David H Ucko
Biographic Data
| ID | 1112402 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David H Ucko |
| GIVEN NAMES | David H |
| FAMILY NAME | Ucko |
| SIGNATURE | UCKO D H |
| AFFILIATIONS | National Defense University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8449-7293 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 25 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 102 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 25 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
Counterinsurgency as fad
The counterinsurgency era that dominated American military discussion post-9/11 has passed. The desire to move on, particularly since the loss of Afghanistan in August 2021, has left unsettled a conversation on counterinsurgency that, both among supporters and detractors, was often dangerously narrow. Too hastily embraced and too rapidly abandoned, counterinsurgency generated false promises and then became the scapegoat for poor strategy. This ar…
The Insurgent's Dilemma
Despite attracting headlines and hype, insurgents rarely win. Even when they claim territory and threaten governmental writ, they typically face a military backlash too powerful to withstand. States struggle with addressing the political roots of such movements, and their military efforts mostly just "mow the grass"; yet, for the insurgent, the grass is nonetheless mowed--and the armed project must start over. This is the insurgent's dilemma: the…
Gray zone in red
With the United States having shifted its defense emphasis to peer and near-peer rivals, study of irregular warfare has likewise expanded its scope to applicable lessons for the strategic level, wi
Counterinsurgency as armed reform
Despite the emphasis in doctrine and academia that counterinsurgency is in its essence political, these operations are all too commonly discussed and approached as primarily military endeavors. Informed by the need to refocus counterinsurgency studies, this article revisits a foundational case of the canon – the Malayan Emergency – to discuss its political (i.e., not military) unfolding. The analysis distinguishes itself by emphasizing the diplom…
Deradicalisation and terrorist rehabilitation
In a memo written in the autumn of 2003, the then US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked his senior-most advisers whether the United States was truly winning the so-called ‘war on terror’. Rumsfeld wanted to know if ‘we [are] capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us’. Whatever came of this memo, it did not have any d…
Systems failure
Since 9/11, the United States has achieved notable gains against al Qaeda, and also Islamic State (IS), all while avoiding another mass-casualty attack at home. Yet, institutionally, culturally, and in its capabilities, the US government remains seriously ill-equipped for the task of countering irregular threats. Partly as a result, Islamist extremism shows no sign of being defeated, having instead metastasized since 9/11 and spread. Why, given t…
Violence in context
The malaise that the United States, and the West, have experienced in recent campaigns stems in large part from unclear thinking about war, its political essence, and the strategies needed to join the two. Instead, analysis and response are predicated on entrenched theoretical concepts with limited practical utility. The inadequacy of understanding has spawned new, and not so new, terms to capture unanticipated trends, starting with the re-discov…
Beyond theUnidades de Polícia Pacificadora
Ten years ago, in 2008, the Brazilian Government adopted a strategy to regain control over the favelas in Rio de Janeiro – the Pacifying Police Units (UPP). In spite of initial favorable results, the main threat, namely the Red Command (CV), fought back and by 2014 the UPP strategy was badly frayed. In order to defeat this threat, it is necessary to reconceptualize CV as a criminal insurgency and to pinpoint and address the social and political f…
Preventing violent extremism through the United Nations
In January 2016, late in his term as Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon introduced a Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE). The approach promised to bring balance to multilateral counterterrorism by adding much-needed focus on the drivers of mobilization into violence. Highly arguable in theory and with great potential against the online recruitment efforts of groups such as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the PVE agenda has nonetheless …
The People are Revolting’
Rather than win hearts and minds, authoritarian counterinsurgency is said to rely heavily on coercion. It has a reputation for effectiveness, if also for its amorality. Still, the research into authoritarian counterinsurgency is surprisingly lacking. By distilling common features from key cases, this article concludes that this approach goes beyond the indiscriminate violence that typically captures the imagination. Like their democratic counterp…
Can Limited Intervention Work? Lessons from Britain’s Success Story in Sierra Leone
Following frustrating campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western interventions are becoming more limited, with troops being deployed for short bursts and residual peace-building tasks being left to others. Although this approach limits exposure for the intervening government, it struggles to achieve meaningful political change. Examining the comparatively successful British intervention in Sierra Leone (2000–02), this article identifies the condi…
The United Nations and the Use of Force
