Lilith Newton
Biographic Data
| ID | 10868577 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lilith Newton |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lilith |
| FAMILY NAME | Newton |
| SIGNATURE | NEWTON L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Edinburgh |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk
In this paper, I provide an account of epistemic anxiety as an emotional response to epistemic risk: the risk of believing in error. The motivation for this account is threefold. First, it makes epistemic anxiety a species of anxiety, thus rendering psychologically respectable a notion that has heretofore been taken seriously only by epistemologists. Second, it illuminates the relationship between anxiety and risk. It is standard in psychology to…
The epistemic significance of modal factors
This paper evaluates whether and to what extent modal constraints on knowledge or the semantics of ‘knows’, which make essential reference to what goes on in other possible worlds, can be considered non - epistemic factors with epistemic significance . This is best understood as the question whether modal factors are non-truth-relevant factors that make the difference between true belief and knowledge, or to whether a true belief falls under the …
Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk
In this paper, I provide an account of epistemic anxiety as an emotional response to epistemic risk: the risk of believing in error. The motivation for this account is threefold. First, it makes epistemic anxiety a species of anxiety, thus rendering psychologically respectable a notion that has heretofore been taken seriously only by epistemologists. Second, it illuminates the relationship between anxiety and risk. It is standard in psychology to…
The epistemic significance of modal factors
This paper evaluates whether and to what extent modal constraints on knowledge or the semantics of ‘knows’, which make essential reference to what goes on in other possible worlds, can be considered non - epistemic factors with epistemic significance . This is best understood as the question whether modal factors are non-truth-relevant factors that make the difference between true belief and knowledge, or to whether a true belief falls under the …
Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk
In this paper, I provide an account of epistemic anxiety as an emotional response to epistemic risk: the risk of believing in error. The motivation for this account is threefold. First, it makes epistemic anxiety a species of anxiety, thus rendering psychologically respectable a notion that has heretofore been taken seriously only by epistemologists. Second, it illuminates the relationship between anxiety and risk. It is standard in psychology to…
Epistemology (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy of language (2 works) · Philosophy of science (2 works) · Anxiety (1 work) · Context (archaeology) (1 work) · Contextualism (1 work) · Epistemic modal logic (1 work)