Andrew T Little
Biographic Data
| ID | 1091210 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrew T Little |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrew T |
| FAMILY NAME | Little |
| SIGNATURE | LITTLE A T |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Berkeley |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9911-4291 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 26 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 379 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 26 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 12 |
Communication, coordination, and surveillance in the shadow of repression
Communication technology helps protesters organize, but also allows the government to monitor and repress their actions. We study this trade‐off in a model where protesters want to show up at the same time and place, but also want to avoid government forces. If leaders of a movement can send messages observed only by other protesters, they can successfully coordinate on a variety of sites and force the government to spread resources thin, helping…
Social segregation, inter-group contact, and discriminatory policing
We analyze a formal model of social contact and discrimination in the context of policing. Officers decide how to interact with members of two social groups while working and while socializing. The officers do not fully distinguish between their experiences of crime across these two contexts (“coarse thinking”), so they end up with excessively positive views of groups they socialize with and excessively negative views of those they police. This c…
How to Distinguish Motivated Reasoning from Bayesian Updating
Can we use the way that people respond to information as evidence that partisan bias or directional motives influence political beliefs? It depends. Using one natural formalization of motivated reasoning as wanting to believe certain things (“once-motivated reasoning”), this is not possible. Anyone exhibiting this kind of motivated reasoning has a “Fully Bayesian Equivalent” with a different prior, who has identical posterior beliefs upon observi…
Selection Neglect and Political Beliefs
Individuals, including researchers, often have to form beliefs about the political world from nonrepresentative samples—e.g., their friends, what they see on TV, or content on social media. Substantial evidence indicates that many struggle to account for this selection problem and generally form beliefs as if what they observe is representative. In this review, we provide a formal typology of how this phenomenon of selection neglect affects polit…
Guilt and Guilty Pleas
Plea bargaining figures heavily in criminal justice systems in the United States and, increasingly, around the globe. Conventional wisdom holds that plea bargaining generates efficiency gains for all parties, while sorting the guilty from the innocent. We build a series of formal models to consider the relationship between a defendant’s guilt and her likelihood of pleading guilty. In an inversion of the conventional wisdom, we show that under a r…
Stronger Challengers can Cause More (or Less) Conflict and Institutional Reform
Prominent theories propose that commitment problems drive phenomena such as war and democratization. However, existing work disagrees about a basic question: how does a challenger’s coercive strength affect prospects for conflict and/or institutional reform? We establish that the relationship depends on how challenger strength affects the average and maximum probability of winning a conflict in a given period (“threat”). We analyze a formal model…
Measuring Democratic Backsliding
Despite the general narrative that the world is in a period of democratic decline, there have been surprisingly few empirical studies that assess whether this is systematically true. Most existing studies of global backsliding are based largely if not entirely on subjective indicators that rely on expert coder judgment. Our study surveys objective indicators of democracy (e.g., incumbent performance in elections) and finds little evidence of glob…
What We Do and Do Not Know about Democratic Backsliding
We are humbled by the quantity and quality of the commentaries on our article in this special issue. Our goal was not to answer definitively how global democracy has changed in recent years but rather to provoke a debate about how we collectively can improve the scholarship on this question. The range of viewpoints raised in this special issue have made important advances on this goal
A Behavioural Theory of Discrimination in Policing
A large economic literature studies whether racial disparities in policing are explained by animus or by beliefs about group crime rates. But what if these beliefs are incorrect? We analyse a model where officers form beliefs using crime statistics, but do not properly account for the fact that they will detect more crime in more heavily policed communities. This creates a feedback loop where officers over-police groups that they (incorrectly) be…
Bayesian explanations for persuasion
The central puzzle of persuasion is why a receiver would listen to a sender who they know is trying to change their beliefs or behavior. This article summarizes five approaches to solving this puzzle: (1) some messages are easier to send for those with favorable information ( costly signaling), (2) the sender and receiver have common interest, (3) the sender messages are verifiable information, (4) the sender cares about their reputation for comp…
Kompromat Can Align Incentives but Ruin Reputations