When, in An Agenda for Peace of June 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali set out his vision for a revitalised UN after the Cold War, he offered a definition of UN ‘peacekeeping’ in which the insertion of o
Critics gone wild
The Western interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced a heated polemic concerning the merits and demerits of counterinsurgency - the operational approach underpinning both campaigns. The two books reviewed here provide a good summation of the arguments against counterinsurgency: it is not a strategy and will fail when mistaken as such; its theory does not make intervention and war significantly easier; and even the most successful count…
Introduction to the DDR Forum
Over the past two decades, international efforts to support the socio-economic adjustment of ex-combatants to the uncertain and often messy realities of post-war situations, have presented donor co
Beyond Clear-Hold-Build
Despite a highly uneven track record, clear-hold-build has remained a dominant, even universal, approach to counterinsurgency. Its prevalence is rooted in its incontestable sequencing of operations and the attendant promise of a linear path towards peace. Yet the appeal of this approach also makes it deceptive and possibly dangerous. Clear-hold-build is not a strategy and must not be mistaken for one, as it has been in Afghanistan, where it inspi…
Counterinsurgency in Crisis
By juxtaposing the deterioration of situations from the Iraq War against Britain’s celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment
The Violent Image
In The Violent Image, Neville Bolt seeks to redefine ‘propaganda of the deed’ for the twenty-first century. Bolt, a teaching fellow and research associate at King's College London, leans on his bac
Counterinsurgency in El Salvador
Following two frustrating counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a drive to find new and more viable ways of addressing irregular security challenges. In this effort, the 1980s' campaign in El Salvador has gained prominence, as it resulted in the defeat of the guerrilla adversary yet involved only a modest deployment of US personnel and resources. The use of history to search for models and precedents can be fruitful, but p…
The Malayan Emergency
Counter‐insurgency operations are notoriously complex and state militaries have often struggled to adapt to their particular logic. The overarching dilemma is that while counterinsurgencies are not
Peace-building after Afghanistan
Engagement in various forms of peace-building has increased dramatically since the Cold War, yet what is the future of peace-building in the aftermath of the troubled intervention in Afghanistan? This article argues that while many Western and allied governments will feel chastened by the experience in Central Asia, their impulse to ‘do good’ internationally will not altogether disappear. Instead, to avoid manage the complexity of future interven…
Lessons from Basra
Public and media attention over the ongoing Iraq Inquiry commissioned by the UK government in summer 2009 has focused primarily on Prime Minister Tony Blair's determination to involve the UK in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. But for Britain's role in international peace and security, the conduct of operations in Iraq and the circumstances of the British withdrawal in 2009 are likely to have effects as far-reaching as the initial invasion of the…
Nato at 60
As NATO turns 60 in April 2009, celebrations will be tempered by the continuing difficulties it faces in Afghanistan. The Alliance's first operation outside the Euro-Atlantic area has revealed a major gap between grand ambitions and actual capability. Central to this problem is the political disunity among NATO's member-states. The Strasbourg–Kehl summit may provide an opportunity to rethink what can most realistically be expected from NATO in te…
Innovation or Inertia
Militias, tribes and insurgents
Following its overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the United States was confronted with one of the most complex state-building enterprises of recent history. A central component of state building, emphasised in the literature yet given scant attention at the time of the invasion, is the process of political reintegration: the transformation of armed groups into political actors willing to participate peacefully in the political future of the cou…
Countering Insurgents through Distributed Operations
This article examines the emerging US Marine Corps concept of ‘Distributed Operations’ (DO) and its applicability to counter-insurgency. DO involves dispersing the force and empowering decentralised units so as to create a network of mobile, agile and adaptable cells, each operating with a significant degree of autonomy yet in line with the commander's overall intent. This concept's applicability to irregular campaigns is assessed with reference …
Innovation or Inertia
The People are Revolting’
Rather than win hearts and minds, authoritarian counterinsurgency is said to rely heavily on coercion. It has a reputation for effectiveness, if also for its amorality. Still, the research into authoritarian counterinsurgency is surprisingly lacking. By distilling common features from key cases, this article concludes that this approach goes beyond the indiscriminate violence that typically captures the imagination. Like their democratic counterp…
Beyond Clear-Hold-Build
