ce cartel à l’Autorité de la concurrence. Lorsque ces cartels concernent plusieurs marchés, les États-Unis ont renforcé cette clémence pour incite…
Settlement implications of lawyer advertising
This paper explores how informative attorney advertising influences the settlement probability and/or offer, using a screening framework. Plaintiffs are privately informed about the expected judgment and their level of ability in controlling the lawyer. More attorney advertising increases case filings by plaintiffs with high or low ability to different extents such that the defendant's beliefs about the plaintiff's type change with the level of a…
Actions en justice et rémunération des avocats
Plusieurs pays européens ont désormais adopté (ou envisagent d’adopter) l’honoraire de résultat comme mécanisme de rémunération des avocats dans le cadre d’actions en responsabilité civile. Ce type d’honoraire implique que l’avocat ne soit rémunéré qu’en cas de transaction amiable ou de victoire au procès, percevant soit un bonus horaire (ou forfaitaire), soit une part de l’indemnisation obtenue par son client. Dans cet article, nous dressons un …
Efficiency of Liability-Sharing Rules
We investigate the relative performance of two liability-sharing rules for managing harms that are caused jointly by two firms. The firms can make investments to reduce the magnitude of the harm, but they face a limited solvency that can prevent them from paying for their share. We derive theoretical predictions, and compare them with observations made from a lab experiment. We show that insolvency leads to underinvestment, and that the relative …
Severance payments
Économie de la responsabilité et nouveaux risques
Political science (6 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Humanities (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Advertising (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Legal and Constitutional Studies (2 works)