Sharyn O''Halloran
Biographic Data
| ID | 1088539 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Sharyn O''Halloran |
| GIVEN NAMES | Sharyn |
| FAMILY NAME | O''Halloran |
| SIGNATURE | HALLORAN S O |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 822 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1994 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| H-INDEX | 8 |
Democratic Transitions
Przeworski et al. (2000)challenge the key hypothesis in modernization theory: political regimes do not transition to democracy as per capita incomes rise, they argue. Rather, democratic transitions occur randomly, but once there, countries with higher levels of GDP per capita remain democratic. We retest the modernization hypothesis using new data, new techniques, and a three‐way rather than dichotomous classification of regimes. Contrary toPrzew…
Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)
In this book, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran present the first unified theory of national policy making. Examining major U.S. policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy."--Jacket
Asymmetric Information, Delegation, and the Structure of Policy-Making
Congress uses varying degrees of specificity when passing legislation. Sometimes it writes very detailed, exacting laws; other times it leaves these details to implementing agencies. A natural positive question then arises: what factors are critical for understanding the degree of delegation used by Congress in a particular circumstance? This paper exploits the tradeoff between the distributive and informational effects of organizational design t…
Measuring the Electoral and Policy Impact of Majority-Minority Voting Districts
The Voting Rights Act guarantees minority voters an opportunity to elect the of their choice. Yet the implementation of this requirement is beset with technical difficulties: first, current case law provides no clear definition as to who qualifies as a of choice for the minority community; second, traditional techniques for estimating equal opportunity rely heavily on ecological regression, which is prone to statistical bias; and third, no attemp…
A Social Science Approach to Race, Redistricting, and Representation
In his critique of our earlier paper on majority-minority voting districts, David Lublin suggests that our conclusions with respect to the election of minorities to office are flawed, and that we incorrectly estimate optimal districting strategies for the substantive representation of minority interests in Congress. Subjecting these claims to direct empirical examination, we find that our previous results are unaltered by the inclusion of Latino …
A Comparative Approach to Legislative Organization: Careerism and Seniority in the United States and Japan
Theory: This paper provides a comparative study of legislative institutions in the United States and Japan. It explains the rise of committee-based legislative organizations as an institutional choice made by rational legislators deciding how best to regularize their career advancement subject to electoral and constitutional constraints. Hypotheses: We argue that the rise of careerism within a legislature leads to a regularized system of career a…
Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test
Despite the abundance of recent studies on divided government, no clear consensus has emerged as to whether divided partisan control has an appreciable impact on policy outcomes. In this article we take a new perspective on the divided government debate by emphasizing the important role that the federal bureaucracy plays in shaping policy. We present a game theoretic model of the policy-making process in which legislators design administrative pr…
Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress
Majority-minority voting districts have been advanced as a remedy to the underrepresentation of minority interests in the political process. Yet, their efficacy in furthering the substantive goals of minority constituents has been questioned because they may dilute minority influence in surrounding areas and lead to an overall decrease in support for minority-sponsored legislation. Thus, there may be a trade-off between increasing the number of m…
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
This paper investigates the design of administrative procedures when policy consequences are uncertain. In general, when deciding how much discretion to delegate, legislators must trade off informational gains from agency expertise and distributive losses from bureaucratic drift. We show that when Congress has both ex post agenda control and access to information, it will delegate a large degree of authority to all agencies, regardless of differe…
Democratic Transitions
Przeworski et al. (2000)challenge the key hypothesis in modernization theory: political regimes do not transition to democracy as per capita incomes rise, they argue. Rather, democratic transitions occur randomly, but once there, countries with higher levels of GDP per capita remain democratic. We retest the modernization hypothesis using new data, new techniques, and a three‐way rather than dichotomous classification of regimes. Contrary toPrzew…
Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress
Majority-minority voting districts have been advanced as a remedy to the underrepresentation of minority interests in the political process. Yet, their efficacy in furthering the substantive goals of minority constituents has been questioned because they may dilute minority influence in surrounding areas and lead to an overall decrease in support for minority-sponsored legislation. Thus, there may be a trade-off between increasing the number of m…
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
This paper investigates the design of administrative procedures when policy consequences are uncertain. In general, when deciding how much discretion to delegate, legislators must trade off informational gains from agency expertise and distributive losses from bureaucratic drift. We show that when Congress has both ex post agenda control and access to information, it will delegate a large degree of authority to all agencies, regardless of differe…
Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test
Despite the abundance of recent studies on divided government, no clear consensus has emerged as to whether divided partisan control has an appreciable impact on policy outcomes. In this article we take a new perspective on the divided government debate by emphasizing the important role that the federal bureaucracy plays in shaping policy. We present a game theoretic model of the policy-making process in which legislators design administrative pr…
