Francesco Reito
Biographic Data
| ID | 1089039 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Francesco Reito |
| GIVEN NAMES | Francesco |
| FAMILY NAME | Reito |
| SIGNATURE | REITO F |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Catania |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0469-1908 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Bribes and Bureaucracy Size
We present a simple agency model with a revenue‐maximizing government and many public officials (agents) in charge of collecting payments from citizens. Agents are of two types, honest and potentially dishonest, with the latter having an inherent propensity to demand bribes from citizens. This propensity may eventually turn into actual (perceived) corruption depending on the strategy pursued by the government. In equilibrium, we derive a non‐line…
Mafia and bricks
Roscas without sanctions
This article shows that, under the assumption that members share the risk of negative income shocks, rotating savings and credit associations can be sustainable even with simple exponential discounting and without the presence of social norms and sanctioning systems
Cooperative firms in hard times
Joint liability taxation and group auditing
Minimum taxation as a luxury good
Redistribution, Collateral Subsidy and Screening
Under adverse selection, redlining of borrowers may occur when their wealth is not sufficient to reach the collateral needed by creditors to separate types. In this paper, potential entrepreneurs can join in a peer group and voluntarily decide to collect and redistribute their endowments. If the fund is not enough to give everyone the amount of collateral that allows for a separation of types, this paper suggests that the government should interv…
Moral Hazard and Labour‐managed Firms in Italy After the Law N. 142/2001
Instead of focusing on the difference between a labour‐managed (LMF) and a profit maximizing firm (PMF) in terms of final out‐come and occupation, this paper considers the actual possibility for a firm to be financed from outside. A simple case of moral hazard in the credit market is analyzed. A bank, for limited funds, can finance one of two potential firms, a LMF or a PMF, both with similar project size. The Italian case is taken into account: …
Bribes and Bureaucracy Size
We present a simple agency model with a revenue‐maximizing government and many public officials (agents) in charge of collecting payments from citizens. Agents are of two types, honest and potentially dishonest, with the latter having an inherent propensity to demand bribes from citizens. This propensity may eventually turn into actual (perceived) corruption depending on the strategy pursued by the government. In equilibrium, we derive a non‐line…
Roscas without sanctions
This article shows that, under the assumption that members share the risk of negative income shocks, rotating savings and credit associations can be sustainable even with simple exponential discounting and without the presence of social norms and sanctioning systems
Moral Hazard and Labour‐managed Firms in Italy After the Law N. 142/2001
Instead of focusing on the difference between a labour‐managed (LMF) and a profit maximizing firm (PMF) in terms of final out‐come and occupation, this paper considers the actual possibility for a firm to be financed from outside. A simple case of moral hazard in the credit market is analyzed. A bank, for limited funds, can finance one of two potential firms, a LMF or a PMF, both with similar project size. The Italian case is taken into account: …
Redistribution, Collateral Subsidy and Screening
Under adverse selection, redlining of borrowers may occur when their wealth is not sufficient to reach the collateral needed by creditors to separate types. In this paper, potential entrepreneurs can join in a peer group and voluntarily decide to collect and redistribute their endowments. If the fund is not enough to give everyone the amount of collateral that allows for a separation of types, this paper suggests that the government should interv…
Minimum taxation as a luxury good
Joint liability taxation and group auditing
Cooperative firms in hard times
Roscas without sanctions
This article shows that, under the assumption that members share the risk of negative income shocks, rotating savings and credit associations can be sustainable even with simple exponential discounting and without the presence of social norms and sanctioning systems
Mafia and bricks
Bribes and Bureaucracy Size
We present a simple agency model with a revenue‐maximizing government and many public officials (agents) in charge of collecting payments from citizens. Agents are of two types, honest and potentially dishonest, with the latter having an inherent propensity to demand bribes from citizens. This propensity may eventually turn into actual (perceived) corruption depending on the strategy pursued by the government. In equilibrium, we derive a non‐line…
Economics (8 works) · Business (6 works) · Finance (5 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Actuarial science (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Public economics (3 works) · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (2 works)