Despite a highly uneven track record, clear-hold-build has remained a dominant, even universal, approach to counterinsurgency. Its prevalence is rooted in its incontestable sequencing of operations and the attendant promise of a linear path towards peace. Yet the appeal of this approach also makes it deceptive and possibly dangerous. Clear-hold-build is not a strategy and must not be mistaken for one, as it has been in Afghanistan, where it inspi…
Violence in context
The malaise that the United States, and the West, have experienced in recent campaigns stems in large part from unclear thinking about war, its political essence, and the strategies needed to join the two. Instead, analysis and response are predicated on entrenched theoretical concepts with limited practical utility. The inadequacy of understanding has spawned new, and not so new, terms to capture unanticipated trends, starting with the re-discov…
The Malayan Emergency
Counter‐insurgency operations are notoriously complex and state militaries have often struggled to adapt to their particular logic. The overarching dilemma is that while counterinsurgencies are not
Preventing violent extremism through the United Nations
In January 2016, late in his term as Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon introduced a Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE). The approach promised to bring balance to multilateral counterterrorism by adding much-needed focus on the drivers of mobilization into violence. Highly arguable in theory and with great potential against the online recruitment efforts of groups such as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the PVE agenda has nonetheless …
Critics gone wild
The Western interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced a heated polemic concerning the merits and demerits of counterinsurgency - the operational approach underpinning both campaigns. The two books reviewed here provide a good summation of the arguments against counterinsurgency: it is not a strategy and will fail when mistaken as such; its theory does not make intervention and war significantly easier; and even the most successful count…
Can Limited Intervention Work? Lessons from Britain’s Success Story in Sierra Leone
Following frustrating campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western interventions are becoming more limited, with troops being deployed for short bursts and residual peace-building tasks being left to others. Although this approach limits exposure for the intervening government, it struggles to achieve meaningful political change. Examining the comparatively successful British intervention in Sierra Leone (2000–02), this article identifies the condi…
Countering Insurgents through Distributed Operations
This article examines the emerging US Marine Corps concept of ‘Distributed Operations’ (DO) and its applicability to counter-insurgency. DO involves dispersing the force and empowering decentralised units so as to create a network of mobile, agile and adaptable cells, each operating with a significant degree of autonomy yet in line with the commander's overall intent. This concept's applicability to irregular campaigns is assessed with reference …
Introduction to the DDR Forum
Over the past two decades, international efforts to support the socio-economic adjustment of ex-combatants to the uncertain and often messy realities of post-war situations, have presented donor co
Militias, tribes and insurgents
Following its overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the United States was confronted with one of the most complex state-building enterprises of recent history. A central component of state building, emphasised in the literature yet given scant attention at the time of the invasion, is the process of political reintegration: the transformation of armed groups into political actors willing to participate peacefully in the political future of the cou…
Counterinsurgency as fad
The counterinsurgency era that dominated American military discussion post-9/11 has passed. The desire to move on, particularly since the loss of Afghanistan in August 2021, has left unsettled a conversation on counterinsurgency that, both among supporters and detractors, was often dangerously narrow. Too hastily embraced and too rapidly abandoned, counterinsurgency generated false promises and then became the scapegoat for poor strategy. This ar…
Counterinsurgency in El Salvador
Following two frustrating counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a drive to find new and more viable ways of addressing irregular security challenges. In this effort, the 1980s' campaign in El Salvador has gained prominence, as it resulted in the defeat of the guerrilla adversary yet involved only a modest deployment of US personnel and resources. The use of history to search for models and precedents can be fruitful, but p…
Lessons from Basra
Public and media attention over the ongoing Iraq Inquiry commissioned by the UK government in summer 2009 has focused primarily on Prime Minister Tony Blair's determination to involve the UK in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. But for Britain's role in international peace and security, the conduct of operations in Iraq and the circumstances of the British withdrawal in 2009 are likely to have effects as far-reaching as the initial invasion of the…
Gray zone in red
With the United States having shifted its defense emphasis to peer and near-peer rivals, study of irregular warfare has likewise expanded its scope to applicable lessons for the strategic level, wi
Counterinsurgency as armed reform