Political leaders face many agency problems, such as managing subordinates who may not honestly report information. One potential solution to these problems is kompromat: the threat to release compromising information. Using a cheap talk model, we demonstrate how kompromat can improve communication, making both principal and agent better off. However, using kompromat to solve an agency problem generates two costs. First, its mere existence means …
Motivated Reasoning and Democratic Accountability
Does motivated reasoning harm democratic accountability? Substantial evidence from political behavior research indicates that voters have "directional motives" beyond accuracy, which is often taken as evidence that they are ill equipped to hold politicians accountable. We develop a model of electoral accountability with voters as motivated reasoners. Directional motives have two effects: (1) divergence-voters with different preferences hold diffe…
Learning from Biased Research Designs
Most contemporary empirical work in political science aims to learn about causal effects from research designs that may be subject to bias. We provide a Bayesian framework for understanding how researchers should approach the general problem of inferring causal effects from potentially biased research designs. Our core contention is that any sincere claim that a research design contains bias entails a belief about what that bias is. Once this bel…
I Don't Know
Political decision makers make choices in a complex and uncertain world, where even the most qualified experts may not know what policies will succeed. Worse, if these experts care about their reputation for competence, they may be averse to admitting what they don't know. We model the strategic communication of uncertainty, allowing for the salient reality that sometimes the effects of proposed policies are impossible to know. Our model highligh…
The Distortion of Related Beliefs
When forming beliefs about themselves, politics, and how the world works more generally, people often face a tension between conclusions they inherently wish to reach and those which are plausible. And the likelihood of beliefs about one variable (e.g., the performance of a favored politician) depends on beliefs about other, related variables (e.g., the quality and bias of newspapers reporting on the politician). I propose a formal approach to co…
Political Corruption Traps
Academics and policymakers recognize that there are serious costs associated with systemic corruption. Stubbornly, many countries or regions remain stuck in a high-corruption equilibrium—a “corruption trap.” Most existing theories concentrate on mutually reinforcing expectations of corrupt behavior among a fixed set of bureaucrats or politicians, implying that changing such expectations can lead to lower corruption. We develop models that more fu…
Propaganda and credulity
Are non-competitive elections good for citizens
Many regimes, particularly autocracies, hold elections where the ruling regime’s victory is a foregone conclusion. This paper provides a formal analysis of how these non-competitive elections affect citizen welfare compared to a non-electoral baseline. To do so, I first develop a game-theoretic framework that captures many extant theories of why regimes hold non-competitive elections, which are modeled solely as a public signal of the regime’s st…
Coordination, Learning, and Coups
This article proposes a theory of coups that centers around coordination and learning. The military is modeled as many officers who only want to join a coup if others join as well (i.e., coordination). If the current regime has survived past coup attempts, it is common knowledge that it is relatively strong (i.e., learning). Combining these effects, once the regime survives the first period, officers know that the regime is strong enough that the…
A Bargaining Theory of Conflict with Evolutionary Preferences
Bargaining models play a central role in international relations, particularly in the study of conflict. A common criticism of this approach is that it fails to account for nonmaterial (e.g., psychological) factors that may influence the bargaining process. We augment a standard bargaining model by allowing actors’ preferences over conflict to diverge from the “fitness” payoffs (e.g., resources) typical of such models. Preferences are subject to …
The Political Violence Cycle
Elections are often violent affairs, casting doubt on the canonical claim that democracy makes societies more peaceful by creating nonviolent means to contest for power. We develop a formal argument to demonstrate that this conclusion is incorrect. Holding elections has a direct effect of increasing levels of violence close to the voting, as this is when electoral violence can influence political outcomes. Precisely for this reason, elections als…
Simple and Formal Models in Comparative Politics
Communication Technology and Protest
Recent antiregime protests throughout the world have been publicized, and arguably facilitated, by social media and other communication technologies. I develop formal models that examine the implications of communication technology generating information about two distinct factors: (1) the level of dissatisfaction with the regime and (2) logistical information about when, where, and how potential protests will occur. Making grievances against the…
Elections, Protest, and Alternation of Power
Canonical theories of elections assume that rules determining the winner will be followed, which necessitates separate models for democratic and nondemocratic elections. To overcome this bifurcation in the literature, we develop a model where compliance is determined endogenously. Rather than serve as a binding contract, elections are modeled solely as a public signal of the regime’s popularity. However, citizens can protest against leaders who b…
