Massimo Renzo
Biographic Data
| ID | 1088929 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Massimo Renzo |
| GIVEN NAMES | Massimo |
| FAMILY NAME | Renzo |
| SIGNATURE | RENZO M |
| AFFILIATIONS | King's College London |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 14 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Fighting Unjust Wars
Legitimate authorities occasionally issue mistaken directives. Do we have a duty to obey such directives? This question is especially pressing in cases in which (1) obeying a mistaken directive would lead us to take part in the perpetration of a serious injustice and (2) the victims of the injustice are not themselves subject to the authority that issued the directive. The clearest case is when a legitimate authority, acting in good faith, orders…
Manipulation and liability to defensive harm
Philosophers working on the morality of harm have paid surprisingly little attention to the problem of manipulation. The aim of this paper is to remedy this lacuna by exploring how liability to defensive harm is affected by the fact that someone posing an unjust threat has been manipulated into doing so. In addressing this problem, the challenge is to answer the following question: Why should it be the case (if it is, indeed, the case) that being…
Authority and Legitimacy
Consider two ways in which the existence of political authorities is morally problematic. Do not think only about tyrannical or unjust authorities, for example, states that persecute minorities, unjustly expropriate property or wage unnecessary wars. These authorities are morally problematic in a number of obvious ways that will not be discussed here. Think about good political authorities: the peaceful ones that protect human rights, respect min…
Introduction
This article links to the Symposium on Causation in War by Carolina Sartorio , Helen Beebee and Alex Kaiserman , and Lars Christie
Why Colonialism Is Wrong
Historically, colonial domination has involved subjecting innocent populations to atrocities such as murder, torture, and exploitation. But pointing at these wrongs is not enough to explain the distinctive way in which colonialism is wrong. After all, murder, torture and exploitation are wrong whether or not they occur in the context of colonial occupation. If all we can do to explain the nature of colonialism is point at the fact that it typical…
Helping the Rebels
In a pair of recent papers, Allen Buchanan has outlined an ambitious account of the ethics of revolution and its implications for military intervention. Buchanan’s account is bold and yet sophisticated. It is bold in that it advances a number of theses that will no doubt strike the reader as highly controversial; it is sophisticated in that it rests on a nuanced account of how revolutions unfold and the constraints that political self-determinati…
Political Authority and Unjust Wars
Just war theory is currently dominated by two positions. According to the orthodox view (Walzer), provided that jus in bello principles are respected, combatants have an equal right to fight, regardless of the justice of the cause pursued by their state. According to “revisionists” (McMahan, Fabre) whenever combatants lack reasons to believe that the war they are ordered to fight is just, their duty is to disobey. I argue that when members of a l…
Rights Forfeiture and Liability to Harm
Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights
What makes something a human right? What is the relationship between the moral foundations of human rights and human rights law? What are the difficulties of appealing to human rights? This book offers a survey of current thinking on the philosophical foundations of human rights. Divided into four parts, this book focuses first on the moral grounds of human rights, for example in our dignity, agency, interests or needs. Secondly, it looks at the …
The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights
The introduction introduces the history of the concept of human rights and its philosophical genealogy. It raises questions of the nature of human rights, the grounds of human rights, difference between proposed and actual human rights, and scepticism surrounding the very idea of human rights. In the course of this discussion, it concludes that the diversity of positions on human rights is a sign of the intellectual, cultural, and political ferti…
Human Needs, Human Rights
This chapter presents a response to the last chapter’s account of the relativity and ethnocentricity of human rights. It outlines a naturalistic conception of human rights that is capable of resisting the objection of parochialism. It begins by considering Chapter 31’s attempt to ground human rights in normative agency. It raises two objections against the view presented in the last chapter and argues for its abandonment in favour of a needs-base…
Fairness, self-deception and political obligation
Associative Responsibilities and Political Obligation
In this paper I criticise an influential version of associative theory of political obligation and I offer a reformulation of the theory in 'quasi-voluntarist' terms. I argue that although unable by itself to solve the problem of political obligation, my quasi-voluntarist associative model can play an important role in solving this problem. Moreover, the model teaches us an important methodological lesson about the way in which we should think ab…
State Legitimacy and Self-defence
In this paper I outline a theory of legitimacy that grounds the state’s right to rule on a natural duty not to harm others. I argue that by refusing to enter the state, anarchists expose those living next to them to the dangers of the state of nature, thereby posing an unjust threat. Since we have a duty not to pose unjust threats to others, anarchists have a duty to leave the state of nature and enter the state. This duty correlates to a claim-r…
Introduction
Associative Responsibilities and Political Obligation
In this paper I criticise an influential version of associative theory of political obligation and I offer a reformulation of the theory in 'quasi-voluntarist' terms. I argue that although unable by itself to solve the problem of political obligation, my quasi-voluntarist associative model can play an important role in solving this problem. Moreover, the model teaches us an important methodological lesson about the way in which we should think ab…