Despite the emphasis in doctrine and academia that counterinsurgency is in its essence political, these operations are all too commonly discussed and approached as primarily military endeavors. Informed by the need to refocus counterinsurgency studies, this article revisits a foundational case of the canon – the Malayan Emergency – to discuss its political (i.e., not military) unfolding. The analysis distinguishes itself by emphasizing the diplom…
Beyond theUnidades de Polícia Pacificadora
Ten years ago, in 2008, the Brazilian Government adopted a strategy to regain control over the favelas in Rio de Janeiro – the Pacifying Police Units (UPP). In spite of initial favorable results, the main threat, namely the Red Command (CV), fought back and by 2014 the UPP strategy was badly frayed. In order to defeat this threat, it is necessary to reconceptualize CV as a criminal insurgency and to pinpoint and address the social and political f…
Countering Insurgents through Distributed Operations
This article examines the emerging US Marine Corps concept of ‘Distributed Operations’ (DO) and its applicability to counter-insurgency. DO involves dispersing the force and empowering decentralised units so as to create a network of mobile, agile and adaptable cells, each operating with a significant degree of autonomy yet in line with the commander's overall intent. This concept's applicability to irregular campaigns is assessed with reference …
Innovation or Inertia
Militias, tribes and insurgents
Following its overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the United States was confronted with one of the most complex state-building enterprises of recent history. A central component of state building, emphasised in the literature yet given scant attention at the time of the invasion, is the process of political reintegration: the transformation of armed groups into political actors willing to participate peacefully in the political future of the cou…
Nato at 60
As NATO turns 60 in April 2009, celebrations will be tempered by the continuing difficulties it faces in Afghanistan. The Alliance's first operation outside the Euro-Atlantic area has revealed a major gap between grand ambitions and actual capability. Central to this problem is the political disunity among NATO's member-states. The Strasbourg–Kehl summit may provide an opportunity to rethink what can most realistically be expected from NATO in te…
The Malayan Emergency
Counter‐insurgency operations are notoriously complex and state militaries have often struggled to adapt to their particular logic. The overarching dilemma is that while counterinsurgencies are not
Peace-building after Afghanistan
Engagement in various forms of peace-building has increased dramatically since the Cold War, yet what is the future of peace-building in the aftermath of the troubled intervention in Afghanistan? This article argues that while many Western and allied governments will feel chastened by the experience in Central Asia, their impulse to ‘do good’ internationally will not altogether disappear. Instead, to avoid manage the complexity of future interven…
Lessons from Basra
Public and media attention over the ongoing Iraq Inquiry commissioned by the UK government in summer 2009 has focused primarily on Prime Minister Tony Blair's determination to involve the UK in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. But for Britain's role in international peace and security, the conduct of operations in Iraq and the circumstances of the British withdrawal in 2009 are likely to have effects as far-reaching as the initial invasion of the…
Introduction to the DDR Forum
Over the past two decades, international efforts to support the socio-economic adjustment of ex-combatants to the uncertain and often messy realities of post-war situations, have presented donor co
Beyond Clear-Hold-Build
Despite a highly uneven track record, clear-hold-build has remained a dominant, even universal, approach to counterinsurgency. Its prevalence is rooted in its incontestable sequencing of operations and the attendant promise of a linear path towards peace. Yet the appeal of this approach also makes it deceptive and possibly dangerous. Clear-hold-build is not a strategy and must not be mistaken for one, as it has been in Afghanistan, where it inspi…
Counterinsurgency in Crisis
By juxtaposing the deterioration of situations from the Iraq War against Britain’s celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment
The Violent Image
In The Violent Image, Neville Bolt seeks to redefine ‘propaganda of the deed’ for the twenty-first century. Bolt, a teaching fellow and research associate at King's College London, leans on his bac
Counterinsurgency in El Salvador
Following two frustrating counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a drive to find new and more viable ways of addressing irregular security challenges. In this effort, the 1980s' campaign in El Salvador has gained prominence, as it resulted in the defeat of the guerrilla adversary yet involved only a modest deployment of US personnel and resources. The use of history to search for models and precedents can be fruitful, but p…
The United Nations and the Use of Force
When, in An Agenda for Peace of June 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali set out his vision for a revitalised UN after the Cold War, he offered a definition of UN ‘peacekeeping’ in which the insertion of o
Critics gone wild
