Katalin Balog
Biographic Data
| ID | 1099039 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Katalin Balog |
| GIVEN NAMES | Katalin |
| FAMILY NAME | Balog |
| SIGNATURE | BALOG K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Yale University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 28 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy 1
Jerry Fodor on non-conceptual content
Commentary on Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics
Commentary on Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics
Simple Mindedness
Book synopsis: How is our conception of what there is affected by our counting ourselves as inhabitants of the natural world? How do our actions fit into a world that is altered through our agency? And how do we accommodate our understanding of one another as fellow subjects of experience—as beings with thoughts and wants and hopes and fears? These questions provide the impetus for the detailed discussions of ontology, human agency, and everyday …
Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy 1
Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
Jerry Fodor on non-conceptual content
Simple Mindedness
Book synopsis: How is our conception of what there is affected by our counting ourselves as inhabitants of the natural world? How do our actions fit into a world that is altered through our agency? And how do we accommodate our understanding of one another as fellow subjects of experience—as beings with thoughts and wants and hopes and fears? These questions provide the impetus for the detailed discussions of ontology, human agency, and everyday …
Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
Commentary on Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics
Commentary on Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics
Jerry Fodor on non-conceptual content
In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy 1
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Analytic philosophy (2 works) · Contemporary philosophy (2 works) · General interest (2 works)