Political Authority and Unjust Wars
Just war theory is currently dominated by two positions. According to the orthodox view (Walzer), provided that jus in bello principles are respected, combatants have an equal right to fight, regardless of the justice of the cause pursued by their state. According to “revisionists” (McMahan, Fabre) whenever combatants lack reasons to believe that the war they are ordered to fight is just, their duty is to disobey. I argue that when members of a l…
Rights Forfeiture and Liability to Harm
Introduction
State Legitimacy and Self-defence
In this paper I outline a theory of legitimacy that grounds the state’s right to rule on a natural duty not to harm others. I argue that by refusing to enter the state, anarchists expose those living next to them to the dangers of the state of nature, thereby posing an unjust threat. Since we have a duty not to pose unjust threats to others, anarchists have a duty to leave the state of nature and enter the state. This duty correlates to a claim-r…
Associative Responsibilities and Political Obligation
In this paper I criticise an influential version of associative theory of political obligation and I offer a reformulation of the theory in 'quasi-voluntarist' terms. I argue that although unable by itself to solve the problem of political obligation, my quasi-voluntarist associative model can play an important role in solving this problem. Moreover, the model teaches us an important methodological lesson about the way in which we should think ab…
Fairness, self-deception and political obligation
Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights
What makes something a human right? What is the relationship between the moral foundations of human rights and human rights law? What are the difficulties of appealing to human rights? This book offers a survey of current thinking on the philosophical foundations of human rights. Divided into four parts, this book focuses first on the moral grounds of human rights, for example in our dignity, agency, interests or needs. Secondly, it looks at the …
The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights
The introduction introduces the history of the concept of human rights and its philosophical genealogy. It raises questions of the nature of human rights, the grounds of human rights, difference between proposed and actual human rights, and scepticism surrounding the very idea of human rights. In the course of this discussion, it concludes that the diversity of positions on human rights is a sign of the intellectual, cultural, and political ferti…
Human Needs, Human Rights
This chapter presents a response to the last chapter’s account of the relativity and ethnocentricity of human rights. It outlines a naturalistic conception of human rights that is capable of resisting the objection of parochialism. It begins by considering Chapter 31’s attempt to ground human rights in normative agency. It raises two objections against the view presented in the last chapter and argues for its abandonment in favour of a needs-base…
Rights Forfeiture and Liability to Harm
Helping the Rebels
In a pair of recent papers, Allen Buchanan has outlined an ambitious account of the ethics of revolution and its implications for military intervention. Buchanan’s account is bold and yet sophisticated. It is bold in that it advances a number of theses that will no doubt strike the reader as highly controversial; it is sophisticated in that it rests on a nuanced account of how revolutions unfold and the constraints that political self-determinati…
Political Authority and Unjust Wars
Just war theory is currently dominated by two positions. According to the orthodox view (Walzer), provided that jus in bello principles are respected, combatants have an equal right to fight, regardless of the justice of the cause pursued by their state. According to “revisionists” (McMahan, Fabre) whenever combatants lack reasons to believe that the war they are ordered to fight is just, their duty is to disobey. I argue that when members of a l…
Why Colonialism Is Wrong
Historically, colonial domination has involved subjecting innocent populations to atrocities such as murder, torture, and exploitation. But pointing at these wrongs is not enough to explain the distinctive way in which colonialism is wrong. After all, murder, torture and exploitation are wrong whether or not they occur in the context of colonial occupation. If all we can do to explain the nature of colonialism is point at the fact that it typical…
Authority and Legitimacy
Consider two ways in which the existence of political authorities is morally problematic. Do not think only about tyrannical or unjust authorities, for example, states that persecute minorities, unjustly expropriate property or wage unnecessary wars. These authorities are morally problematic in a number of obvious ways that will not be discussed here. Think about good political authorities: the peaceful ones that protect human rights, respect min…
Introduction
This article links to the Symposium on Causation in War by Carolina Sartorio , Helen Beebee and Alex Kaiserman , and Lars Christie
Manipulation and liability to defensive harm
Philosophers working on the morality of harm have paid surprisingly little attention to the problem of manipulation. The aim of this paper is to remedy this lacuna by exploring how liability to defensive harm is affected by the fact that someone posing an unjust threat has been manipulated into doing so. In addressing this problem, the challenge is to answer the following question: Why should it be the case (if it is, indeed, the case) that being…
Fighting Unjust Wars
Legitimate authorities occasionally issue mistaken directives. Do we have a duty to obey such directives? This question is especially pressing in cases in which (1) obeying a mistaken directive would lead us to take part in the perpetration of a serious injustice and (2) the victims of the injustice are not themselves subject to the authority that issued the directive. The clearest case is when a legitimate authority, acting in good faith, orders…
Political science (14 works) · Law (13 works) · Sociology (12 works) · Law and economics (10 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Politics (10 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (10 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (8 works) · Free Will and Agency (4 works)