Michael Strevens
Biographic Data
| ID | 1090594 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael Strevens |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael |
| FAMILY NAME | Strevens |
| SIGNATURE | STREVENS M |
| AFFILIATIONS | New York University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7558-5301 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 22 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 117 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 22 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1995 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Grasp as a universal requirement for understanding
Grasp and scientific understanding
Dynamic probability and the problem of initial conditions
Permissible idealizations for the purpose of prediction
Philosophy Unbound
The structure of asymptotic idealization
Explanation, Abstraction, and Difference‐Making
Thinking Off Your Feet
In an original defense of armchair philosophy, Michael Strevens seeks to restore philosophy to its traditional position as an essential part of the quest for knowledge, by reshaping debates about the nature of philosophical thinking. His approach explores experimental philosophy's methodological implications and the cognitive science of concepts
No understanding without explanation
Replies to Weatherson, Hall, and Lange
Précis of Depth
Depth
C. S. Bertuglia and F. Vaio Nonlinearity, Chaos, and Complexity
The role of the Matthew effect in science
How Are the Sciences of Complex Systems Possible
To understand the behavior of a complex system, one must understand the interactions among its parts. Doing so is difficult for nondecomposable systems, in which the interactions strongly influence the short term behavior of the parts. Science's principal tool for dealing with nondecomposable systems is a variety of probabilistic analysis that I call EPA. I show that EPA's power derives from an assumption that appears to be false of nondecomposab…
The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses
Fitelson and Waterman's ([2005]) principal objection to Strevens's ([2001]) Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses rests on a misinterpretation of Strevens's central claim about the negligibility of certain small probabilities. The present paper clarifies and proves a very general version of the claim. 1. The project 2. Clarifications 3. The negligibility argument 4. Generalization and proof
Bayesian Confirmation Theory
The Role of the Priority Rule in Science
Science’s priority rule rewards those who are first to make a discovery, at the expense of all other scientists working towards the same goal, no matter how close they may be to making the same discovery. I propose an explanation of the priority rule that, better than previous explanations, accounts for the distinctive features of the rule. My explanation treats the priority system, and more generally, any scheme of rewards for scientific endeavo…
The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses
This paper examines the standard Bayesian solution to the Quine–Duhem problem, the problem of distributing blame between a theory and its auxiliary hypotheses in the aftermath of a failed prediction. The standard solution, I argue, begs the question against those who claim that the problem has no solution. I then provide an alternative Bayesian solution that is not question‐begging and that turns out to have some interesting and desirable propert…
Do Large Probabilities Explain Better
It is widely thought that the size of a probability makes no difference to the quality of a probabilistic explanation. I argue that explanatory practice in statistical physics, past and present, belies this claim. The claim has gained currency only because of an impoverished conception of the nature of probabilistic processes and an unwarranted assumption that all probabilistic explanations have a single form
Quantum Mechanics and Frequentism
A Closer Look at the ‘New’ Principle
David Lewis, Michael Thau, and Ned Hall have recently argued that the Principal Principle—an inferential rule underlying much of our reasoning about probability—is inadequate in certain respects, and that something called the ‘New Principle’ ought to take its place. This paper argues that the Principle Principal need not be discarded. On the contrary, Lewis et al. can get everything they need—including the New Principle—from the intuitions and in…
No understanding without explanation
Do Large Probabilities Explain Better
It is widely thought that the size of a probability makes no difference to the quality of a probabilistic explanation. I argue that explanatory practice in statistical physics, past and present, belies this claim. The claim has gained currency only because of an impoverished conception of the nature of probabilistic processes and an unwarranted assumption that all probabilistic explanations have a single form
The role of the Matthew effect in science
The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses
This paper examines the standard Bayesian solution to the Quine–Duhem problem, the problem of distributing blame between a theory and its auxiliary hypotheses in the aftermath of a failed prediction. The standard solution, I argue, begs the question against those who claim that the problem has no solution. I then provide an alternative Bayesian solution that is not question‐begging and that turns out to have some interesting and desirable propert…
The structure of asymptotic idealization
How Are the Sciences of Complex Systems Possible
