Melinda Bonnie Fagan
Biographic Data
| ID | 1092152 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Melinda Bonnie Fagan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Melinda Bonnie |
| FAMILY NAME | Fagan |
| SIGNATURE | FAGAN M B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Rice University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 43 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Immunology and Population Health
Immunology is a notoriously complex field with distinct concepts and terminology. Yet immunologists regularly and effectively collaborate with other researchers, notably clinicians and experts in population health. How does such “collaboration without convergence” work? This paper offers an answer. Immunology exhibits three features that support collaboration in the absence of major consensus on theories, methods, or concepts. These are a multifa…
Epigenetic lacunae
Stem cells and systems models
Generative models
Interventionist Omissions
It is widely assumed that mechanistic explanations are causal explanations. Many prominent new mechanists endorse interventionism as the correct analysis of explanatory causal models in biology and other fields. This article argues that interventionism is not entirely satisfactory in this regard. A case study of Jacob and Monod’s operon model shows that at least some important mechanistic explanations in biology present significant contrasts with…
Collaborative explanation and biological mechanisms
The Stem Cell Uncertainty Principle
Stem cells are defined as having capacities for both self-renewal and differentiation. Many different entities satisfy this working definition. I show that this general stem cell concept is relative to a cell lineage, temporal duration, and characters of interest. Experiments specify values for these variables. So claims about stem cells must be understood in terms of experimental methods used to identify them. Furthermore, the stem cell concept …
The Joint Account of Mechanistic Explanation
Many explanations in molecular biology, neuroscience, and other fields of experimental biology describe mechanisms underlying phenomena of interest. These mechanistic explanations (MEx) account for higher-level phenomena in terms of causally active parts and their spatiotemporal organization. What makes such a mechanistic description explanatory? The best-developed answer, Craver's causal-mechanical account, has several weaknesses. It does not fu…
Collective Scientific Knowledge
Philosophical debates about collective scientific knowledge concern two distinct theses: (1) groups are necessary to produce scientific knowledge, and (2) groups have scientific knowledge in their own right. Thesis (1) has strong support. Groups are required, in many cases of scientific inquiry, to satisfy methodological norms, to develop theoretical concepts, or to validate the results of inquiry as scientific knowledge. So scientific knowledge-…
Is There Collective Scientific Knowledge? Arguments From Explanation
Journal Article Is there Collective Scientific Knowledge? Arguments from Explanation Get access Melinda Bonnie Fagan Melinda Bonnie Fagan Rice University, Houston, Texas Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 61, Issue 243, April 2011, Pages 247–269, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.676.x Published: 14 July 2010
Social Construction Revisited
Philosophy of scientific practice aims to critically evaluate as well as describe scientific inquiry. Epistemic norms are required for such evaluation. Social constructivism is widely thought to oppose this critical project. I argue, however, that one variety of social constructivism, focused on epistemic justification, can be a basis for critical epistemology of scientific practice, while normative accounts that reject this variety of social con…
Fleck and the social constitution of scientific objectivity
The search for the hematopoietic stem cell
The Joint Account of Mechanistic Explanation
Many explanations in molecular biology, neuroscience, and other fields of experimental biology describe mechanisms underlying phenomena of interest. These mechanistic explanations (MEx) account for higher-level phenomena in terms of causally active parts and their spatiotemporal organization. What makes such a mechanistic description explanatory? The best-developed answer, Craver's causal-mechanical account, has several weaknesses. It does not fu…
Generative models
Is There Collective Scientific Knowledge? Arguments From Explanation
Journal Article Is there Collective Scientific Knowledge? Arguments from Explanation Get access Melinda Bonnie Fagan Melinda Bonnie Fagan Rice University, Houston, Texas Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 61, Issue 243, April 2011, Pages 247–269, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.676.x Published: 14 July 2010
Collaborative explanation and biological mechanisms
Stem cells and systems models
Collective Scientific Knowledge
Philosophical debates about collective scientific knowledge concern two distinct theses: (1) groups are necessary to produce scientific knowledge, and (2) groups have scientific knowledge in their own right. Thesis (1) has strong support. Groups are required, in many cases of scientific inquiry, to satisfy methodological norms, to develop theoretical concepts, or to validate the results of inquiry as scientific knowledge. So scientific knowledge-…