Fraud and Monitoring in Non-competitive Elections
This article develops a game-theoretic model that reconciles three facts: (1) fraud is pervasive in non-competitive elections, (2) domestic and international monitoring of elections have become nearly universal and (3) incumbent regimes often invite monitoring and still cheat. The incumbent regime commits fraud to manipulate the information generated by a non-competitive election before a political interaction with someaudience. The audience expe…
Communication Technology and Protest
Recent antiregime protests throughout the world have been publicized, and arguably facilitated, by social media and other communication technologies. I develop formal models that examine the implications of communication technology generating information about two distinct factors: (1) the level of dissatisfaction with the regime and (2) logistical information about when, where, and how potential protests will occur. Making grievances against the…
Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution
Elections are modeled as a public signal in an incomplete information game of revolution. By changing beliefs about the general level of antiregime sentiment, elections can make citizens more or less apt to rebel and hence make a successful revolution more or less likely. This effect makes elections valuable to incumbents that are not secure in office as they have more to gain by good results than they have to lose from bad results. Electoral fra…
The Political Violence Cycle
Elections are often violent affairs, casting doubt on the canonical claim that democracy makes societies more peaceful by creating nonviolent means to contest for power. We develop a formal argument to demonstrate that this conclusion is incorrect. Holding elections has a direct effect of increasing levels of violence close to the voting, as this is when electoral violence can influence political outcomes. Precisely for this reason, elections als…
Elections, Protest, and Alternation of Power
Canonical theories of elections assume that rules determining the winner will be followed, which necessitates separate models for democratic and nondemocratic elections. To overcome this bifurcation in the literature, we develop a model where compliance is determined endogenously. Rather than serve as a binding contract, elections are modeled solely as a public signal of the regime’s popularity. However, citizens can protest against leaders who b…
Coordination, Learning, and Coups
This article proposes a theory of coups that centers around coordination and learning. The military is modeled as many officers who only want to join a coup if others join as well (i.e., coordination). If the current regime has survived past coup attempts, it is common knowledge that it is relatively strong (i.e., learning). Combining these effects, once the regime survives the first period, officers know that the regime is strong enough that the…
Measuring Democratic Backsliding
Despite the general narrative that the world is in a period of democratic decline, there have been surprisingly few empirical studies that assess whether this is systematically true. Most existing studies of global backsliding are based largely if not entirely on subjective indicators that rely on expert coder judgment. Our study surveys objective indicators of democracy (e.g., incumbent performance in elections) and finds little evidence of glob…
The Distortion of Related Beliefs
When forming beliefs about themselves, politics, and how the world works more generally, people often face a tension between conclusions they inherently wish to reach and those which are plausible. And the likelihood of beliefs about one variable (e.g., the performance of a favored politician) depends on beliefs about other, related variables (e.g., the quality and bias of newspapers reporting on the politician). I propose a formal approach to co…
Fraud and Monitoring in Non-competitive Elections
This article develops a game-theoretic model that reconciles three facts: (1) fraud is pervasive in non-competitive elections, (2) domestic and international monitoring of elections have become nearly universal and (3) incumbent regimes often invite monitoring and still cheat. The incumbent regime commits fraud to manipulate the information generated by a non-competitive election before a political interaction with someaudience. The audience expe…
Motivated Reasoning and Democratic Accountability
Does motivated reasoning harm democratic accountability? Substantial evidence from political behavior research indicates that voters have "directional motives" beyond accuracy, which is often taken as evidence that they are ill equipped to hold politicians accountable. We develop a model of electoral accountability with voters as motivated reasoners. Directional motives have two effects: (1) divergence-voters with different preferences hold diffe…
Are non-competitive elections good for citizens
Many regimes, particularly autocracies, hold elections where the ruling regime’s victory is a foregone conclusion. This paper provides a formal analysis of how these non-competitive elections affect citizen welfare compared to a non-electoral baseline. To do so, I first develop a game-theoretic framework that captures many extant theories of why regimes hold non-competitive elections, which are modeled solely as a public signal of the regime’s st…
A Bargaining Theory of Conflict with Evolutionary Preferences
