Mahvish Shami
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1089825 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Mahvish Shami |
| NOMBRES | Mahvish |
| APELLIDO | Shami |
| FIRMA | SHAMI M |
| AFILIACIONES | London School of Economics and Political Science |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6550-5120 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 8 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 39 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 8 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2012 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Unpacking rural-urban clientelist networks
Despite the importance of public goods provisioning for poverty reduction, empirical evidence shows gross under-provision of state resources in developing countries. This results in the establishment of clientelist networks between people of unequal social status. However, clientelism is not homogenous. It varies based on the environment in which it is cultivated. Using household-level data from villages and urban slums in Pakistan, we provide a …
What Do Brokers Provide for Urban Slums
Rapid urbanisation in developing countries has often resulted in slums with minimal public goods provision, where the poor rely on clientelist networks to provide for their basic needs. Using household‐level data, this paper is the first to empirically document how political clientelism operates in Pakistani slums. It finds that urban brokers, unlike their rural counterparts, are unable to claim credit for public goods provision. Instead, they pr…
Targeting the centre and (least) poor
Using the case of Pakistan, this article explores the distribution and politics of public goods provision in urban slums. Across slums, we find that public goods are mainly provided to households located in central slums rather than those in the urban periphery. Within slums, we find politicians target spending towards wealthy households but do not go through brokers, unlike the more-studied case of India. Overall, the article shows how electoral…
The Incoherence of Institutional Reform
Institutional reforms are structural changes in the rules and norms of authority, with effects that are long-term and unpredictable on government, politics, and society. But leaders may undertake them to solve unrelated, discrete, short-term political problems. Understanding the latter is key to understanding the characteristics of many real reforms, and hence their fate. We introduce the concept of instrumental incoherence and use it to construc…
Access to Justice in Clientelist Networks
Despite its importance for poverty reduction, the poor face barriers when accessing justice. However, the literature, looking mostly at developed countries, focuses on the institutional underpinnings of these restrictions, and thus ignores social structural barriers. This paper deals with one type of social barrier; clientelism and its impact on poor clients’ access to justice. I argue that asymmetric power distribution enables patrons to bar cli…
Connectivity, Clientelism and Public Provision
In many developing countries the rural poor often depend on patrons to act as brokers in order to get public provision from the government. The broker facilitates provision in return for securing peasants’ votes for politicians. Yet, low bargaining power of peasants allows patrons to appropriate public resources for themselves. I propose increasing peasants’ bargaining power by connecting them to markets outside their village. Making use of a nat…
The Impact of Connectivity on Market Interlinkages
Collective Action, Clientelism, and Connectivity
Backed by studies finding only limited propensity for free-riding when communities have an interest in self-provision, the last few decades have seen a surge of interest in community-based development. A major caveat to the "second wave" of collective action studies, however, is that collective action often breaks down under hierarchical social relationships. This is unfortunate news for developing countries' rural societies, which are often entr…
Collective Action, Clientelism, and Connectivity
Backed by studies finding only limited propensity for free-riding when communities have an interest in self-provision, the last few decades have seen a surge of interest in community-based development. A major caveat to the "second wave" of collective action studies, however, is that collective action often breaks down under hierarchical social relationships. This is unfortunate news for developing countries' rural societies, which are often entr…
The Impact of Connectivity on Market Interlinkages
The Incoherence of Institutional Reform
Institutional reforms are structural changes in the rules and norms of authority, with effects that are long-term and unpredictable on government, politics, and society. But leaders may undertake them to solve unrelated, discrete, short-term political problems. Understanding the latter is key to understanding the characteristics of many real reforms, and hence their fate. We introduce the concept of instrumental incoherence and use it to construc…
Connectivity, Clientelism and Public Provision
In many developing countries the rural poor often depend on patrons to act as brokers in order to get public provision from the government. The broker facilitates provision in return for securing peasants’ votes for politicians. Yet, low bargaining power of peasants allows patrons to appropriate public resources for themselves. I propose increasing peasants’ bargaining power by connecting them to markets outside their village. Making use of a nat…
Targeting the centre and (least) poor
Using the case of Pakistan, this article explores the distribution and politics of public goods provision in urban slums. Across slums, we find that public goods are mainly provided to households located in central slums rather than those in the urban periphery. Within slums, we find politicians target spending towards wealthy households but do not go through brokers, unlike the more-studied case of India. Overall, the article shows how electoral…
Access to Justice in Clientelist Networks
Despite its importance for poverty reduction, the poor face barriers when accessing justice. However, the literature, looking mostly at developed countries, focuses on the institutional underpinnings of these restrictions, and thus ignores social structural barriers. This paper deals with one type of social barrier; clientelism and its impact on poor clients’ access to justice. I argue that asymmetric power distribution enables patrons to bar cli…
The Impact of Connectivity on Market Interlinkages
Collective Action, Clientelism, and Connectivity
Backed by studies finding only limited propensity for free-riding when communities have an interest in self-provision, the last few decades have seen a surge of interest in community-based development. A major caveat to the "second wave" of collective action studies, however, is that collective action often breaks down under hierarchical social relationships. This is unfortunate news for developing countries' rural societies, which are often entr…
Connectivity, Clientelism and Public Provision
In many developing countries the rural poor often depend on patrons to act as brokers in order to get public provision from the government. The broker facilitates provision in return for securing peasants’ votes for politicians. Yet, low bargaining power of peasants allows patrons to appropriate public resources for themselves. I propose increasing peasants’ bargaining power by connecting them to markets outside their village. Making use of a nat…
The Incoherence of Institutional Reform
Institutional reforms are structural changes in the rules and norms of authority, with effects that are long-term and unpredictable on government, politics, and society. But leaders may undertake them to solve unrelated, discrete, short-term political problems. Understanding the latter is key to understanding the characteristics of many real reforms, and hence their fate. We introduce the concept of instrumental incoherence and use it to construc…
Access to Justice in Clientelist Networks
Despite its importance for poverty reduction, the poor face barriers when accessing justice. However, the literature, looking mostly at developed countries, focuses on the institutional underpinnings of these restrictions, and thus ignores social structural barriers. This paper deals with one type of social barrier; clientelism and its impact on poor clients’ access to justice. I argue that asymmetric power distribution enables patrons to bar cli…
Unpacking rural-urban clientelist networks
Despite the importance of public goods provisioning for poverty reduction, empirical evidence shows gross under-provision of state resources in developing countries. This results in the establishment of clientelist networks between people of unequal social status. However, clientelism is not homogenous. It varies based on the environment in which it is cultivated. Using household-level data from villages and urban slums in Pakistan, we provide a …
What Do Brokers Provide for Urban Slums
Rapid urbanisation in developing countries has often resulted in slums with minimal public goods provision, where the poor rely on clientelist networks to provide for their basic needs. Using household‐level data, this paper is the first to empirically document how political clientelism operates in Pakistani slums. It finds that urban brokers, unlike their rural counterparts, are unable to claim credit for public goods provision. Instead, they pr…
Targeting the centre and (least) poor
Using the case of Pakistan, this article explores the distribution and politics of public goods provision in urban slums. Across slums, we find that public goods are mainly provided to households located in central slums rather than those in the urban periphery. Within slums, we find politicians target spending towards wealthy households but do not go through brokers, unlike the more-studied case of India. Overall, the article shows how electoral…
Economics (7 obras) · Political science (7 obras) · Politics (7 obras) · Business (5 obras) · Clientelism (5 obras) · Economic growth (4 obras) · Sociology (4 obras) · Democracy (3 obras) · Law (3 obras) · Market economy (3 obras)