The search for the hematopoietic stem cell
The Stem Cell Uncertainty Principle
Stem cells are defined as having capacities for both self-renewal and differentiation. Many different entities satisfy this working definition. I show that this general stem cell concept is relative to a cell lineage, temporal duration, and characters of interest. Experiments specify values for these variables. So claims about stem cells must be understood in terms of experimental methods used to identify them. Furthermore, the stem cell concept …
Fleck and the social constitution of scientific objectivity
Interventionist Omissions
It is widely assumed that mechanistic explanations are causal explanations. Many prominent new mechanists endorse interventionism as the correct analysis of explanatory causal models in biology and other fields. This article argues that interventionism is not entirely satisfactory in this regard. A case study of Jacob and Monod’s operon model shows that at least some important mechanistic explanations in biology present significant contrasts with…
Social Construction Revisited
Philosophy of scientific practice aims to critically evaluate as well as describe scientific inquiry. Epistemic norms are required for such evaluation. Social constructivism is widely thought to oppose this critical project. I argue, however, that one variety of social constructivism, focused on epistemic justification, can be a basis for critical epistemology of scientific practice, while normative accounts that reject this variety of social con…
The search for the hematopoietic stem cell
Fleck and the social constitution of scientific objectivity
Social Construction Revisited
Philosophy of scientific practice aims to critically evaluate as well as describe scientific inquiry. Epistemic norms are required for such evaluation. Social constructivism is widely thought to oppose this critical project. I argue, however, that one variety of social constructivism, focused on epistemic justification, can be a basis for critical epistemology of scientific practice, while normative accounts that reject this variety of social con…
Is There Collective Scientific Knowledge? Arguments From Explanation
Journal Article Is there Collective Scientific Knowledge? Arguments from Explanation Get access Melinda Bonnie Fagan Melinda Bonnie Fagan Rice University, Houston, Texas Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 61, Issue 243, April 2011, Pages 247–269, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.676.x Published: 14 July 2010
The Joint Account of Mechanistic Explanation
Many explanations in molecular biology, neuroscience, and other fields of experimental biology describe mechanisms underlying phenomena of interest. These mechanistic explanations (MEx) account for higher-level phenomena in terms of causally active parts and their spatiotemporal organization. What makes such a mechanistic description explanatory? The best-developed answer, Craver's causal-mechanical account, has several weaknesses. It does not fu…
Collective Scientific Knowledge
Philosophical debates about collective scientific knowledge concern two distinct theses: (1) groups are necessary to produce scientific knowledge, and (2) groups have scientific knowledge in their own right. Thesis (1) has strong support. Groups are required, in many cases of scientific inquiry, to satisfy methodological norms, to develop theoretical concepts, or to validate the results of inquiry as scientific knowledge. So scientific knowledge-…
The Stem Cell Uncertainty Principle
Stem cells are defined as having capacities for both self-renewal and differentiation. Many different entities satisfy this working definition. I show that this general stem cell concept is relative to a cell lineage, temporal duration, and characters of interest. Experiments specify values for these variables. So claims about stem cells must be understood in terms of experimental methods used to identify them. Furthermore, the stem cell concept …
Collaborative explanation and biological mechanisms
Stem cells and systems models
Generative models
Interventionist Omissions
It is widely assumed that mechanistic explanations are causal explanations. Many prominent new mechanists endorse interventionism as the correct analysis of explanatory causal models in biology and other fields. This article argues that interventionism is not entirely satisfactory in this regard. A case study of Jacob and Monod’s operon model shows that at least some important mechanistic explanations in biology present significant contrasts with…
Epigenetic lacunae
Immunology and Population Health
Immunology is a notoriously complex field with distinct concepts and terminology. Yet immunologists regularly and effectively collaborate with other researchers, notably clinicians and experts in population health. How does such “collaboration without convergence” work? This paper offers an answer. Immunology exhibits three features that support collaboration in the absence of major consensus on theories, methods, or concepts. These are a multifa…
Epistemology (11 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Computer Science (9 works) · Sociology (8 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (7 works) · Psychology (7 works) · Cognitive science (5 works) · Gene Regulatory Network Analysis (5 works) · Biology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works)