Bargaining models play a central role in international relations, particularly in the study of conflict. A common criticism of this approach is that it fails to account for nonmaterial (e.g., psychological) factors that may influence the bargaining process. We augment a standard bargaining model by allowing actors’ preferences over conflict to diverge from the “fitness” payoffs (e.g., resources) typical of such models. Preferences are subject to …
Political Corruption Traps
Academics and policymakers recognize that there are serious costs associated with systemic corruption. Stubbornly, many countries or regions remain stuck in a high-corruption equilibrium—a “corruption trap.” Most existing theories concentrate on mutually reinforcing expectations of corrupt behavior among a fixed set of bureaucrats or politicians, implying that changing such expectations can lead to lower corruption. We develop models that more fu…
Stronger Challengers can Cause More (or Less) Conflict and Institutional Reform
Prominent theories propose that commitment problems drive phenomena such as war and democratization. However, existing work disagrees about a basic question: how does a challenger’s coercive strength affect prospects for conflict and/or institutional reform? We establish that the relationship depends on how challenger strength affects the average and maximum probability of winning a conflict in a given period (“threat”). We analyze a formal model…
Learning from Biased Research Designs
Most contemporary empirical work in political science aims to learn about causal effects from research designs that may be subject to bias. We provide a Bayesian framework for understanding how researchers should approach the general problem of inferring causal effects from potentially biased research designs. Our core contention is that any sincere claim that a research design contains bias entails a belief about what that bias is. Once this bel…
How to Distinguish Motivated Reasoning from Bayesian Updating
Can we use the way that people respond to information as evidence that partisan bias or directional motives influence political beliefs? It depends. Using one natural formalization of motivated reasoning as wanting to believe certain things (“once-motivated reasoning”), this is not possible. Anyone exhibiting this kind of motivated reasoning has a “Fully Bayesian Equivalent” with a different prior, who has identical posterior beliefs upon observi…
What We Do and Do Not Know about Democratic Backsliding
We are humbled by the quantity and quality of the commentaries on our article in this special issue. Our goal was not to answer definitively how global democracy has changed in recent years but rather to provoke a debate about how we collectively can improve the scholarship on this question. The range of viewpoints raised in this special issue have made important advances on this goal
Kompromat Can Align Incentives but Ruin Reputations
Political leaders face many agency problems, such as managing subordinates who may not honestly report information. One potential solution to these problems is kompromat: the threat to release compromising information. Using a cheap talk model, we demonstrate how kompromat can improve communication, making both principal and agent better off. However, using kompromat to solve an agency problem generates two costs. First, its mere existence means …
A Behavioural Theory of Discrimination in Policing
A large economic literature studies whether racial disparities in policing are explained by animus or by beliefs about group crime rates. But what if these beliefs are incorrect? We analyse a model where officers form beliefs using crime statistics, but do not properly account for the fact that they will detect more crime in more heavily policed communities. This creates a feedback loop where officers over-police groups that they (incorrectly) be…
Bayesian explanations for persuasion
The central puzzle of persuasion is why a receiver would listen to a sender who they know is trying to change their beliefs or behavior. This article summarizes five approaches to solving this puzzle: (1) some messages are easier to send for those with favorable information ( costly signaling), (2) the sender and receiver have common interest, (3) the sender messages are verifiable information, (4) the sender cares about their reputation for comp…
I Don't Know
Political decision makers make choices in a complex and uncertain world, where even the most qualified experts may not know what policies will succeed. Worse, if these experts care about their reputation for competence, they may be averse to admitting what they don't know. We model the strategic communication of uncertainty, allowing for the salient reality that sometimes the effects of proposed policies are impossible to know. Our model highligh…
Simple and Formal Models in Comparative Politics
Communication, coordination, and surveillance in the shadow of repression
Communication technology helps protesters organize, but also allows the government to monitor and repress their actions. We study this trade‐off in a model where protesters want to show up at the same time and place, but also want to avoid government forces. If leaders of a movement can send messages observed only by other protesters, they can successfully coordinate on a variety of sites and force the government to spread resources thin, helping…
Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution
Elections are modeled as a public signal in an incomplete information game of revolution. By changing beliefs about the general level of antiregime sentiment, elections can make citizens more or less apt to rebel and hence make a successful revolution more or less likely. This effect makes elections valuable to incumbents that are not secure in office as they have more to gain by good results than they have to lose from bad results. Electoral fra…
