Tom Dougherty
Biographic Data
| ID | 1107385 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Tom Dougherty |
| GIVEN NAMES | Tom |
| FAMILY NAME | Dougherty |
| SIGNATURE | DOUGHERTY T |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8025-0330 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 42 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Social Scripts and Sexual Agency
Social scripts specify the normal way for people to interact in certain situations. For example, a social script for a restaurant conversation explains why the world over, these conversations take a similar form. I develop an account of how social scripts can structure people’s sexual agency—sometimes, for the worse. I show how people’s sexual agency can be constrained by the presence of a linear social script for heteronormative sexual encounter…
Morality and Institutional Detail in the Law of Torts: Reflections on Goldberg’s and Zipursky’s Recognizing Wrongs
Social constraints on sexual consent
Sometimes, people consent to sex because they face social constraints. For example, someone may agree to sex because they believe that it would be rude to refuse. I defend a consent-centric analysis of these encounters. This analysis connects constraints from social contexts with constraints imposed by persons e.g. coercion. It results in my endorsing what I call the “Constraint Principle.” According to this principle, someone's consent to a sexu…
Sexual Misconduct on a Scale: Gravity, Coercion, and Consent
To develop a theoretical framework for drawing moral distinctions between instances of sexual misconduct, I defend the “Ameliorative View” of consent, according to which there are three possibilities for what effect, if any, consent has: “fully valid consent” eliminates a wronging, “fully invalid consent” has no normative effect, and “partially valid consent” has an ameliorative effect on a wronging in the respect that it makes the wronging less …
Coerced Consent with an Unknown Future
It is hard enough giving an account of how coercion undermines the consent of someone who knows full well the consequences of her choices. But in the wild, coerced consent is even more ethically complex because people are often unsure or misled about what will happen if they refuse to consent. In this essay, I discuss how coercion can invalidate consent under conditions of imperfect information. To explain how consent is invalidated in this way, …
Disability as solidarity: Political not (only) metaphysical
Informed Consent, Disclosure, and Understanding
Affirmative Consent and Due Diligence
So far, the debate over affirmative consent policies is yet to explore the possibility that affirmative consent policies might have a rationale that is acceptable to adherents of both the Mental View and the Behavioral View. In this essay, I articulate this independent rationale: each of us has a “Duty of Due Diligence” to take adequate measures to investigate whether our sexual partners are willing to engage in sexual activity. But on the assump…
Why Do Female Students Leave Philosophy? The Story from Sydney
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Yes Means Yes: Consent as Communication
improve prevention. 2 In response, several
Aggregation, Beneficence and Chance
It is plausible to think that it is wrong to cure many people’s headaches rather than save someone else’s life. On the other hand, it is plausible to think that it is not wrong to expose someone to a tiny risk of death when curing this person’s headache. I will argue that these claims are inconsistent. For if we keep taking this tiny risk then it is likely that one person dies, while many others’ headaches are cured. In light of this inconsistenc…
Vague Value
You are morally permitted to save your friend at the expense of a few strangers, but not at the expense of very many. However, there seems no number of strangers that marks a precise upper bound here. Consequently, there are borderline cases of groups at the expense of which you are permitted to save your friend. This essay discusses the question of what explains ethical vagueness like this, arguing that there are interesting metaethical conseque…
Rational Numbers: A Non-Consequentialist Explanation Of Why You Should Save The Many And Not The Few
Journal Article Rational Numbers: A Non‐Consequentialist Explanation Of Why You Should Save The Many And Not The Few Get access Tom Dougherty Tom Dougherty The University of Sydney Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 63, Issue 252, July 2013, Pages 413–427, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.12047 Published: 18 June 2013
Yes Means Yes: Consent as Communication
improve prevention. 2 In response, several
Vague Value
You are morally permitted to save your friend at the expense of a few strangers, but not at the expense of very many. However, there seems no number of strangers that marks a precise upper bound here. Consequently, there are borderline cases of groups at the expense of which you are permitted to save your friend. This essay discusses the question of what explains ethical vagueness like this, arguing that there are interesting metaethical conseque…
Why Do Female Students Leave Philosophy? The Story from Sydney
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Social constraints on sexual consent