Measuring the Electoral and Policy Impact of Majority-Minority Voting Districts
The Voting Rights Act guarantees minority voters an opportunity to elect the of their choice. Yet the implementation of this requirement is beset with technical difficulties: first, current case law provides no clear definition as to who qualifies as a of choice for the minority community; second, traditional techniques for estimating equal opportunity rely heavily on ecological regression, which is prone to statistical bias; and third, no attemp…
A Comparative Approach to Legislative Organization: Careerism and Seniority in the United States and Japan
Theory: This paper provides a comparative study of legislative institutions in the United States and Japan. It explains the rise of committee-based legislative organizations as an institutional choice made by rational legislators deciding how best to regularize their career advancement subject to electoral and constitutional constraints. Hypotheses: We argue that the rise of careerism within a legislature leads to a regularized system of career a…
A Social Science Approach to Race, Redistricting, and Representation
In his critique of our earlier paper on majority-minority voting districts, David Lublin suggests that our conclusions with respect to the election of minorities to office are flawed, and that we incorrectly estimate optimal districting strategies for the substantive representation of minority interests in Congress. Subjecting these claims to direct empirical examination, we find that our previous results are unaltered by the inclusion of Latino …
Asymmetric Information, Delegation, and the Structure of Policy-Making
Congress uses varying degrees of specificity when passing legislation. Sometimes it writes very detailed, exacting laws; other times it leaves these details to implementing agencies. A natural positive question then arises: what factors are critical for understanding the degree of delegation used by Congress in a particular circumstance? This paper exploits the tradeoff between the distributive and informational effects of organizational design t…
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
This paper investigates the design of administrative procedures when policy consequences are uncertain. In general, when deciding how much discretion to delegate, legislators must trade off informational gains from agency expertise and distributive losses from bureaucratic drift. We show that when Congress has both ex post agenda control and access to information, it will delegate a large degree of authority to all agencies, regardless of differe…
Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test
Despite the abundance of recent studies on divided government, no clear consensus has emerged as to whether divided partisan control has an appreciable impact on policy outcomes. In this article we take a new perspective on the divided government debate by emphasizing the important role that the federal bureaucracy plays in shaping policy. We present a game theoretic model of the policy-making process in which legislators design administrative pr…
Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress
Majority-minority voting districts have been advanced as a remedy to the underrepresentation of minority interests in the political process. Yet, their efficacy in furthering the substantive goals of minority constituents has been questioned because they may dilute minority influence in surrounding areas and lead to an overall decrease in support for minority-sponsored legislation. Thus, there may be a trade-off between increasing the number of m…
A Comparative Approach to Legislative Organization: Careerism and Seniority in the United States and Japan
Theory: This paper provides a comparative study of legislative institutions in the United States and Japan. It explains the rise of committee-based legislative organizations as an institutional choice made by rational legislators deciding how best to regularize their career advancement subject to electoral and constitutional constraints. Hypotheses: We argue that the rise of careerism within a legislature leads to a regularized system of career a…
Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)
In this book, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran present the first unified theory of national policy making. Examining major U.S. policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy."--Jacket
Asymmetric Information, Delegation, and the Structure of Policy-Making
Congress uses varying degrees of specificity when passing legislation. Sometimes it writes very detailed, exacting laws; other times it leaves these details to implementing agencies. A natural positive question then arises: what factors are critical for understanding the degree of delegation used by Congress in a particular circumstance? This paper exploits the tradeoff between the distributive and informational effects of organizational design t…
Measuring the Electoral and Policy Impact of Majority-Minority Voting Districts
The Voting Rights Act guarantees minority voters an opportunity to elect the of their choice. Yet the implementation of this requirement is beset with technical difficulties: first, current case law provides no clear definition as to who qualifies as a of choice for the minority community; second, traditional techniques for estimating equal opportunity rely heavily on ecological regression, which is prone to statistical bias; and third, no attemp…
A Social Science Approach to Race, Redistricting, and Representation
In his critique of our earlier paper on majority-minority voting districts, David Lublin suggests that our conclusions with respect to the election of minorities to office are flawed, and that we incorrectly estimate optimal districting strategies for the substantive representation of minority interests in Congress. Subjecting these claims to direct empirical examination, we find that our previous results are unaltered by the inclusion of Latino …
Democratic Transitions
Przeworski et al. (2000)challenge the key hypothesis in modernization theory: political regimes do not transition to democracy as per capita incomes rise, they argue. Rather, democratic transitions occur randomly, but once there, countries with higher levels of GDP per capita remain democratic. We retest the modernization hypothesis using new data, new techniques, and a three‐way rather than dichotomous classification of regimes. Contrary toPrzew…
Political science (9 works) · Economics (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Politics (7 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (5 works) · Public Administration (5 works) · Public Administration (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Legislation (4 works)