Kazuhiro Ohnishi
Biographic Data
| ID | 11124294 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kazuhiro Ohnishi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kazuhiro |
| FAMILY NAME | Ohnishi |
| SIGNATURE | OHNISHI K |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2225-7777 |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Lifetime Employment Contract and Quantity Competition with Profit-Maximizing and Joint-Stock Firms
This paper studies two-stage Cournot duopoly competition with a profit-maximizing firm and a joint-stock income-per-unit-of-capital-maximizing firm. In the first stage, each firm noncooperatively decides whether to offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment. In the second stage, both firms noncooperatively choose actual outputs. The paper shows the equilibrium outcome of the mixed model and finds that the introduction of lifetime employm…
Strategic Commitment and International Mixed Competition with Domestic State-owned and Foreign Labor-managed Firms
This paper examines an international mixed model in which a domestic state-owned welfare-maximizing public firm competes against a foreign labor-managed income-per-worker-maximizing private firm. In the first stage, each firm independently decides whether or not to make a commitment to capacity. This capacity may subsequently be increased, but cannot be reduced. Hence, the firm's capacity cost is sunk and changes from a variable cost to a fixed c…
A Mixed Duopoly with a Lifetime Employment Contract as a Strategic Commitment
This paper examines the behaviors of a profit-maximizing private firm and a social-welfare-maximizing public firm in a mixed market model with a lifetime employment contract as a strategic commitment. The paper then shows that there exists an equilibrium in which the private firm enters into a lifetime employment contract with its employees while the public firm does not.
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A Mixed Duopoly with a Lifetime Employment Contract as a Strategic Commitment
This paper examines the behaviors of a profit-maximizing private firm and a social-welfare-maximizing public firm in a mixed market model with a lifetime employment contract as a strategic commitment. The paper then shows that there exists an equilibrium in which the private firm enters into a lifetime employment contract with its employees while the public firm does not.
Strategic Commitment and International Mixed Competition with Domestic State-owned and Foreign Labor-managed Firms
This paper examines an international mixed model in which a domestic state-owned welfare-maximizing public firm competes against a foreign labor-managed income-per-worker-maximizing private firm. In the first stage, each firm independently decides whether or not to make a commitment to capacity. This capacity may subsequently be increased, but cannot be reduced. Hence, the firm's capacity cost is sunk and changes from a variable cost to a fixed c…
Lifetime Employment Contract and Quantity Competition with Profit-Maximizing and Joint-Stock Firms
This paper studies two-stage Cournot duopoly competition with a profit-maximizing firm and a joint-stock income-per-unit-of-capital-maximizing firm. In the first stage, each firm noncooperatively decides whether to offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment. In the second stage, both firms noncooperatively choose actual outputs. The paper shows the equilibrium outcome of the mixed model and finds that the introduction of lifetime employm…
Business (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Industrial organization (3 works) · Labour economics (3 works) · Competition (biology) (2 works) · Corporate Finance and Governance (2 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance (1 work) · Cournot competition (1 work)