Elections, Protest, and Alternation of Power
Canonical theories of elections assume that rules determining the winner will be followed, which necessitates separate models for democratic and nondemocratic elections. To overcome this bifurcation in the literature, we develop a model where compliance is determined endogenously. Rather than serve as a binding contract, elections are modeled solely as a public signal of the regime’s popularity. However, citizens can protest against leaders who b…
Fraud and Monitoring in Non-competitive Elections
This article develops a game-theoretic model that reconciles three facts: (1) fraud is pervasive in non-competitive elections, (2) domestic and international monitoring of elections have become nearly universal and (3) incumbent regimes often invite monitoring and still cheat. The incumbent regime commits fraud to manipulate the information generated by a non-competitive election before a political interaction with someaudience. The audience expe…
Simple and Formal Models in Comparative Politics
Communication Technology and Protest
Recent antiregime protests throughout the world have been publicized, and arguably facilitated, by social media and other communication technologies. I develop formal models that examine the implications of communication technology generating information about two distinct factors: (1) the level of dissatisfaction with the regime and (2) logistical information about when, where, and how potential protests will occur. Making grievances against the…
Propaganda and credulity
Are non-competitive elections good for citizens
Many regimes, particularly autocracies, hold elections where the ruling regime’s victory is a foregone conclusion. This paper provides a formal analysis of how these non-competitive elections affect citizen welfare compared to a non-electoral baseline. To do so, I first develop a game-theoretic framework that captures many extant theories of why regimes hold non-competitive elections, which are modeled solely as a public signal of the regime’s st…
Coordination, Learning, and Coups
This article proposes a theory of coups that centers around coordination and learning. The military is modeled as many officers who only want to join a coup if others join as well (i.e., coordination). If the current regime has survived past coup attempts, it is common knowledge that it is relatively strong (i.e., learning). Combining these effects, once the regime survives the first period, officers know that the regime is strong enough that the…
A Bargaining Theory of Conflict with Evolutionary Preferences
Bargaining models play a central role in international relations, particularly in the study of conflict. A common criticism of this approach is that it fails to account for nonmaterial (e.g., psychological) factors that may influence the bargaining process. We augment a standard bargaining model by allowing actors’ preferences over conflict to diverge from the “fitness” payoffs (e.g., resources) typical of such models. Preferences are subject to …
The Political Violence Cycle
Elections are often violent affairs, casting doubt on the canonical claim that democracy makes societies more peaceful by creating nonviolent means to contest for power. We develop a formal argument to demonstrate that this conclusion is incorrect. Holding elections has a direct effect of increasing levels of violence close to the voting, as this is when electoral violence can influence political outcomes. Precisely for this reason, elections als…
Political Corruption Traps
Academics and policymakers recognize that there are serious costs associated with systemic corruption. Stubbornly, many countries or regions remain stuck in a high-corruption equilibrium—a “corruption trap.” Most existing theories concentrate on mutually reinforcing expectations of corrupt behavior among a fixed set of bureaucrats or politicians, implying that changing such expectations can lead to lower corruption. We develop models that more fu…
The Distortion of Related Beliefs
When forming beliefs about themselves, politics, and how the world works more generally, people often face a tension between conclusions they inherently wish to reach and those which are plausible. And the likelihood of beliefs about one variable (e.g., the performance of a favored politician) depends on beliefs about other, related variables (e.g., the quality and bias of newspapers reporting on the politician). I propose a formal approach to co…
I Don't Know
Political decision makers make choices in a complex and uncertain world, where even the most qualified experts may not know what policies will succeed. Worse, if these experts care about their reputation for competence, they may be averse to admitting what they don't know. We model the strategic communication of uncertainty, allowing for the salient reality that sometimes the effects of proposed policies are impossible to know. Our model highligh…
Learning from Biased Research Designs
Most contemporary empirical work in political science aims to learn about causal effects from research designs that may be subject to bias. We provide a Bayesian framework for understanding how researchers should approach the general problem of inferring causal effects from potentially biased research designs. Our core contention is that any sincere claim that a research design contains bias entails a belief about what that bias is. Once this bel…
Kompromat Can Align Incentives but Ruin Reputations