Sometimes, people consent to sex because they face social constraints. For example, someone may agree to sex because they believe that it would be rude to refuse. I defend a consent-centric analysis of these encounters. This analysis connects constraints from social contexts with constraints imposed by persons e.g. coercion. It results in my endorsing what I call the “Constraint Principle.” According to this principle, someone's consent to a sexu…
Informed Consent, Disclosure, and Understanding
Disability as solidarity: Political not (only) metaphysical
Rational Numbers: A Non-Consequentialist Explanation Of Why You Should Save The Many And Not The Few
Journal Article Rational Numbers: A Non‐Consequentialist Explanation Of Why You Should Save The Many And Not The Few Get access Tom Dougherty Tom Dougherty The University of Sydney Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 63, Issue 252, July 2013, Pages 413–427, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.12047 Published: 18 June 2013
Aggregation, Beneficence and Chance
It is plausible to think that it is wrong to cure many people’s headaches rather than save someone else’s life. On the other hand, it is plausible to think that it is not wrong to expose someone to a tiny risk of death when curing this person’s headache. I will argue that these claims are inconsistent. For if we keep taking this tiny risk then it is likely that one person dies, while many others’ headaches are cured. In light of this inconsistenc…
Vague Value
You are morally permitted to save your friend at the expense of a few strangers, but not at the expense of very many. However, there seems no number of strangers that marks a precise upper bound here. Consequently, there are borderline cases of groups at the expense of which you are permitted to save your friend. This essay discusses the question of what explains ethical vagueness like this, arguing that there are interesting metaethical conseque…
Rational Numbers: A Non-Consequentialist Explanation Of Why You Should Save The Many And Not The Few
Journal Article Rational Numbers: A Non‐Consequentialist Explanation Of Why You Should Save The Many And Not The Few Get access Tom Dougherty Tom Dougherty The University of Sydney Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 63, Issue 252, July 2013, Pages 413–427, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.12047 Published: 18 June 2013
Why Do Female Students Leave Philosophy? The Story from Sydney
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Yes Means Yes: Consent as Communication
improve prevention. 2 In response, several
Affirmative Consent and Due Diligence
So far, the debate over affirmative consent policies is yet to explore the possibility that affirmative consent policies might have a rationale that is acceptable to adherents of both the Mental View and the Behavioral View. In this essay, I articulate this independent rationale: each of us has a “Duty of Due Diligence” to take adequate measures to investigate whether our sexual partners are willing to engage in sexual activity. But on the assump…
Coerced Consent with an Unknown Future
It is hard enough giving an account of how coercion undermines the consent of someone who knows full well the consequences of her choices. But in the wild, coerced consent is even more ethically complex because people are often unsure or misled about what will happen if they refuse to consent. In this essay, I discuss how coercion can invalidate consent under conditions of imperfect information. To explain how consent is invalidated in this way, …
Disability as solidarity: Political not (only) metaphysical
Informed Consent, Disclosure, and Understanding
Sexual Misconduct on a Scale: Gravity, Coercion, and Consent
To develop a theoretical framework for drawing moral distinctions between instances of sexual misconduct, I defend the “Ameliorative View” of consent, according to which there are three possibilities for what effect, if any, consent has: “fully valid consent” eliminates a wronging, “fully invalid consent” has no normative effect, and “partially valid consent” has an ameliorative effect on a wronging in the respect that it makes the wronging less …
Morality and Institutional Detail in the Law of Torts: Reflections on Goldberg’s and Zipursky’s Recognizing Wrongs
Social constraints on sexual consent
Sometimes, people consent to sex because they face social constraints. For example, someone may agree to sex because they believe that it would be rude to refuse. I defend a consent-centric analysis of these encounters. This analysis connects constraints from social contexts with constraints imposed by persons e.g. coercion. It results in my endorsing what I call the “Constraint Principle.” According to this principle, someone's consent to a sexu…
Social Scripts and Sexual Agency
Social scripts specify the normal way for people to interact in certain situations. For example, a social script for a restaurant conversation explains why the world over, these conversations take a similar form. I develop an account of how social scripts can structure people’s sexual agency—sometimes, for the worse. I show how people’s sexual agency can be constrained by the presence of a linear social script for heteronormative sexual encounter…
Law (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Political science (8 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Free Will and Agency (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Ethics in medical practice (4 works) · Law (4 works)