To understand the behavior of a complex system, one must understand the interactions among its parts. Doing so is difficult for nondecomposable systems, in which the interactions strongly influence the short term behavior of the parts. Science's principal tool for dealing with nondecomposable systems is a variety of probabilistic analysis that I call EPA. I show that EPA's power derives from an assumption that appears to be false of nondecomposab…
The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses
Fitelson and Waterman's ([2005]) principal objection to Strevens's ([2001]) Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses rests on a misinterpretation of Strevens's central claim about the negligibility of certain small probabilities. The present paper clarifies and proves a very general version of the claim. 1. The project 2. Clarifications 3. The negligibility argument 4. Generalization and proof
Permissible idealizations for the purpose of prediction
Précis of Depth
Bayesian Confirmation Theory
A Closer Look at the ‘New’ Principle
David Lewis, Michael Thau, and Ned Hall have recently argued that the Principal Principle—an inferential rule underlying much of our reasoning about probability—is inadequate in certain respects, and that something called the ‘New Principle’ ought to take its place. This paper argues that the Principle Principal need not be discarded. On the contrary, Lewis et al. can get everything they need—including the New Principle—from the intuitions and in…
Dynamic probability and the problem of initial conditions
Explanation, Abstraction, and Difference‐Making
Replies to Weatherson, Hall, and Lange
A Closer Look at the ‘New’ Principle
David Lewis, Michael Thau, and Ned Hall have recently argued that the Principal Principle—an inferential rule underlying much of our reasoning about probability—is inadequate in certain respects, and that something called the ‘New Principle’ ought to take its place. This paper argues that the Principle Principal need not be discarded. On the contrary, Lewis et al. can get everything they need—including the New Principle—from the intuitions and in…
Quantum Mechanics and Frequentism
Do Large Probabilities Explain Better
It is widely thought that the size of a probability makes no difference to the quality of a probabilistic explanation. I argue that explanatory practice in statistical physics, past and present, belies this claim. The claim has gained currency only because of an impoverished conception of the nature of probabilistic processes and an unwarranted assumption that all probabilistic explanations have a single form
The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses
This paper examines the standard Bayesian solution to the Quine–Duhem problem, the problem of distributing blame between a theory and its auxiliary hypotheses in the aftermath of a failed prediction. The standard solution, I argue, begs the question against those who claim that the problem has no solution. I then provide an alternative Bayesian solution that is not question‐begging and that turns out to have some interesting and desirable propert…
The Role of the Priority Rule in Science
Science’s priority rule rewards those who are first to make a discovery, at the expense of all other scientists working towards the same goal, no matter how close they may be to making the same discovery. I propose an explanation of the priority rule that, better than previous explanations, accounts for the distinctive features of the rule. My explanation treats the priority system, and more generally, any scheme of rewards for scientific endeavo…
Bayesian Confirmation Theory
How Are the Sciences of Complex Systems Possible
To understand the behavior of a complex system, one must understand the interactions among its parts. Doing so is difficult for nondecomposable systems, in which the interactions strongly influence the short term behavior of the parts. Science's principal tool for dealing with nondecomposable systems is a variety of probabilistic analysis that I call EPA. I show that EPA's power derives from an assumption that appears to be false of nondecomposab…
The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses
Fitelson and Waterman's ([2005]) principal objection to Strevens's ([2001]) Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses rests on a misinterpretation of Strevens's central claim about the negligibility of certain small probabilities. The present paper clarifies and proves a very general version of the claim. 1. The project 2. Clarifications 3. The negligibility argument 4. Generalization and proof
The role of the Matthew effect in science
C. S. Bertuglia and F. Vaio Nonlinearity, Chaos, and Complexity
Depth
Replies to Weatherson, Hall, and Lange
Précis of Depth
No understanding without explanation
Philosophy Unbound
The structure of asymptotic idealization
Explanation, Abstraction, and Difference‐Making
Thinking Off Your Feet
In an original defense of armchair philosophy, Michael Strevens seeks to restore philosophy to its traditional position as an essential part of the quest for knowledge, by reshaping debates about the nature of philosophical thinking. His approach explores experimental philosophy's methodological implications and the cognitive science of concepts
Dynamic probability and the problem of initial conditions
Permissible idealizations for the purpose of prediction
Grasp and scientific understanding
Grasp as a universal requirement for understanding
Computer Science (18 works) · Epistemology (18 works) · Philosophy (18 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (15 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Mathematics (7 works) · Metaphysics (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Mathematical economics (6 works) · Psychology (6 works)