Political leaders face many agency problems, such as managing subordinates who may not honestly report information. One potential solution to these problems is kompromat: the threat to release compromising information. Using a cheap talk model, we demonstrate how kompromat can improve communication, making both principal and agent better off. However, using kompromat to solve an agency problem generates two costs. First, its mere existence means …
Motivated Reasoning and Democratic Accountability
Does motivated reasoning harm democratic accountability? Substantial evidence from political behavior research indicates that voters have "directional motives" beyond accuracy, which is often taken as evidence that they are ill equipped to hold politicians accountable. We develop a model of electoral accountability with voters as motivated reasoners. Directional motives have two effects: (1) divergence-voters with different preferences hold diffe…
A Behavioural Theory of Discrimination in Policing
A large economic literature studies whether racial disparities in policing are explained by animus or by beliefs about group crime rates. But what if these beliefs are incorrect? We analyse a model where officers form beliefs using crime statistics, but do not properly account for the fact that they will detect more crime in more heavily policed communities. This creates a feedback loop where officers over-police groups that they (incorrectly) be…
Bayesian explanations for persuasion
The central puzzle of persuasion is why a receiver would listen to a sender who they know is trying to change their beliefs or behavior. This article summarizes five approaches to solving this puzzle: (1) some messages are easier to send for those with favorable information ( costly signaling), (2) the sender and receiver have common interest, (3) the sender messages are verifiable information, (4) the sender cares about their reputation for comp…
Selection Neglect and Political Beliefs
Individuals, including researchers, often have to form beliefs about the political world from nonrepresentative samples—e.g., their friends, what they see on TV, or content on social media. Substantial evidence indicates that many struggle to account for this selection problem and generally form beliefs as if what they observe is representative. In this review, we provide a formal typology of how this phenomenon of selection neglect affects polit…
Guilt and Guilty Pleas
Plea bargaining figures heavily in criminal justice systems in the United States and, increasingly, around the globe. Conventional wisdom holds that plea bargaining generates efficiency gains for all parties, while sorting the guilty from the innocent. We build a series of formal models to consider the relationship between a defendant’s guilt and her likelihood of pleading guilty. In an inversion of the conventional wisdom, we show that under a r…
Stronger Challengers can Cause More (or Less) Conflict and Institutional Reform
Prominent theories propose that commitment problems drive phenomena such as war and democratization. However, existing work disagrees about a basic question: how does a challenger’s coercive strength affect prospects for conflict and/or institutional reform? We establish that the relationship depends on how challenger strength affects the average and maximum probability of winning a conflict in a given period (“threat”). We analyze a formal model…
Measuring Democratic Backsliding
Despite the general narrative that the world is in a period of democratic decline, there have been surprisingly few empirical studies that assess whether this is systematically true. Most existing studies of global backsliding are based largely if not entirely on subjective indicators that rely on expert coder judgment. Our study surveys objective indicators of democracy (e.g., incumbent performance in elections) and finds little evidence of glob…
What We Do and Do Not Know about Democratic Backsliding
We are humbled by the quantity and quality of the commentaries on our article in this special issue. Our goal was not to answer definitively how global democracy has changed in recent years but rather to provoke a debate about how we collectively can improve the scholarship on this question. The range of viewpoints raised in this special issue have made important advances on this goal
Communication, coordination, and surveillance in the shadow of repression
Communication technology helps protesters organize, but also allows the government to monitor and repress their actions. We study this trade‐off in a model where protesters want to show up at the same time and place, but also want to avoid government forces. If leaders of a movement can send messages observed only by other protesters, they can successfully coordinate on a variety of sites and force the government to spread resources thin, helping…
Social segregation, inter-group contact, and discriminatory policing
We analyze a formal model of social contact and discrimination in the context of policing. Officers decide how to interact with members of two social groups while working and while socializing. The officers do not fully distinguish between their experiences of crime across these two contexts (“coarse thinking”), so they end up with excessively positive views of groups they socialize with and excessively negative views of those they police. This c…
Political science (24 works) · Law (18 works) · Economics (17 works) · Law (15 works) · Psychology (15 works) · Politics (14 works) · Sociology (13 works) · Media Influence and Politics (11 works) · Computer Science (10 works) · Social Psychology (9 works)