The Western interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced a heated polemic concerning the merits and demerits of counterinsurgency - the operational approach underpinning both campaigns. The two books reviewed here provide a good summation of the arguments against counterinsurgency: it is not a strategy and will fail when mistaken as such; its theory does not make intervention and war significantly easier; and even the most successful count…
The People are Revolting’
Rather than win hearts and minds, authoritarian counterinsurgency is said to rely heavily on coercion. It has a reputation for effectiveness, if also for its amorality. Still, the research into authoritarian counterinsurgency is surprisingly lacking. By distilling common features from key cases, this article concludes that this approach goes beyond the indiscriminate violence that typically captures the imagination. Like their democratic counterp…
Can Limited Intervention Work? Lessons from Britain’s Success Story in Sierra Leone
Following frustrating campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western interventions are becoming more limited, with troops being deployed for short bursts and residual peace-building tasks being left to others. Although this approach limits exposure for the intervening government, it struggles to achieve meaningful political change. Examining the comparatively successful British intervention in Sierra Leone (2000–02), this article identifies the condi…
Violence in context
The malaise that the United States, and the West, have experienced in recent campaigns stems in large part from unclear thinking about war, its political essence, and the strategies needed to join the two. Instead, analysis and response are predicated on entrenched theoretical concepts with limited practical utility. The inadequacy of understanding has spawned new, and not so new, terms to capture unanticipated trends, starting with the re-discov…
Beyond theUnidades de Polícia Pacificadora
Ten years ago, in 2008, the Brazilian Government adopted a strategy to regain control over the favelas in Rio de Janeiro – the Pacifying Police Units (UPP). In spite of initial favorable results, the main threat, namely the Red Command (CV), fought back and by 2014 the UPP strategy was badly frayed. In order to defeat this threat, it is necessary to reconceptualize CV as a criminal insurgency and to pinpoint and address the social and political f…
Preventing violent extremism through the United Nations
In January 2016, late in his term as Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon introduced a Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE). The approach promised to bring balance to multilateral counterterrorism by adding much-needed focus on the drivers of mobilization into violence. Highly arguable in theory and with great potential against the online recruitment efforts of groups such as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the PVE agenda has nonetheless …
Counterinsurgency as armed reform
Despite the emphasis in doctrine and academia that counterinsurgency is in its essence political, these operations are all too commonly discussed and approached as primarily military endeavors. Informed by the need to refocus counterinsurgency studies, this article revisits a foundational case of the canon – the Malayan Emergency – to discuss its political (i.e., not military) unfolding. The analysis distinguishes itself by emphasizing the diplom…
Deradicalisation and terrorist rehabilitation
In a memo written in the autumn of 2003, the then US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked his senior-most advisers whether the United States was truly winning the so-called ‘war on terror’. Rumsfeld wanted to know if ‘we [are] capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us’. Whatever came of this memo, it did not have any d…
Systems failure
Since 9/11, the United States has achieved notable gains against al Qaeda, and also Islamic State (IS), all while avoiding another mass-casualty attack at home. Yet, institutionally, culturally, and in its capabilities, the US government remains seriously ill-equipped for the task of countering irregular threats. Partly as a result, Islamist extremism shows no sign of being defeated, having instead metastasized since 9/11 and spread. Why, given t…
Gray zone in red
With the United States having shifted its defense emphasis to peer and near-peer rivals, study of irregular warfare has likewise expanded its scope to applicable lessons for the strategic level, wi
The Insurgent's Dilemma
Despite attracting headlines and hype, insurgents rarely win. Even when they claim territory and threaten governmental writ, they typically face a military backlash too powerful to withstand. States struggle with addressing the political roots of such movements, and their military efforts mostly just "mow the grass"; yet, for the insurgent, the grass is nonetheless mowed--and the armed project must start over. This is the insurgent's dilemma: the…
Counterinsurgency as fad
The counterinsurgency era that dominated American military discussion post-9/11 has passed. The desire to move on, particularly since the loss of Afghanistan in August 2021, has left unsettled a conversation on counterinsurgency that, both among supporters and detractors, was often dangerously narrow. Too hastily embraced and too rapidly abandoned, counterinsurgency generated false promises and then became the scapegoat for poor strategy. This ar…
Political science (24 works) · Law (22 works) · Sociology (21 works) · Political economy (20 works) · Politics (16 works) · Law (14 works) · Military History and Strategy (14 works) · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East (11 works) · Insurgency (8 works) · Economics (7 works)