Irwin Lipnowski
Biographic Data
| ID | 1087560 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Irwin Lipnowski |
| GIVEN NAMES | Irwin |
| FAMILY NAME | Lipnowski |
| SIGNATURE | LIPNOWSKI I |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Manitoba |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1983 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
A Partial Rehabilitation of the Principle of Collective Punishment
Most, if not all, high school graduates have experienced the following event at some stage of their academic careers. Their teacher wishes to leave the classroom but is fearful about the noise level that will ensue after he or she departs, and so issues the following stern warning to the class: I shall be out of the classroom for a few minutes and during my absence, I want to be able to hear a pin drop from down the hall. If I hear so much as a p…
A Reply to Professor Brodeur
I welcome the opportunity to respond to Professor Brodeur's thoughtful and provocative comments on my paper. Notwithstanding the gracious tone of his rejoinder, I am afraid that I must take issue with several points that Professor Brodeur makes. The concept of “collective punishment” is a rather elastic one that lends itself to a wide range of interpretation. I believe that ambiguity in the interpretation of “collective punishment” lies at the he…
The Coase Theorem and Coalitional Stability
It is the contention of this paper that the Coase theorem has yet to be formulated and proved in a rigorou s manner. The paper addresses the problem of strategic coalitional be havior when more than two agents are involved in the externality. It is shown that there are examples for which nonefficient allocations a re stable in the sense of Aumann-Maschler bargaining sets, thereby vi tiating the Coase theorem. Hence a proper formulation of the Coa…
Macroeconomic Conflict and Social Institutions
The design of a Tort law to control accidents
The Coase Theorem and Coalitional Stability
It is the contention of this paper that the Coase theorem has yet to be formulated and proved in a rigorou s manner. The paper addresses the problem of strategic coalitional be havior when more than two agents are involved in the externality. It is shown that there are examples for which nonefficient allocations a re stable in the sense of Aumann-Maschler bargaining sets, thereby vi tiating the Coase theorem. Hence a proper formulation of the Coa…
The design of a Tort law to control accidents
Macroeconomic Conflict and Social Institutions
The Coase Theorem and Coalitional Stability
It is the contention of this paper that the Coase theorem has yet to be formulated and proved in a rigorou s manner. The paper addresses the problem of strategic coalitional be havior when more than two agents are involved in the externality. It is shown that there are examples for which nonefficient allocations a re stable in the sense of Aumann-Maschler bargaining sets, thereby vi tiating the Coase theorem. Hence a proper formulation of the Coa…
A Partial Rehabilitation of the Principle of Collective Punishment
Most, if not all, high school graduates have experienced the following event at some stage of their academic careers. Their teacher wishes to leave the classroom but is fearful about the noise level that will ensue after he or she departs, and so issues the following stern warning to the class: I shall be out of the classroom for a few minutes and during my absence, I want to be able to hear a pin drop from down the hall. If I hear so much as a p…
A Reply to Professor Brodeur
I welcome the opportunity to respond to Professor Brodeur's thoughtful and provocative comments on my paper. Notwithstanding the gracious tone of his rejoinder, I am afraid that I must take issue with several points that Professor Brodeur makes. The concept of “collective punishment” is a rather elastic one that lends itself to a wide range of interpretation. I believe that ambiguity in the interpretation of “collective punishment” lies at the he…
Economics (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Criminology (2 works) · Economic Theory and Institutions (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Political science (2 works)