Julia Markovits
Biographic Data
| ID | 1098568 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Julia Markovits |
| GIVEN NAMES | Julia |
| FAMILY NAME | Markovits |
| SIGNATURE | MARKOVITS J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Cornell University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2147-3101 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 53 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
On who may be blameworthy, and how: Comments on Elinor Mason’s Ways to be Blameworthy
On Sarah McGrath's Moral Knowledge
Reply to Sobel and Kearns
Précis of Moral Reason
Moral Reason
Julia Markovits develops a desire-based, internalist account of what normative reasons are-an account which is compatible with the idea that moral reasons can apply to all of us, regardless of our desires. She builds on Kant's formula of humanity to defend universal moral reasons, and addresses the age-old question of why we should be moral
Acting for the Right Reasons
This essay examines the thought that our right actions have moral worth only if we perform them for the right reasons. It argues against the view, often ascribed to Kant, that morally worthy actions must be performed because they are right and argues that Kantians and others ought instead to accept the view that morally worthy actions are those performed for the reasons why they are right. In other words, morally worthy actions are those for whic…
Moral Reason
Julia Markovits develops a desire-based, internalist account of what normative reasons are-an account which is compatible with the idea that moral reasons can apply to all of us, regardless of our desires. She builds on Kant's formula of humanity to defend universal moral reasons, and addresses the age-old question of why we should be moral
Acting for the Right Reasons
This essay examines the thought that our right actions have moral worth only if we perform them for the right reasons. It argues against the view, often ascribed to Kant, that morally worthy actions must be performed because they are right and argues that Kantians and others ought instead to accept the view that morally worthy actions are those performed for the reasons why they are right. In other words, morally worthy actions are those for whic…
Reply to Sobel and Kearns
Précis of Moral Reason
Acting for the Right Reasons
This essay examines the thought that our right actions have moral worth only if we perform them for the right reasons. It argues against the view, often ascribed to Kant, that morally worthy actions must be performed because they are right and argues that Kantians and others ought instead to accept the view that morally worthy actions are those performed for the reasons why they are right. In other words, morally worthy actions are those for whic…
Moral Reason
Julia Markovits develops a desire-based, internalist account of what normative reasons are-an account which is compatible with the idea that moral reasons can apply to all of us, regardless of our desires. She builds on Kant's formula of humanity to defend universal moral reasons, and addresses the age-old question of why we should be moral
Reply to Sobel and Kearns
Précis of Moral Reason
On Sarah McGrath's Moral Knowledge
On who may be blameworthy, and how: Comments on Elinor Mason’s Ways to be Blameworthy
Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Ethics in medical practice (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Action (physics) (2 works) · Citation (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works)